297. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, November 19, 19571
SUBJECT
- Arms for Tunisia
PARTICIPANTS
- French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau
- M. Louis Joxe, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ambassador Hervé Alphand
- M. Charles Lucet, Minister of the French Embassy
- M. Jean de la Grandville, Counselor of the French Embassy
- M. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor of the French Embassy
- M. Francois de Rose, Chief of the Treaty Section of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- General André Martin, Deputy for Air to the French Chief of Staff
- M. Albert du Chalet of the French Atomic Energy Commissariat
- The Secretary of State
- Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
- Mr. G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor
- Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary EUR
- Mr. Walter N. Walmsley, Deputy Assistant Secretary IO
- Mr. Joseph Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary NEA
- Mr. John N. Irwin, II, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
- Mr. B.E.L. Timmons, RA
- Mr. John Bovey, AF/N
- Mr. Matthew Looram, WE
Mr. Pineau said that he thought it would be useful to review briefly the background of the Tunisian arms issue, as he understood it, not so much to exacerbate a situation which is past, but rather in order to avoid similar difficulties in the future. The question of arms for Tunisia was raised with him in the first instance by a letter from the Secretary of State on September 14 in which the Secretary stated he was most anxious for France to deliver arms to Tunisia. If this were not possible, the letter stated, the U.S. would have to ask other European countries to supply the arms and failing this, the U.S. would have to deliver the arms itself in order to prevent Tunisia from obtaining arms from the East or the Middle East. Mr. Pineau stated that he had personally believed that the best solution was for France to furnish the arms itself and had accordingly tried to convince the Bourgès-Maunoury Cabinet to take this decision. The subsequent cabinet crisis played an adverse role in the whole matter, which, he said, he was the first to recognize. During this period the American Ambassador in Paris had frequent consultations with the [Page 765] French Government with a view to seeing if a solution could not be found which would avoid a shipment of arms from the East. Shortly after the formation of the Gaillard Government, on November 8,2 Mr. Pineau stated, he was informed by both the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors that if France could not act by November 12, the U.S. and U.K. would have to proceed themselves with the deliveries. There was one point that was obscure at that juncture, namely, whether the U.S. and U.K. would still feel obliged to fulfill their commitments to Tunisia and furnish arms even if the French Government decided to deliver them or whether French action would obviate U.S. and U.K. action of this nature. The French assumed that if they acted, it would be unnecessary for the U.S. to deliver arms. In view of the absence of the President of the Republic, it was impossible to have a cabinet meeting before Tuesday, November 12. At that time the French Government took the decision to deliver arms to Tunisia. However, immediately thereafter the Government was informed that an Egyptian shipment of 2,000 rifles destined for Tunisia had just left Alexandria. This development altered the whole picture, Mr. Pineau stated, as the purpose of sending arms to Tunisia was to avoid arms coming from Egypt. Moreover, it would have been impossible to have justified before the French Parliament and French public opinion a decision by the French Government to deliver arms to Tunisia if Tunisia at the same time accepted arms from the Middle East. Mr. Pineau accordingly convoked the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors immediately and requested them to urge their Governments to make a démarche to Bourguiba to reject the Egyptian offer. The U.S. reply was that such a démarche would not be appropriate and the U.K. said that it did not perceive objections to Egypt’s sending this particular shipment of arms to Tunisia. It was then explained that the purpose of deliveries from Western sources was that they should arrive prior to the Egyptian shipment, rather than, as he had always understood, to prevent an Egyptian shipment completely. Mr. Pineau stated that this factor was a most important point and was the basic reason why France did not deliver the arms.
The Secretary stated that our stand regarding the need for the West to supply arms to Tunisia was based on the principle that Tunisia was a sovereign nation entitled to arms and that it was essential that the Tunisian Government not be given the impression that it had been deserted by the West, which might induce the Tunisians to reorient their policies toward the East. The U.S. had been aware that a small gift shipment from Egypt had been planned, and President Bourguiba had indicated that it would be impossible for him to reject it. We had thus never expected that the Egyptian [Page 766] shipment could be prevented. The U.S. basic purpose had been first to prevent the Tunisian Government from concluding that the Western powers were concerting in an effort to block it from obtaining a reasonable supply of arms from the West and second, to effect the deliveries prior to the arrival of the Egyptian shipment. The Secretary stated, there had evidently been an additional misunderstanding on our part, namely, we had been given to understand that France would definitely make the delivery of arms itself without any special conditions other than the guarantees regarding use and nontransferability, which had already been discussed with Bourguiba. So convinced had the U.S. been of this that our arms had been unloaded from the planes. When it was ascertained that the French Government would not act on the matter, we had had to reload and a further delay had ensued. Moreover, Prime Minister Gaillard’s letter to the President had stated that the French Government would act only if no other powers furnished the arms rather than only if Tunisia did not accept arms from the East. This condition has seemed to the U.S. incompatible with Tunisian sovereignty. In any event, the Secretary said, it was recognized that there had been mutual misunderstandings, that the matter has created an adverse reaction in public opinion and that the important thing now was to look to the future.
