104. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Laos (Yost) to the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young)1
SUBJECT
- SEATO Aid to Laos
Crown Prince Savang and the Lao Prime Minister2 have with increasing insistence during recent months raised with me, and since my departure with Mr. Blancké,3 their desire for more concrete assurances as to the character of aid Laos could expect to receive from SEATO in case of Communist attack.
The Prince has made it clear that when he speaks of SEATO in this connection he means primarily the U.S., with minor supplements from Thailand and Australia, since he considers French and British contributions to SEATO to be negligible. He has also stated flatly [Page 216] that, unless more concrete assurances of this kind can be obtained, Laos will conclude that SEATO offers only “paper” protection and will have no alternative but “to follow the path of Sihanouk”.
This last statement contains an element of exaggeration and blackmail but it would nevertheless be dangerous to ignore the state of mind which it reflects. Laos is on the point of being inundated with substantial Communist offers of collaboration and assistance, behind which will lie, either explicitly or implicitly, the threat of sanctions if these offers, with their attendant conditions, are not accepted. The degree of firmness which the Lao Government will show, in limiting this collaboration with their Communist neighbors to a point compatible with Lao independence, will depend very largely on their judgment of the firmness and effectiveness of U.S. support, including of course the support we would furnish in case of Communist attack on a larger scale than the Royal Army could meet.
The Crown Prince has not been explicit as to the exact form of “assurance” he desires. I firmly believe that he does not seek any “guarantee”, either public or secret, which verbally goes beyond the commitment we have already made in the SEATO protocol. What is desired are some concrete indications of the form and extent of military support which would be forthcoming in an emergency, approximately the same sort of indications which SEATO members receive through their participation in the work of SEATO military organs.
We had hoped this Lao concern could be met by the bilateral Lao–Thai military conversations which we encouraged. Experience has shown, however, that the Thais will not talk turkey without explicit SEATO backing. The bilateral talks have therefore in effect been broken off, leaving the Lao even more worried than before.
One way to meet this problem would be to invite Lao military observers to sit in on certain sessions of SEATO military committees or subcommittees. Before this could be done it would be necessary (1) to secure the assent of all SEATO members to such an invitation and (2) to ensure that the discussions which the Lao would “observe” would serve to encourage rather than to discourage them. I am very doubtful these two conditions could be met in the near future.4
As an alternative, I would suggest that the U.S. formally join in the hitherto bilateral Lao-Thai military conversations, first informing SEATO that we are doing so in response to a Lao invitation, that the conversations are purely exploratory and contingent, and that we will keep SEATO fully informed. It might be necessary also to include the French because of the presence of their military mission and their [Page 217] base at Seno. First, of course, the appropriate U.S. military authorities would have to decide what could be told to the Lao military, but in general I would suggest they be given only pertinent portions of such studies and plans as are made available to our South Asian allies through SEATO. Though these will doubtless be far less explicit, in stating exactly what aid Laos would get in case of attack, than the Crown Prince would wish, the fact that it is carrying on with the U.S. military conversations of this kind would in itself go far toward providing the required reassurance.
I have mentioned this matter to Admiral Radford and found him fully alive to the problem and to the importance of finding a prompt solution. He would, I believe, be receptive to a State Department recommendation along the lines suggested above.