Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

224. Letter From the Ambassador in Cambodia (McClintock) to the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young)¹

Phnom Penh, December 29, 1955.

Dear Ken: Your welcome letter of December 16² arrived in good season as I received it just before Admiral Radford spent the night in Phnom Penh. In particular, the paragraph filling me in on the present feeling in Washington on the training problem was most helpful.

It is no secret to you, of course, that Admiral Radford like others in the Pentagon is anxious for us to have complete responsibility for training FARK if we are to receive the best returns from our investment in MDA assistance. I have always myself held this view. However, Admiral Radford added an interesting point which is that, so far as possible, we use adjacent training facilities, particularly in Thailand where large American investment has been made, as this will yield an additional increment in improving regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. Perhaps instinctively, our MAAG had already set the ball in motion in this direction by arranging for Cambodian General Staff officers to visit Thai military installations and see how U.S. training is being applied.

We will have to go slowly in this matter because of French sensitivity and because of the invariable Cambodian desire to get the sharpest bargain from their would-be friends. I shall not be prepared to formulate recommendations as to how to phase the French out and the Americans in until I have seen what the situation is following Sihanouk’s travels early next year, as well as the visits of his able Defense Minister Lon Nol to the Philippines, India and the United States. In the meantime, it would certainly be helpful if the Department could re-think its position so that by next Spring if I still think that U.S. training responsibility here is a feasible proposition, my present instructions which are presumably to plug for the Secretary’s formula can be modified. These will be difficult negotiations in any case but not, I believe, impossible.

All of us here are deeply appreciative of the kind of backstopping we are receiving from PSA and are exceedingly happy with the tender care given us not only by your good self, but likewise by Eric Kocher and Hoyt Price.

With best wishes to all of you for the New Year, plus

Cheers,

Rob

P.S. Since this was dictated, the Sangkum Congress on December 30 unanimously approved Prince Sihanouk’s policy of accepting U.S. military assistance. You will already have received our telegram No.³ with the report of Sihanouk’s highly significant remarks on training. This shows that my talk with him on the utility of American technical training and specifically the desirability of bringing in a tank training team has gone home. Likewise, I think it very significant that the Prince told the Sangkum gathering that, in effect, the French training mission was here only because Cambodian officers have no other foreign language than French. I think if we can on our side develop MAAG personnel who speak French and on their side Cambodian officers who speak English, the task of trading a French for an American training mission will be much facilitated.

. . . . . . .

This is about the longest P.S. of the outgoing year, but I did think you would be interested in this addendum.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, PSA Files: Lot 58 D 207, Cambodian Correspondence, Nov. 1954–Dec. 1955. Secret; Official–Informal.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. There is a blank in the source text at this point. Apparent reference to a portion of a conversation reported in telegram 734 from Phnom Penh, December 16. Sihanouk had been impressed with the training procedures at Okinawa during his recent visit there. Ambassador McClintock “added that I thought it would be exceedingly helpful to FARK if small training team of about 6 officers were invited to come to Cambodia on TDY to train FARK in use of armored weapons. Sihanouk thought this an excellent idea. I am asking MAAG to follow up immediately.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.11/12–1555)
4. A note apparently in Robertson’s hand at this point reads “very much so.”