Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

399. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Kocher) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald)¹

Washington, November 26, 1956.

SUBJECT

• British Démarche Re Coalition Government in Laos

Arthur de la Mare, Counselor at the British Embassy, handed us today the attached “piece of paper”² containing a proposed United States reply to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma’s recent request for support of his plan for Pathet Lao participation in a coalition government… .

To acquiesce in the British proposal would in effect mean rescinding our letter of November 13, giving Souvanna the impression that our so-called “firm” positions can be altered relatively easily and need therefore not be taken seriously.

We believe we should continue to stand on our November 13 letter, and in this case should give a negative reply to the British demarche, for the following reasons:

1. We suspect that Holliday’s principal concern, that Souvanna will resign if his plan is not accepted and in so doing will blame the United States, is not valid. If we are correct in thinking Souvanna is bluffing, there is patently no cause to yield to his entreaties.

2. If, on the other hand, he does resign, we would indeed be faced with a prolonged Government crisis, but since the present Prime Minister has proven so unreliable and unsatisfactory from our point of view, the prospect of post-resignation confusion in Laos does not appear to us catastrophic. As for blaming the United States, we are not dismayed.

3. We know that the Cabinet is opposed to Souvanna’s plan for coalition government, and that consequently he would not be able to ram it through without some external influential backing. It seems, therefore, that the Prime Minister is seeking American support with which to bludgeon the Cabinet into acquiescence. By an affirmative response to coalition, the United States would undoubtedly weaken the now-strong stand of the nationalist leaders in the Cabinet and Assembly, and would enable Souvanna to execute an arrangement unpalatable to the Lao themselves. The Prime Minister is thus creating his own pressure for coalition.

4. Souvanna’s actions thus far lead us to believe that this dangerous concession to the Pathet Lao would not be his last. U.S. failure to stand firm against coalition at the present time would only facilitate his continuing down the garden path. We fail to see the logic of the British assumption that the U.S., through the leverage of its aid programs, could control the situation after coalition government when it may not be able to do so now.

5. Lack of American opposition to Lao compromise with the Communists, if known, would have unfortunate repercussions throughout Southeast Asia.

6. Assuming the Pathet Lao were willing to settle for coalition and failing that would break off negotiations, we consider no settlement better than a bad settlement. Laos would be in no worse position than it is now.

Recommendation

That you approve our informing the British that we cannot agree to their proposed American reply to Souvanna Phouma, and that we stand by our letter of November 13.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2656. Secret. Drafted by Byrne.
2. A copy of the British paper, November 26, is attached to the source text but not printed.
3. Sebald initialed his approval of the recommendation. He also wrote the following qualification: “but there should be a further thinking through of this problem with a view to finding an alternative solution, at the same time retaining flexibility. WJS”.