Mr. Pineau stated that in this connection he had just received alarming news to the effect that the Egyptian arms had been unloaded at Tripoli and that 40 Tunisian trucks were required to transport the arms to Tunisia. It seemed to him that if 40 trucks were required, it was hardly a symbolic shipment, but involved much greater quantities than had been anticipated. He feared this would exacerbate the already strong feelings of the French public which the French Government was trying to appease rather than exploit, as had been wrongly reported in the press. The storm of protests by French public opinion resulting from the U.S.–U.K. decision had been even greater than the French Government had feared. It was essential to smooth over this matter, but frankly, Mr. Pineau said, it would take a considerable length of time for French public opinion to calm down. Moreover, he said, there were many adversaries of NATO in France who were ready to exploit such matters to our mutual disadvantage. He apologized for going into the matter of French domestic politics, but he thought he should set forth the difficulties of the present Parliamentary situation in order for the Secretary to be fully cognizant of the difficult situation in France. In the National Assembly there were 150 Communists, about 20 of the Left, such as Mendès-France, who looked for support from the Communists, about 70 nationalistic deputies on the Right and about 10 adherents of Mr. Soustelle. This made about 250 out of 596 [Page 767] deputies who could be counted on to exploit an issue which would weaken NATO. The principle which Mr. Mollet and he had long fought for in the Socialist Party and which had become the Party’s basic principle was the Atlantic Pact. If this matter of the arms could not be resolved before the next Socialist Party Congress, there was a grave danger that there might emerge a majority in the Party which would question this principle. It was thus essential, he said, to explore every means for smoothing over this difference and to restore in the minds of the French public the importance and validity of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Mr. Pineau stated that with regard to specifics, the essential task, he thought, was to see to it that arms delivered to Tunisia would not find their way to the Algerian rebels. The first and most important thing to be done was to assure that the arms requested by Tunisia and delivered to her were in fact in consonance with the number of soldiers Tunisia had and not in excess of her basic requirements. The greatest danger was that if in fact there were more arms than soldiers, the arms would then have to be stored and as a result could easily be diverted to the Algerian rebels. Secondly, Mr. Pineau requested that the U.S. urge the Tunisian Government to keep close watch on the arms and to give absolute guarantees as to their safekeeping. In this connection it might be useful if the U.S. were to supply the French Government with the serial numbers of the U.S. rifles delivered. Thirdly, it was important for the U.S. to hold up further deliveries pending the National Assembly vote on the Loi-Cadre and give the French Government an opportunity to enter into negotiations with the Tunisian Government on all matters outstanding. Within such context the French Government might be able to come to an agreement on the matter of arms.
In response to the Secretary’s question as to the French estimate of Tunisia’s justifiable requirements, Mr. Pineau stated that it was difficult to judge in view of conflicting reports from Tunisia as to how many units they intended to constitute. At first they had mentioned requirements for one battalion, but more recently they indicated requirements for units amounting to about 6,000 men. Of course, what was important in this estimate of Tunisian requirements was how many units were in being and not how many were on paper. It was true that up until now the French forces had found among the Algerian rebels only one rifle out of the amount that France had provided Tunisia. However, the rebels had received a vast quantity of British arms that had been taken from the depots in Suez and it was important that a similar situation should not occur in Tunisia.
The Secretary stated that he thought Mr. Pineau would be interested in the fact that Bourguiba had rejected the Egyptian proposal for shipping the Egyptian [Page 768] arms to Tunisia via an Egyptian naval vessel, which would have provoked a great deal of publicity on the arrival of the arms in Tunisia. Bourguiba had insisted that they be unloaded in Tripoli and brought in inconspicuously by Tunisian trucks. The Secretary thought this indicated a highly desirable point of view of the Tunisian Government to play down the Egyptian deliveries.
