Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

395. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 20, 1956—7 p.m.

802. Reference Deptel 556.² Prime Minister late yesterday after National Assembly session gave me his reaction to letter of November 13 (Embtel 773³) carrying out instructions reference tel. Meeting was at my initiative (1) because of British Ambassador’s belief (Embtel 794⁴) he was about to resign largely because of American pressure, (2) my own feeling he should give me info on “political crisis” directly and, (3) his earlier remark (Embtel 778⁵) he wished discuss letter with me.

Souvanna’s comment was limited to but one of four illustrative developments which we would consider as jeopardizing Lao independence and thus possibly leading to re-examination US policy. He said he noted letter specified coalition “without elections”. I said I had added qualifying phrase on my own responsibility because I assumed that while we thought coalition unwise in any case, I did not see how we could oppose if coalition arrived at as result of elections and operation constitutional procedure.

PriMin then indicated key to settlement to PL problem was entry into govt of several PL representatives (including Souphanouvong) which he insisted could be arrived at in terms entirely consistent with maintenance Laos sovereignty and integrity. His arguments fell into two categories as follows:

(1) Souphanouvong and PL leaders not Communists and not under their control. In addition to fact that their behavior in Vientiane, oath of loyalty, etc., all supported this view, PriMin asserted (in reply to my query) that Souphanouvong’s family were free and at Sam Neua, that their persistent bargaining for more concessions was really due to fear of reprisals by RLG, and that intelligence report indicated subversion, infiltration and propaganda activity was diminished—and anyway was attributable to Vietminh, not PL. We must remember fear of reprisals kept alive by RLG agents continuing arrest PL here and there throughout past months.

(2) Admission of 2 or 3 PL leaders into govt would be based on written agreement PriMin could obtain, which would provide that in return for, and simultaneously with, admission of PL, there would be complete and unconditional restoration of Royal authority in two provinces and complete submission of PL effectives to RLG, with result they could be immediately removed from north and later subjected to screening, reindoctrination, and eventual incorporation of reduced number in ANL. Souvanna said there would be no expense to US beyond terms we had indicated in our aide-mémoire of November 6 (Embtel 731⁶) and PL would comply with RLG decisions on both civil and military integration. Whole problem would thus be settled at once, and he wished very much to have opportunity to try to put this through. If after 3 or 4 months it became clear that individuals, or former PL as whole, were acting disloyally and seeking to subvert country, they could and would be dealt with by RLG.

I asked whether this scheme would require approval of National Assembly. Prime Minister said, yes, it would.

In his presentation, Souvanna said with frankness and feeling that he had worked to limit of his resources for many months, that there was absolutely no material motive for him to remain in power, that his personal desires were quite to contrary. He had in fact so stated to Holliday that morning. He had now reached point where he could go no further without American support. If that support were withheld he would resign, and someone else—he did not know who—would have to take over. But he did wish to try solution in which he had faith, and which had now reached point described. His course of action depended on United States.

I told Prime Minister that I could not exceed my instructions, which were clear, as he knew, that I was not reflecting on his brother whom we could not know as he did but that it was most difficult for me or my government, in face of history of past several years, to believe PL were not Communist or controlled by Communists. Furthermore, this was not merely national problem but international one affecting US and others as well, which Prime Minister readily acknowledged. I went on to say I was not optimistic that there would be any change in our position but, as he had said he could obtain a written agreement, I wished to report what he said—and if he so desired, I would show him my message in advance so he could be sure his position was reported accurately. Souvanna said he did indeed want me to consult my government as without American support he could do no more.

I sent substance of foregoing to Souvanna in English, suitably modified in minor respects, with note saying I wished insure accuracy as promised. He has now returned text with note thanking me and agreeing it is accurate.

Comment follows in subsequent telegram.⁷

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2056. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, and Ottawa.
2. Document 393.
3. See footnote 7, Supra.
4. Dated November 20, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2056)
5. Dated November 16, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–1656)
6. Document 391.
7. Infra.