Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

206. Letter From the Ambassador in Cambodia (McClintock) to the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young)¹

Phnom Penh, June 21, 1955.

Dear Ken: Your welcome letter of June 6² arrived at an apposite time since we are now in the initial phase of getting our negotiated aid agreements mounted in Cambodia.

As for MAAG, of course we regret General Lodoen’s inability to report as soon as had been expected,³ but I concur with you and Felix Stump that it would be well to wait for his arrival. I had sent my telegram from Hong Kong largely based upon Herz’ estimate of the situation which was valid, I think, in light of the information he then had at hand. However, with Colonel Moore, who is an excellent officer, as interim Chief, I do not feel we need worry until General Lodoen turns up. Meanwhile, Colonel Moore and I are in agreement that the July 15 deadline is impossible to meet if a sound survey is to be prepared, and Moore has already flagged this to the attention of CINCPAC.

I am making an extra copy of this letter which you may pass along to Livvy Merchant and George West on the French Desk since, as was to be expected, our French friends under cover are doing their utmost to sabotage our effort here. A case in point came to my attention this morning when I found that our tiny initial MAAG survey group had their airplane and interpreter taken away from them because they had made an end-use check and were given most insulting treatment this morning at the Cambodian War College by Colonel Leroy, who is the head of that school. However, these are problems which were anticipated, and I have no doubt we shall find the appropriate solution.

I intend to make local soundings as to the French attitude on Secretary Dulles’ formula which was presented on February 28. You will recall from your attendance at our meeting with the Cambodian Prime Minister that he expressed interest but not unequivocal assent; and in our after midnight conversation the same or the following day in Saigon between the Secretary, Ambassador Bonnet and General Ely, the French evinced strong disagreement with the notion that the formula could work.⁴ Since then from neither the Department nor Paris have I received any indication of the official French view on the training proposition of the Secretary. Meanwhile, emissaries from CINCPAC on the survey mission confirm my understanding that Defense will not touch the training issue with even an eleven foot pole.

This is as it should be, since no training of the Cambodian armed forces can be effective unless the Cambodians desire it. I am convinced that once our MAAG is in operation, they will manifest such a desire, and, in consequence, my consistent advocacy that we regard Cambodian sovereignty as the key to this problem will, I trust, find its justification.

May I say that the first elements of MAAG are splendid officers who have handled themselves with tact and intelligence. I am back-stopping them to the limit because we have an interim of lost months to make up.

With reference to the police training program, undoubtedly your letter of June 6 was written before you had seen the results of my negotiations initially with Penn Nouth and later with Tep Phan which produced a “firm request” for an FOA project of $640,000 to get this on the road. I hope that you and Ray Moyer and Clint Morrison in FOA, plus certain other friends, can see that this goes apace in Washington.

Likewise, your letter was written too soon for you to have profited by Martin Herz’ brilliant long despatch (No. 445 of June 7⁵) on the political situation here. I am sure that you will agree that with so small a staff we have had to direct most of our energies to the recent negotiations and to telegraphic traffic. However, I think Martin has done an outstanding job in a very short time in getting a firm grasp on an extremely involved and delicate political situation.

As for the British desire to install the Indians in Cambodia, this comes, as you must realize, from Eden’s IOUs given at Geneva. The Indians themselves are doing their best—or worst—to queer this deal because of the metaphysical attitude they adopt toward our aid agreements. I regret this because Parthasarathi is one of the most able and well-balanced young Indians I know, and his recent sorrowful soul-searching convinces me that in his own mind he is not convinced that his Government is right in raising objections to our MDA agreement. However, from the way the Indians are playing the game, and particularly so long as they leave their ubiquitous Third Secretary Mitra to be a fly in every ointment, their ability to influence Cambodian policy is steadily lessening. As I said before, I regret this because in the broad sweep of diplomacy in Southeast Asia I still firmly believe we should pit Indian influence against Chinese Communist expansion.

On the most recent flap, namely, the challenge to the Commission by Prince Sihanouk to stand up and be counted on our MDA exchange of notes, for tactical reasons I chose to remain aloof from the commission and found, as I expected, that the Indian and Canadian came to me. I hope this thing is going to be buttoned up satisfactorily with the compromise that the Cambodians (with whom I have counseled) will make a conciliatory statement which will not be objectionable to us. Just to prove the aphorism that “My strength is as the strength of ten because my heart is pure”, I am spending a long week-end in Bangkok to underscore likewise that we are not coaching the sovereign Cambodians nor exerting undue influence on the neutral International Commission.

If Walter Robertson has a moment to read part of these lines, I would not mind if you bucked a copy up to him.⁶

With warm regards, plus

Cheers,

Rob McClintock⁷

P.S. See the next sheet for an extraordinary protocol problem.

1. Source: Department of State, PSA Files: Lot 58 D 207, SEA, Cambodian Correspondence, Nov. 1954–Dec. 1955. Secret; Official–Informal.
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. General Lodoen was hospitalized and unable to reach Phnom Penh until August 1955, according to Young’s letter of June 6.
4. See Document 192.
5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/6–755)
6. According to a covering note, July 12, Robertson read this letter and the attached memorandum.
7. On the question of diplomatic dress at the coronation of the King and Queen of Cambodia, not printed.