Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

284. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, November 12, 1957—2 p.m.

2371. For the Secretary. Deptel 1786. Secretary’s message delivered to Pineau this morning at 11:30 Paris time.

Pineau had just come from restricted Cabinet meeting which he said had taken following decisions re Tunisia: French Government had decided that if United States delivers arms to Tunisia at this time France will not deliver arms to Tunisia. In this case, moreover, French Government will envisage ceasing all aid to Tunisia and would adopt entirely new policy. Reasoning behind this decision would be that if United States delivers arms to GOT, there would be no reason why United Kingdom, Spain and others (he said Spain had received Tunisian request for 6,000 rifles) would not deliver and total quantities would be far in excess of Tunisian needs. Under these circumstances it would be wholly impossible to obtain French Assembly approval for credits to Tunisia, part of which would be presumed as likely to be used for financing arms for Algerian rebels.

On other hand, Pineau declared, Cabinet had decided that if United States agreed not to deliver arms to Tunisia at this time, French would make such deliveries this evening November 12 from stocks now in Tunisia.

Pineau went on to explain, in his personal capacity and not as Foreign Minister, that United States decision to deliver arms to Tunisia regardless of what action French might take, had had most deplorable and dangerous effect. Some of his colleagues had urged that under these circumstances France not participate in NATO meeting next month. He himself felt that such action by United States would for second time defeat Algerian Loi-cadre in French Assembly, he being convinced that publicity on this issue had been responsible for its defeat in September. He said that he does not believe United States Government is fully aware how very grave a situation is being created by our proposed action in this case. He declared Prime Minister is drafting message to President Eisenhower which will be ready shortly and which he asked us to dispatch. He urged that in meantime I telephone Department and recommend that no further action on arms delivery be taken until this message has been received by President.

I explained again considerations which prompted our delivery of arms to GOT and particularly emphasized that it was only due to very long delay that we had felt obliged to commit ourselves to Bourguiba to deliver November 12 unless prior agreement had been reached between GOF and GOT obviating this necessity. Pineau reiterated that proposed French arms delivery this evening would in fact obviate that necessity. He insisted French had always been given to understand here and in Washington that United States would deliver arms to Tunisia only if France did not do so. I explained again that this had been the case until very recently, but that prolonged delay and imminence arrival Egyptian arms had obliged us to take firm commitment in regard this token delivery from which only GOT itself could release us.

Comment: We are transmitting separately Gaillard message to President.²

There can be no doubt that French are taking this matter even more seriously than we anticipated. They had supposed until my conversation with Gaillard over weekend that, if they delivered arms to Tunisia, we would not. They are therefore shocked to learn that we propose to deliver arms in any case, except in the unlikely event we are released from our commitment by Bourguiba.

While remarks about possible refusal to attend NATO meeting need not at the moment be taken too seriously, declaration of intention, in case we deliver arms, to cease aid to Tunisia and to follow “entirely new policy” should be taken very seriously. In view probable temper of French Assembly this might well be what French Government would be obliged to do whether it wishes to or not. Result would be to leave Tunisian baby entirely in our lap, as well of course as to create anti-American storm in France. Outcry would probably take line that we are “driving” French out of Tunisia and intend henceforth to help rebels drive them out of Algeria. It is difficult predict effect these emotions on Loi-cadre but Pineau’s estimate is quite plausible. In any case prospects of getting French to adopt liberal line in Algeria would be greatly reduced and chance of her accepting Tunisia as intermediary reduced to nil. Of course if Algerian Loi-cadre should be defeated on confidence vote, government would be out again and it is very difficult to guess when next one would be constituted and what would be its character.

I do not wish to seem unduly alarmist but frankly I find it impossible to exaggerate possible damaging effect of this situation. I realize extent to which we are committed with Bourguiba but cannot help but feel that it is not even in his best interest to press matter to this extreme.

I hope you may be able to send me message for Pineau this afternoon.³

Houghton

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/11–1257. Secret; Niact. Repeated to London and Tunis. Received at 10:36 a.m..
2. Transmitted in telegram 2382, November 12, not printed. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 1789 to Paris, sent at 12:48 p.m. November 12, authorized Houghton to inform Pineau that the United States was suspending its arms delivery to Tunisia on the understanding that France would provide an equivalent amount on the same conditions agreed to between the United States and Tunisia. (Ibid.) Secretary Dulles called Ambassador Houghton late that afternoon to convey the decision. Joxe was informed around 7:30 p.m. and he passed the word to Pineau at approximately 9 p.m. (Despatch 1069 from Paris, December 30; ibid., 772.56/12–3057)