Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

371. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, August 7, 1956—7:31 p.m.

129. Vientiane 166 repeated Bangkok 104 London 32 Paris 42 Ottawa 31 New Delhi Saigon Phnom Penh unnumbered.² We are disturbed at import Lao Government-PL communiqué. While declaration couched general terms and critical points obviously left for political military commissions we do not like statement neutrality made with Communist leader or mention coalition government. We note Souvanna’s protestations he will give nothing away and share your desire care be taken not give Lao impression we losing confidence in them (Vientiane 168 and 170³). Neverthless we believe necessary express our concern to Lao in order leave no doubt our position and possibly stiffen Lao to retrieve situation in future Government-PL committee discussions.

Appears to us communiqué considerably weakens Government bargaining position by giving in initial negotiations what Communists clearly wanted (as shown Souphannouvong’s opening statements re neutrality and Viet Minh organ Nhan Dan’s repeated assertions aim of negotiations was “peace and neutrality” and makes concessions going far beyond Geneva terms. (We do not wish undertake discussion pros and cons British and Commonwealth contention Laos will eventually turn neutral or neutralist; we do object however to public statement on neutrality which totally undefined and which can be exploited by Communist propaganda.) “Establishing friendly contact with neighboring countries” can only mean Communist China and DRV since Laos already has relations with other bordering states. “Abstaining from adherence to any military pact” imposes greater restrictions than Geneva which requires only such pacts conform UN Charter and cease-fire agreement.

PL on other hand made no concessions since they have long paid lip service to RLG ultimate right administer two provinces and Army, indeed ostensible Communist adherence Geneva required them do so. Further, PL in negotiations on detailed arrangements will undoubtedly ignore RLG concessions in communiqué demanding additional Government compensation for any slight yielding on PL part.

For Vientiane: Request you take appropriate occasion convey above to Lao Government, mentioning if you deem appropriate fact New York Times article datelined Hong Kong August 6 stated “Acceptance of terms by RLG was victory for pro-Communist movement”. Suggest you add we aware intense Lao desire reunification and high motivation RLG in attempting reach agreement with PL. Nevertheless US strongly hopes RLG will stand firm in detailed negotiations which are heart of matter. You should reiterate unwavering US and SEATO backing Laos but stress seriousness concern with which US would view arrangement involving for example coalition government without duly held free elections under RLG control or integration PL troops in such numbers or in such manner as to jeopardize integrity Army.

Moreover Free World would seriously question trip to Peiping made on Lao assumption communiqué synonymous settlement PL problem. Hurried visit to ChiComs when knottiest problems integration and restoration Government control two provinces still unresolved and PL position not clear would be regarded as unworthy Lao haste accommodate to Communists.

In discussing communiqué’s restriction military pacts request you state we trust this will mean no interruption Thai-Lao planning. You might also remind RLG we have not received promised French version Lao concept defense Laos.

Unless you believe following step would damage your working relationship with Soulie,⁴ you might at your discretion mention to Souvanna our inability understand necessity employ French Chargé as middleman in explaining Lao foreign policy to us in view our heretofore frequent and sympathetic contacts RLG officials.

For London: As foregoing indicates we were opposed British suggestion Lao issue neutrality statement (London’s 661⁵) but joint RLG-PL declaration (for which we assume British not responsible) renders our opposition academic.

For London and Paris: Request you convey our views joint communiqué and Peiping trip to Foreign Offices, omitting mention Thai-Lao planning and French role as interpreter Lao foreign policy.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–656. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Byrne; cleared by SEA, WE, and BNA; and approved by Sebald. Sent also to London and Paris and repeated to New Delhi, Bangkok, Ottawa, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
2. See footnote 3, Document 368.
3. Documents 368 and 369.
4. Reference to Soulie’s proposed role as an “honest broker” in explaining Lao neutrality to the United States; see footnote 5, Document 368.
5. Dated August 3, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–356)