Office of the Historian

355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

Washington, May 31, 1956—3:55 p.m.

1225. Vientiane’s 1531 repeated Ottawa 138 New Delhi 159 London 150 Paris Bangkok Saigon Phnom Penh Unnumbered.2 It is likely we cannot prevent Lao Government-Pathet negotiations without exerting excessive pressure and we concur we might only lose by trying: Our opposition to talks would be incomprehensible to Lao [Page 766] Government and would prove excellent plum for Communist propaganda.

You should continue however hammering on necessity Lao Government insist January 7 resolution be basis any negotiations with Pathets and on essentiality Government treat Pathets as dissidents not equals and as entitled settlement only on terms Geneva Agreements. Emphasize to Lao officials Pathets give every appearance being on defensive and anxious for terms (settlement). If so, to concede now on principles would be foolish abandonment clear advantage. You might also convey idea Government should be wary making concessions which might engage U.S. or oblige U.S. reconsider its policy toward Laos.3 For our position on integration PL troops for example, see Department’s 310 to Vientiane repeated Ottawa 134 London 2161 New Delhi 943 pouched other addressees.4

We too do not like Sam Neua as venue. Suggest you tell Lao Government it demeaning for them seek out Pathets on Pathet home ground and remind Lao Government of first armistice negotiations Korea at Kaesong, originally considered no-man’s-land but actually in Communist hands, which Chinese Communists publicized throughout Asia as surrender by UN Command. If as expected Government continues see no harm meeting Sam Neua, you should strongly support Lao Government making as big show as possible of its entry into area.

We concerned prospect both Katay and Savang may be out of country during upcoming negotiations with Pathets. Trust you can convey advisability at least one of these leaders remaining on hand provide required firmness Lao Government side.

Request you also take appropriate opportunities urge there be no let-up in auto-defense effort as result prospective talks since pursuit [Page 767] current Government auto-defense advantage can only strengthen Government bargaining position in these talks.

Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–2956. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Byrne, cleared by Young and Yost, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Ottawa, New Delhi, Paris, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok.↩
  2. See footnote 2, supra.↩
  3. In telegram 1544 from Vientiane, June 1, Blancké reported that in a meeting with Souvanna Phouma on June 1, he had made these points and also had expressed U.S. Government disapproval of Sam Neua as a potential meeting place. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–156)↩
  4. According to this telegram, October 20, 1955, the position was summarized as follows:

    “Provided Lao Government administration effectively restored immediately and Government has been able conduct free elections, U.S Government might consider limited integration Pathets into National Army if acceptable Lao Government and if National Army without direct ICC participation applied stringent entrance criteria Pathet applicants. Remainder would be demobilized. Lao Government might then make statement those unable find employment would be assisted in same manner as refugees. During election campaign Pathet troops would be confined certain areas as in Canadian plan summarized Vientiane 293 New Delhi 914 repeated Saigon Phnom Penh Ottawa Unnumbered being pouched London Bangkok Paris. We agree Canadian view Pathet integration should not be included as ICC recommendation.” (Ibid., 751J.00/1o–1455)

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