The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting
Director, Bureau of the Budget, and Mr. J. Walter
Yeagley for the Attorney General, at the 243rd Council
meeting on March 31, 1955,3 noted
the Study contained in NSC 5515, amended
as set forth in NSC Action No. 1366–b,
and enclosed herewith as NSC 5515/1.
Because of the sensitivity of the information therein, this Study is
being given a limited distribution; it is requested
that special security precautions be observed in its handling and
that access to it be limited on a strict need-to-know
basis.
[Enclosure]
STUDY OF POSSIBLE HOSTILE SOVIET ACTIONS
Scope of This Study
1. This study, based on a report by a special subcommittee of the
NSC Planning Board,5 describes what possible Soviet action or series or
group of actions should leave no doubt in the President’s mind as to
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the need for taking
immediate military action to save the United States from the
consequences of enemy attack, or to postpone, lessen or prevent
imminent enemy attack.
2. For purposes of this study, the term “military action by the U.S.”
includes action ranging from lesser measures (such as mobilization,
redisposition of U.S. forces, a possible warning to the USSR accompanied by a limited
demonstration of force, etc.) all the way to actual hostilities. The
study is limited to consideration of the Soviet actions which might
be taken; it does not identify the sources or methods by which
intelligence or information of such actions might be derived, or
identify the precise nature of the military actions (war plans)
which might be taken. While refraining from dealing with the nature
of U.S. counteraction, the study nevertheless does not imply that
the U.S. response should necessarily be uniform in nature. The U.S.
response would have to be adapted to the danger to the U.S. inherent
in each instance, and might include actions other than military
measures.
3. Possible Soviet actions have been examined in terms of their
bearing on the imminence and probability of an attack on the U.S. by
the USSR. The possibility can not
be excluded that certain actions, obviously acts of war, might be
undertaken by the USSR without
warning, such as a declaration of war on the U.S., a Soviet military
attack on the continental U.S., or the detonation of a nuclear
weapon in the U.S. However, such acts are outside the scope of this
study, the purpose of which is to identify and anticipate Soviet
actions preliminary to an attack.
4. Possible Soviet actions preliminary to an attack upon the
continental U.S. are listed in the next section of this study under
three categories according to the degree of certainty or imminence
of such an attack.
5. There is no hard and fast dividing line between the categories of
possible Soviet actions. It is probable that Soviet actions
enumerated in category I would not occur in isolation from those
listed in categories II or III. The impression of simplicity and
precision given by the lists which follow should not be allowed to
disguise the fact that a difficult and complex value judgment would
be involved in determining the exact significance of certain of
these actions within the context of the general situation existing
at the time of their occurrence.
6. This study can be considered valid only in terms of the current
world situation and of Soviet capabilities as set forth in current
National Intelligence Estimates. As the world situation and Soviet
capabilities develop in the future, the significance of certain of
the Soviet actions considered herein will doubtless change.
Therefore, this study cannot be viewed either as a long-range or
all-inclusive guide.
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7. It is assumed that firm and conclusive evidence that the USSR had decided to undertake any of
the actions listed below would be equivalent to the occurrence of
the act itself. The order of listing in any category is not
necessarily an indication of priority. Moreover, it should be noted
that nothing in this study affects the mission of the Watch
Committee of the IAC, which is “To
provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government of
hostile action by the USSR, or its
Allies, which endangers the security of the United States.”
Possible Hostile Soviet Actions
8. Although as previously mentioned the possibility of total surprise
cannot be excluded, it is considered that Soviet actions immediately
threatening the safety of the continental U.S. would probably occur
against a background of increased international tension and a
drastic change toward an offensive posture by Soviet military
forces.
Category I
9. Any of the following specific Soviet actions should be judged in
and of itself as clear evidence that Soviet attack upon the
continental U.S. is certain or imminent:
- a.
- Penetration of the continental air control and warning
system by Soviet aircraft in a flight pattern indicating
attack upon the continental U.S.
- b.
- Introduction into or possession within the U.S. of a
complete nuclear weapon, assembled or unassembled, or of the
nuclear components of a nuclear weapon, of Soviet origin or
under Soviet direction.
- c.
- Soviet attacks against U.S. territories (Alaska and
Hawaii), U.S. possessions, the Pacific Trust Territory, the
Panama Canal Zone, U.S. armed forces or bases overseas.6
- d.
- Soviet attack against the countries or territories covered
by the NATO mutual defense
guarantees.
- e.
- Concentration of Soviet submarines in a postion and in
sufficient numbers to permit effective attacks on major U.S.
coastal target areas.
- f.
- Laying of Soviet minefields in approaches to U.S. ports or
in coastal shipping routes (an action regarded as
unlikely).
Category II
10. Any of the following specific Soviet actions should be judged as
clear warning that Soviet attack upon the continental U.S. is
probably imminent:
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- a.
- Soviet aircraft in a flight pattern capable of attack upon
the continental U.S. detected in the approaches to the
continental air control and warning system.
- b.
- Any concentration of Soviet submarines in the approaches
to the continental U.S. coast, particularly if accompanied
by the absence of substantial numbers of long-range
submarines from their normal stations.
- c.
- Extensive preparations by the long-range air force for
early offensive operations. A few, but by no means all or
conclusive, manifestations of such a situation might be (1)
movement of key atomic technicians to launching sites, (2)
extensive standdowns of long-range air units for maximum
maintenance, (3) unusual or increased logistical activities
under high priority to launching sites, (4) massing of
substantial numbers of long-range air units at forward
bases.
- d.
- Delivery of an ultimatum to the U.S. under threat of
attack.
- e.
- Soviet attack against any of the following: Japan, the
Ryukyus, South Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, the
Philippines, Australia, or New Zealand.
- f.
- Soviet attempts to smuggle weapons of mass destruction
into bases abroad where U.S. forces are located or into
areas under U.S. jurisdiction outside the continental
U.S.
- g.
- Soviet attempts to introduce into the U.S. or areas under
U.S. jurisdiction significant amounts of biological,
chemical or radiological warfare agents.
- h.
- Destruction, or attempted destruction, by Soviet sabotage
teams or indigenous communist teams under Soviet
instructions of key military or industrial
facilities.
- i.
- Soviet action to assassinate or to attempt to assassinate
key U.S. civil and military authorities.
Category III
11. Any of the following specific Soviet actions should be judged as
a possible prelude to Soviet attack upon the continental U.S., or as
creating a serious international situation which, through action and
counteraction, might lead to Soviet attack on the continental U.S.:
- a.
- Delivery of a Soviet ultimatum, under threat of attack, to
a NATO country or Japan,
including an ultimatum to remain neutral.
- b.
- Soviet or East German blockade of West Berlin; Soviet
blockade of Vienna.
- c.
- Soviet attack against Iran.
- d.
- Soviet attack against Yugoslavia.
- e.
- Soviet attack against Sweden.
- f.
- Soviet occupation of Finland.
- g.
- Soviet active assistance, either by the provision of
organized offensive armed forces or nuclear weapons, to Far
Eastern communist forces engaged in hostilities against any
area covered by a U.S. defense agreement, or area related
thereto.
- h.
- Setting up by Soviet-controlled or communist
party-controlled personnel of signal devices for the purpose
of directing bombing or guided missile attacks against the
U.S., Canada or Mexico.
- i.
- Organized armed insurrection in the U.S. by communist
party members or persons under Soviet direction (an action
regarded as unlikely).
- j.
- Distribution in the U.S. of previously cached weapons,
ammunition, explosives, or instruments capable of supporting
enemy attack or insurrection, by communist party members or
persons under Soviet direction.
