190. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
4744. Reference: Tangier 464 to Department.2 After hearing Savary’s favorable reply on the increased troop ceiling in Morocco I told him I had one question which I wished discuss with him. I said we felt this question to be important even though it was not the question of the moment but that it might become critical at any time. This was the question of our diplomatic relations with the new Moroccan Government. I said that we were continuing to deal only with the French and were following strictly the letter and spirit of the Franco-Moroccan agreements which left handling of diplomatic matters in hands of French for time being. I said that we were doing this despite continual, although informal, pressure from the Moroccans on our military to talk with them directly.
I pointed out to Savary that while we continued to deal solely with the French we realized that the Franco-Moroccan accords foresaw that Morocco would handle her own foreign relations. I said we felt it was important that when this time arrived the US be in a position to act very rapidly to recognize Moroccan competence in this field rather than delay so that other countries, such as the Soviet and satellite countries, might get in ahead of us. Savary agreed that this was important and said he would keep us closely informed of progress in this field. He said that this would be one of the first suggestions which would be taken up when negotiations are resumed in Paris at the end of next week.
I further mentioned to Savary that we had heard from Moroccans of the possibility that the Sultan might appoint a foreign minister without prior agreement with the French and I asked him what his views were on this subject. Savary replied that it was very possible that the Sultan would take such action. He said such an appointment had not been envisaged in the Franco-Moroccan accords but neither had it been specifically excluded. It was clear that the French would make no objection if the Sultan took such action. However, Savary pointed out that such action would not change the Franco-Moroccan agreement regarding the handling of foreign relations. He said that it was his understanding with the Moroccans that even if they should appoint a foreign minister of their own there [Page 527] would be no change in the handling of foreign affairs until the matter had been discussed with the French.
I then asked Savary what the situation would be regarding our bases after Morocco assumed control of their foreign relations. Savary pointed out that this was a more complicated issue because it depended not only on Franco-Moroccan agreement regarding the conduct of foreign relations but also on Franco-Moroccan agreement regarding defense, as the bases were an integral part of the defense of the area. Therefore, after the Moroccans had assumed control of their own foreign relations, base matters would still be subject to Franco-Moroccan agreement on defense. While he could not prejudge the future he thought that any discussions to do with our bases would almost inevitably be three power discussions between France, Morocco and US.
Comment: In view of above I think key words of reference telegram are last words in first paragraph, “Moroccans have assumed control foreign relations”. It is clear that mere appointment of foreign minister will not automatically mean that Moroccans have taken over control of foreign relations. We will keep in closest touch with Savary on this matter but I feel that in spite of reasons for prompt action in Morocco we should take no definitive action with Moroccans on this subject until we have had chance to discuss matter with French here in Paris. Savary has promised to see me promptly any time such an emergency arises. I feel it is also important once Moroccans have assumed control of their foreign relations that we continue to realize that base problems are a matter of the defense of Morocco which according to the Franco-Moroccan agreements interest both France and Morocco. France should in no event be cut out of any talks on bases until and if situation arises where Franco-Moroccan defense agreement gives sole control of this subject to Moroccan Government. I very much doubt that this will occur in any near future, i.e., within the next couple of years.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.00/4–1256. Secret. Repeated to Tangier and Rabat.↩
- Telegram 464, April 11, reported that while the French might prefer that a Moroccan foreign minister not be appointed as yet it was likely that they would either give in ahead of time or acquiesce thereafter. (Ibid., 771.00/4–1156)↩