390. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
671. For many weeks we have pondered whether agreement will be reached with Pathet Lao, whether agreement having its origin in August communiqués would be better than no agreement, and what would be consequences if no agreement thus precipitating crisis. Our actions to date have been based on assumption agreement would be [Page 831] reached and should so continue. However, it may be useful explore questions posed above in view present uncertainties.
First question is do PL wish settlement or not. Reasons for assuming PL genuinely want settlement include following. Settlement even without RLG commitment to immediate coalition would bring PL measurably nearer to entering government, would increase their opportunities influence RLG policy both external and internal, would facilitate extension PL apparatus throughout country, would multiply opportunities for causing trouble designed alienate RLG from US and to bring about termination aid programs. Negative factor supporting thesis they want settlement is that under present bloc tactics of smiles, there is no real alternative as PL cannot be sure of same degree Viet Minh Chinese Communist support if fighting resumed.
One cannot exclude possibility, however, Communists desire preserve PL as separate and separatist force based in north. Factors supporting thesis PL may not want settlement are as follows:
PL have already achieved immediate objectives and had major successes in neutralizing Laos, in August rating contact Peking and Hanoi, causing trouble with US, albeit not to point of eliminating aid. If PL should mistrust RLG’s good faith in carrying out agreement, they might feel no advantage in reaching one. Furthermore, failure of negotiations would bring into open incipient government crisis, probably force Souvanna out of office and introduce interval of uncertainty with at least possibility that Petsarath, who is reportedly far to left and at heart not very friendly to West, might come into power.
Whether PL want or do not want agreement, their tactics as Communist-dominated group thus far fit either thesis. They have argued endlessly, probed every point in hopes of whittling away RLG position, sought sell same horse twice, avoided commitments themselves. Question arises, however, whether time continues be on their side. Longer settlement delayed, more time government has to organize internal security and prepare to counter overt and covert activity throughout country. PL will doubtless learn Prime Minister has now approved civic action program, will expect that with return Somsanith police program will be developed further, that ANL and auto-defense organization will be adapted to internal security tasks, and that other projects to cement loyalty to RLG (including Operation Brotherhood) will get under way.
Tactics government should follow are equally clear. Whichever their estimate of PL intent, they should make no more concessions. If PL instructed to reach agreement, there is no need for concessions to achieve it. If PL are instructed not to reach agreement, no concessions will bring it about. I put this to Souvanna directly yesterday and he said he would not concede anything. But he will not admit these PL [Page 832] are Communist dominated, said any Lao could tell me longer PL negotiators stay Vientiane more they talk and act like Lao, less they show signs of Viet Minh propaganda.
However, if PL do not come to terms there was and maybe still is danger that ANL would take military action (as it is reliably reported to favor). Souvanna, as he indicated in London, also leaned to this. French Charge tells me that he sought and received instructions from Paris which were to effect that if ANL were to act, it would be in violation of Geneva accords and France would have to reserve its position and avoid involvement its fliers, doctors and other ancillary services. However, if PL should be aggressor, French support to limit ability would of course be forthcoming. Prime Minister apparently concerned by this and British statements, and issued strict orders to ANL against provocations. Nevertheless, he has also taken view according Soulie that Geneva accords are vague and it is therefore difficult to maintain that ANL has no right to enter two provinces at all. (See also London’s 1894 to Department.2)
In conclusion I think it likely that agreement will be reached but that PL who have so long maintained position in north are not in hurry. Slowness of Souphannouvong in responding to Souvanna’s summons would so indicate as well as continuance present negotiating tactics. Given last August’s denouncement and fact that greater dangers for Laos are there and then created, I believe it is in our interest that negotiations should result in agreement provided no further concessions are made, particularly with respect to coalition. Furthermore, if agreement is not reached for some time yet it will probably benefit RLG more than PL. Finally, if talks were to break down, resulting fall of Souvanna Government, unsatisfactory as it is in some respects, would not be likely to lead to anything better and could result in something much worse. This means that I no longer think Katay has reasonable chance of coming to power in months to come, and also that I have been disappointed in some of attitudes attributed to him of late.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–3056. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Ottawa, and New Delhi.↩
- In telegram 1894, October 6, the Embassy in London transmitted British Foreign Office reports of Souvanna Phouma’s conversation in London with British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Nutting. (Ibid., 033.51J41/10–656)↩