Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

140. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, August 16, 1957¹

Washington, August 16, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Wilson
• General Randall
• Major Eisenhower

Expenditure ceiling—Mr. Wilson presented a copy of his plan for the expenditures of the three services in 1958,² pointing out that the figures for the first half must not exceed half of those shown on the memorandum. He pointed out that the Budget Director had estimated slightly higher but that Mr. Wilson had instructed him to keep expenditures within these limits.

The President stressed that the only way to get into an area where we have a strong position with the Congress as regards budgets is to eliminate soft estimates. By the time the budget is down to the point where further cuts would be truly injurious, we can fight for our estimates.

The difficulty, in Mr. Wilson’s view of the procedures thus far, is that we have attempted to go on a “requirement of services” basis and settle it down as the early expenditure goes on. We sometimes have a poor shopping list and at the end of the year some monies are not expended. When Congress discovers these unexpected items, it chops on the following year. Expenditure is of course a separate matter from obligational authority. The President stated that before very long the backlog of unexpected monies will be eaten; therefore, expenditures and NOA will be the same.

In that connection, Mr. Wilson pointed out that fiscal year 1959 should wash out that backlog. The Army previously had some unexpected funds which were used for make-up for other services. The division of monies for 1959 will be the same as those brought forth in the NSC meeting of 25 July.³ The figures as shown for 1960–61 will be used, but more flexibility for planning will be allowed than was brought out at that meeting. In this connection, Mr. Wilson has required force levels from the services by September 10.

Discussion then lapsed into an analogy between the defense expenditure problem and that of mutual aid, with emphasis on the soft estimates. Mr. Wilson in this connection pointed out that on the foreign aid we will have to take a completely new look at what we will receive, what our requirements are, and what our allocations must be. The President mentioned parenthetically that he does not know how we will be able to get by with $620 million of defense support.

Mr. Wilson then expressed the opinion that he can see where we can save $150 million of mutual aid. Of course, this will involve by necessity President Rhee’s losing four divisions in Korea. The complication in this problem, according to the President, is that President Rhee is completely capable of cutting his forces entirely to the point where they are able only to maintain internal security and decide to abolish any idea of holding the front line.

Missiles

The committee for consolidation of IRBM No. 1 and IRBM No. 2 has been appointed. There will be no more of each type of missile ordered beyond a few for testing purposes. In this connection the President offered the opinion that if we had the missile problem to face over again—that is, if we were in the position we were five years ago—that he would institute an agency similar to the Manhattan District for missile development. The difficulty now is that of morale. From the way it is being handled in the press, it will appear that the Army and the Air Force are in a cat and dog fight over possession of the missile, with the Air Force emerging winner. This we know is not true since we are following plans which have been made of long standing. He went on to point out that the new IRBM will have as much of the Jupiter as the Thor. He emphasized the current morale problem of ground troops, again stating his conviction that ground troops at home will save this country in the next war and expressed his consternation at the reluctance of the Army to accept that as a role. He mentioned the pride of discovery which the Army has developed concerning the Jupiter and stressed it should not appear that we are deciding a great fight.

Mr. Wilson expressed the opinion that he was right in bringing the Army into the IRBM field since the developments at Huntsville had gotten quite far advanced. He agreed with the President that there will be at least as much Jupiter as Thor in the final IRBM. The IRBM was initially conceived as a “fall-out” of the ICBM. (That is, the ICBM would be a three-stage and the IRBM a two-stage rocket of the same design.) However, it did not turn out to be that simple and the fall-out from the 175-mile Redstone also resulted in an IRBM. The difficulty was that the group of German scientists located at Huntsville desired to get into longer range missiles. The Army’s viewpoint was that these missiles were really large mortars and that the Army was therefore going ahead and operating these missile units, even though on a sub rosa basis. He recognizes there is a large service morale problem which involves the entire future ballistic missile mission. (Mr. Wilson further allowed that he had previous experience with a bunch of inventors.)

The Army Missile Program

Mr. Wilson then brought up the subject of the Army missile program which had been treated in the discussion of August 12.⁴ He expressed the feeling that if we had sufficient money we should let the Army go ahead with the modified Redstone. However, since the Redstone is becoming an obsolete weapon, Mr. Wilson said he “tends to choke” on developing it further. He recommends that the Army go ahead with a two-stage solid propellant missile, say 10,000–15,000 pounds, highly maneuverable. He states that it can be a good missile for the 200-mile range and does not know whether it can be boosted into the 500-mile range.

Again the President reiterated his statement of 12 August that the technical angles, which included cost and procurement, are not matters for the President. However, he reemphasized his desire that the Army not feel that it is forbidden to develop a good missile which has the capability of firing 500 miles.

Redeployment

Mr. Wilson brought up the fact that we still have not got all our combat troops out of Japan. One of the problems is where to put them, one of the solutions, of course, being to redeploy them home. His figures were that we can eventually redeploy 8,000 out of Korea, 40,000 out of Japan and 35,000 out of Europe, in view of the smaller divisions and the possible reductions in size of headquarters. In this connection the President said you can redeploy very easily so long as you don’t talk about it. Mr. Wilson expressed the opinion it would be difficult to keep this redeployment secret. However, he had every intention of keeping it secret until 15 September, the date of the German elections. The large trouble, in Mr. Wilson’s view, is President Rhee.

