282. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 11, 19571
SUBJECT
- Arms for Tunisia
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Herve Alphand, Ambassador of France
- Mr. Charles Lucet, Minister of France
- Mr. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor, French Embassy
- Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
- Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State
- Mr. William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State, NEA (for part of meeting)
- Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Assistant Secretary for AF
The French Ambassador called this evening at the Secretary’s request. The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that we were greatly concerned at the situation which is developing with respect to the furnishing of arms to Tunisia. He said that we are now giving urgent study to the problem and that he wished to consult the French in this matter. The Secretary then reviewed the history of our commitment to Bourguiba, recalling his last conversation with the Ambassador on October 18. As a result of that conversation, we had been successful in obtaining Mr. Bourguiba’s agreement to delay shipments until after the October 31 deadline to which we had been committed. Subsequently, we set a new date of November 12 on the assumption that a French Government would have been formed and had about a week to act on this matter before the shipments took place. Within the last few days, we had again talked to Mr. Bourguiba about the French desire for further delay, but for reasons which are surely persuasive, Mr. Bourguiba felt that he could not agree to a further postponement.
The Secretary went on to emphasize the lengths to which we have gone in this matter to accommodate the French, despite the dangers which we believe exist for Western interests in North Africa. He pointed out that all that is immediately involved is a token shipment of 500 rifles and 50,000 rounds of ammunition. The supply of these to Tunisia would be covered by the most explicit type of assurances, which we have already exacted from the Tunisian Government. The Secretary said that in the light of all these circumstances, he did not see any honorable alternative for the United States but to proceed as scheduled with the delivery of the [Page 743] token shipment on November 12. We would still strongly prefer, however, to do this in some way in concert with the French. He would therefore appreciate Mr. Alphand inquiring urgently of his government whether it would be prepared also to make at least a token shipment coincidentally with our own, or alternatively, authorize us to say that we are proceeding to make our delivery with the concurrence of the French Government.
Mr. Alphand said that he would of course put these points to his government. He emphasized that this problem presents very great dangers for any French Government for reasons arising from the Algerian rebellion, mentioning particularly the danger that the arms may wind up in Algerian hands. The Secretary intervened to say that he understood that Mr. Pineau himself had indicated before the French Assembly only a short time ago that there was no evidence whatsoever that Tunisia itself is supplying arms to the Algerians.
Ambassador Alphand acknowledged the correctness of the Secretary’s statement. He went on to say that he thought the best course under the circumstances would be for his government to assume responsibility for the shipment of arms to Tunisia. He assumed that under these conditions the United States would cancel its plans for delivery of the token shipment and any further deliveries to Tunisia.
After consulting his United States colleagues, the Secretary informed Ambassador Alphand that the nature of our commitments to the Tunisians were such that he did not believe that we could withhold the token shipment at the present time. Mr. Rountree pointed out that our agreement is to make the token shipment on November 12 unless the governments of France and Tunisia have meanwhile reached an agreement obviating the need for such action. We interpret this to mean that only a comprehensive agreement by France and Tunisia relating to arms which is completely satisfactory to both parties would obviate the need for United States delivery of the token amounts.
Ambassador Alphand said that this was completely contrary to his previous understandings. He had always understood that if France stood ready to supply Tunisia, the United States would withdraw. He was sure that his government was under the same impression. He said that under these circumstances he hardly saw how he could conscientiously recommend that his government ship any arms to Tunisia.
The Secretary indicated understanding of the Ambassador’s position, but emphasized our efforts to move in unison with the French and our continued desire to avoid the appearance of any split. He therefore hoped that the French Government would find it possible [Page 744] to associate itself in one way or another with our proposed actions. Mr. Alphand reiterated that he would inform his government immediately and try to let us have his reply by tomorrow.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/11–1157. Secret. Drafted by Palmer.↩