Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

188. Telegram From the Consulate General at Casablanca to the Department of State¹

Casablanca, April 10, 1956—5 p.m.

239. The probable length of general strike on US military installations in Morocco called by UMT (our telegram 238)² is difficult predict. While union undoubtedly cannot provide financial support its striking workers long, near subsistence level on which most workers live coupled with menace of UMT terrorism provide compelling counterpressure. Strong-arm methods at transportation pickup points in population centers can be expected check effectively any return to work movement which UMT does not condone.

UMT has been under considerable pressure to produce wage and benefit increases for its workers on US bases. This is part of Moroccan’s independence heritage and has little to do with present wages, which may or may not be higher than the “Prevailing” wage. The conflicting reports which UMT has received and long delay in replies from US forces employing doubtful agency of French liaison mission have unquestionably antagonized UMT leaders. In addition the liberty of action which leaders give to their local organizations, in this case USBA, may have been responsible for action by USBA which was precipitate but which Seddik nevertheless felt he could not repudiate as he had in case of recent Atlas negotiations.

Calling strike at this time raises questions re role of Sultan in this matter. Following early March strike threat he had intervened with UMT to postpone action. It is unrealistic think UMT would dare seize upon Sultan’s temporary absence in Spain to thwart wishes they knew he still entertained. Explanation lies perhaps in understanding nature of UMT. It is the vehicle of mass worker-peasant uprising, a political more than labor organization. Its allegiance is vital to those who would hold power here. The Istiqlal and Sultan are well aware of this.

Irresponsibility on part of leaders of this movement, while easy to charge, is not necessarily valid in view of nature of colossus they are heading. There is no doubt however that recent developments here inevitably bring up the wisdom of relying so heavily on Moroccan labor for fulfillment of mission of US bases here. US negotiating position is complicated, as before, by the uncertain loyalty of French intermediaries, but interservice cooperation, apparently forged by present strike, seems considerably improved. The next step appears, as far as can be predicted, for US forces, once UMT indicates willingness open negotiations without pressure of strike to offer union contract similar to that recently granted by Atlas. This contract now in process of formulation by three services, will be negotiated with UMT by French liaison mission with US observer present. Exceptions taken by union to contract will, theorectically, be referred by French mission to US services who will coordinate their reply. Success of this cumbersome system appears remote but could succeed in event UMT, having tripped into this situation, is anxious make concessions to re-establish friendly atmosphere. This will require understanding by US however and aid in finding union a face-saving formula.³

Also to be considered is possibility Moroccans are seeking this method to plough through French intermediary for position from which direct dealings with US re bases can be had. Recent FLM willingness compromise in its role of sole interlocutor of union could then be expected evaporate.

Lamont

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 71156371A/4–1056. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, Tangier, and Rabat.
2. Telegram 238, April 10, indicated that the general strike directed at all U.S. military installations began on April 9 and was effective. The union was blamed for the strike and thus was expected to make the first move in reaching a settlement. (Ibid.) The Union Morocaine du Travail (UMT) was openly established on March 21, with Majoub ben Seddik as president and Taieb ben Bouazza as secretary-general. One of its components was the Union Syndical des Bases Americans (USBA). The governing agreement covering wages and other matters had been exclusively negotiated with France on January 22, and thus France had the responsibility for determining wage scales which the United States had the right to approve.
3. In telegram 168 to Rabat, April 11, the Department of State indicated that the labor impasse might damage vital U.S. interests or endanger U.S. personnel at a crucial stage in Morocco’s independence. Thus the Seventeenth Air Force (commanded by General Frederick Glantzberg) was given full authority to negotiate with the UMT and local labor authorities. (Ibid.) Representatives of all sides, including the French, USBA, and U.S. civilian and military personnel, met on April 11. Pending a permanent settlement of the issues, a temporary understanding was reached and the strike ended on April 13. (Telegram 241 from Casablanca, April 12; ibid.)