Proceeding further to the other services, he felt that he could redeploy 15,000 out of the Navy which will bring the total to about 100,000 redeployments from overseas. As to 1959, the plans there depend on what we will work out this fall. In summary, Mr. Wilson’s opinion is that the services could go to a figure of 2.5 million more and keep five divisions in Europe and two in Korea. He states that he still has to “make his sale” with the Army, who thinks they are one division short, Much apparently will come out of the meeting on 5 September between the Department of Defense and Secretary Dulles.⁵

Personnel

Mr. Wilson expressed satisfaction over the results of Mr. McElroy’s confirmation procedures before Congress⁶ and stated that Dr. Foote’s would go up to the Senate today.⁷ Mr. McElroy’s nomination had been reported out of committee unanimously except for a remark which Senator Byrd placed in the Record. The matter of concern to Senator Byrd is that “conflict of interest,” and involves a difference in viewpoint. The difference in viewpoint is that the Secretary of Defense, by one view, is not a procurement officer. A procurement officer’s is a technical job, and an old law requires that the procurement officer should have no interest in the contracting agencies. However, the three departments are separately administered, and whereas the Department of Defense may reach down into the services in exceptional cases, it is entirely possible for the Secretary of Defense to stay away from a situation which might involve a conflict of interest. With this last point Senate Byrd disagrees.

Disarmament

Disarmament was mentioned only briefly. Mr. Wilson expressed the hope that General Twining would take the same interest as Admiral Radford has taken.⁸ He deplored the press’ tendency to paint a picture of a conflict between State and Defense.

Personal plans

Discussion then went to personal plans of Mr. Wilson. He plans to be off on leave in the next couple of days, but will be ready to return at a moment’s notice. This is the result of the current embarrassment caused by many high officials of the Government being absent during the most heated period of the Congressional session. Mr. Wilson’s plans are to make the change-over at a time from late September to 10 October.⁹ He plans to make a speech for former Secretary of the Navy Thomas in California on 10 October. He then brought up the matter of the opportunity for the new Secretary of Defense to see the President at frequent intervals. The President expressed the opinion that is is better to stick with the policy that a Cabinet officer can delay any other appointment and can come to see the President whenever he wishes, rather than try to set a regular date for a meeting. Mr. Wilson mentioned the great aid it had been to him at first to be able to come periodically to make sure he was “in the ball park.”

In the matter of personnel, Mr. Wilson expressed the hope that Mr. Quarles may be prevailed upon to remain in the Defense Department. No trouble on this matter is anticipated at this moment. He also mentioned that Admiral Radford should be kept available if possible. However, the President stated that the fact that Congress had not kept him on permanent active duty makes it more difficult to make Admiral Radford available.

IRBM for UK

The next item discussed was the difficulty we are having in making good our commitments to the UK as regards the IRBM. On this subject the President was very familiar. The President was happy that he had been careful at Bermuda to tell Mr. Macmillan that the commitments to supply IRBM to Britain were not entirely firm because of the change in price and the difficulty of estimating for a product that is not yet complete.¹⁰ The President, however, did express dismay at the vast difference between the initial estimate and the figures that are being put forth now. Mr. Wilson then assured the President that the picture is not so bleak as the $149 million figure (over $78 million estimated cost to US) in the fact sheet of 15 August and feels that a cutback in spare parts may ease the problem somewhat.

Hardtack¹¹

When Mr. Wilson brought up the subject of Operation Hardtack, the President stated that this subject has him in a more awkward position than any other that he can think of. Here he is talking disarmament and at the same time planning a four-month period of atomic weapon testing which will involve twenty-five shots.

Mr. Wilson assured the President that of the twenty-five, only five were under the auspices of the Department of Defense.

He then went on to mention another item in cost figuring for guided missiles. The Defense Department, from its own point of view, gets warheads for nothing, since these are sent from AEC and are charged to AEC funds. However, the smaller the warhead the more expensive as regards the IRBM types. Therefore, Mr. Wilson will henceforth require all people in calculating costs of missiles to figure in the cost of the warhead as well. This is something which has not been done in the past and affected the Army’s optimistic figures as regards the cost of the 500-mile missile. The President acknowledged this proposal and felt that it was sound. However, he once again emphasized, in connection with the Army missile program, that a good weapon should not be taken away from the Army for the mere fact that it fires more than two-hundred miles.

John S. D. Eisenhower

Major, Infantry, US Army

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by John S.D. Eisenhower on August 20.
2. Not found in the Eisenhower Library.
3. See Document 133.
4. See the summary of conference, supra.
5. A memorandum of conversation of this meeting on September 5, 2:30–4:30 p.m., attended by Cutler, Secretary Dulles, several Department of State representatives, Quarles, General Twining, General Lemnitzer, and several other Department of Defense representatives, is in the Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, State Department.
6. President Eisenhower nominated Neil McElroy, president of Procter and Gamble, as Secretary of Defense to succeed Wilson.
7. Dr. Paul D. Foote, retired vice president of Gulf Oil Company, was nominated as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering). When the Senate refused confirmation because of possible “conflict of interest” problems stemming from his refusal to give up his Gulf pension or oil stocks, Eisenhower gave him a recess appointment until Congress reconvened in January 1958.
8. General Twining succeeded Admiral Radford as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 15.
9. Wilson formally left office on October 8.
10. Documentation on the meetings between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan in Bermuda, March 21–23, 1957, is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII.
11. See the memorandum of conference with the President, dated August 9, vol. XX, p. 699.