The Secretary said that he had no objection in principle to Mr. Pineau’s proposals. The U.S. had no desire to supply arms in excess of Tunisia’s basic requirements which might thus provide an opportunity for them to be smuggled to Algeria. … There was no reason why a mutually satisfactory understanding could not be reached on this matter, although the U.S. could obviously not prevent the Tunisians from obtaining arms from other sources, such as Spain, Italy or Belgium. Secondly, the U.S. would be willing to urge the Tunisian Government to take all necessary measures for safeguarding the arms. The Tunisian Government had already given us a formal and satisfactory commitment in this sense, but we would be glad to follow up this point. Thirdly, the U.S. had no plans for further arms deliveries for the present and was in agreement that an opportunity should be given for the French and Tunisian Governments to enter into negotiations. It was the U.S. hope that this would result in Tunisia’s looking to France for its normal source for arms. If a satisfactory arrangement could be made by Tunisia and France, the U.S. would no longer be interested in furnishing arms to Tunisia.
Mr. Pineau stated that in all this it was important to realize that the military situation in Algeria had profoundly changed during the last few months. A great many rebel units had been destroyed and more and more Moslems were coming over to the French side. The only important FLN military units now in existence were concentrated in Tunisia. Should these units, armed with weapons they had obtained surreptitiously from Tunisian depots, launch an attack on Algeria, the consequences could well be disastrous.
In response to Mr. Murphy’s question as to whether the French Government considered that there was actual collaboration between the Tunisian Government and the FLN, Mr. Pineau replied that there was a very fine distinction between overt Tunisian assistance to the rebels and clandestine help. There were presently FLN training camps, hospitals, etc. in Tunisia near the Algerian border. However, until now the FLN had only obtained contraband arms through Tunisia, and none of the arms that had been provided to the Tunisian Government.
In response to the Secretary’s question as to how the arms, presumably coming from Syria and Egypt, were reaching Algeria, Mr. Pineau stated that they came by many different ways, but the [Page 769] most important were via Libya and Tunisia and to a lesser extent through Morocco. All the arms which France had furnished Syria have since been shipped to the FLN and replaced by Soviet equipment.
In response to Mr. Pineau’s request for information regarding the size of the current Egyptian shipment of arms, the Secretary stated that the U.S. would also wish to have information regarding this matter and would in due course convey its substance to the French Government. The Secretary added, however, that the U.S. had no reason to believe that President Bourguiba intended to build up a big military establishment or act as an intermediary for the Algerian rebels in obtaining arms. In fact, his intentions in this connection have appeared far more modest than those of many of the Arab leaders who seemed to think that their prestige was dependent on the amount of arms in their possession. The Secretary accordingly thought that this would not constitute a problem and that Bourguiba would keep his military establishment to a modest level. Mr. Pineau replied that he hoped the Secretary was right, although he frankly did not share the Secretary’s confidence in Bourguiba. However, what he feared most was that the arms would find their way to the Algerian rebels, despite Bourguiba’s best intentions rather than with his concurrence.
Mr. Pineau stated that it was important that consultations be initiated immediately with the U.S. with a view to reviewing the whole arms problem for Tunisia and whether or not the current shipments that Tunisia was receiving were in effect in accordance with her requirements or in excess of them. He thought it was essential that a procedure for such consultations be set up now. This might be done in Washington through consultations between the French Ambassador and the Secretary.
The Secretary replied that he, for his part, agreed to setting up such procedure, although it would of course be necessary first to obtain British concurrence to this arrangement in view of the U.K. interest in this matter. He also made clear that the Tunisian Government would have to be consulted and that the U.S., the U.K. and France could not set themselves up as independent judges of Tunisia’s needs without creating a mutual resentment.
Although it was first agreed that a joint communiqué would be issued at the end of the meeting covering the discussion on the Tunisian arms issue, it was finally agreed, as the result of Mr. Pineau’s objection to the draft prepared, that no communiqué would be issued. Mr. Pineau stated that he would tell the press following the meeting that he had set forth his Government’s point of view with regard to the delivery of arms to Tunisia and that it had been agreed that a procedure would be sought to meet French preoccupations [Page 770] regarding the danger of diversions to the Algerian rebels. The Secretary cautioned Mr. Pineau in this connection not to say anything that might be misinterpreted and which might require U.S. clarification. An issuance of conflicting statements would only make matters worse. Mr. Pineau stated that he fully agreed.