Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

318. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State¹

Damascus, January 8, 1956—10 a.m.

645. For R.² Deptel 498.³ Local press reports that Shishakli has recently been in Syria and that he is plotting coup with SSNP may explain uneasiness and suspicion of Iraq displayed by certain Syrian G–2 officers. Otherwise ArmAtt’s SA 932 and SA 936 adequately cover Embassy’s current information about SSNP plans.

In recent weeks and months Syrian Government has fallen more and more under influence of anti-western elements willing, if not anxious, to cooperate with Communists. Of these elements, most dangerous groups are composed of Army officers who do not openly espouse Communism, Russian model. Some call themselves Arab nationalists or partisans of ASRP. Others pretend to be adherents of Shishakli. All are amenable to Communist suggestion and propaganda, … and to Egyptian pressure… .

A struggle appears to be taking place in Syrian Army centering on person of C/S Shuqayr, with anti-western officers attempting to remove him against opposition of more conservative army element. Outcome of this contest may provide clearest evidence yet whether or not anti-western officers have secured effective control over Syrian army and therefore over GOS.

Should anti-western officers succeed, US may be faced with a Syria which for all practical purposes will be an unfriendly country subject to large measure of Soviet influence. Many Syrian politicians, both in uniform and out, apparently believe that after entering on slippery path of cooperation with Russians, they can stop wherever they please and return whenever they choose. This belief is danger not only to Syria but to many other countries as well.

The Embassy’s views on what the US could do by orthodox diplomatic procedures to improve US position in Syria have already been communicated to Department.⁴ Local situation has recently deteriorated to such an extent that protection of US interests may require that a thought be given to other methods. I therefore believe that plan outlined in ArmAtt’s two messages should be weighed to determine whether or not it responds potential US needs.

The following factors enter into an assessment of SSNP plan:

(1) Anti-west Syrian officers made great effort in Malki pseudo-trial to show that the US encouraged SSNP to overthrow GOS, and their efforts have had some effect locally. Should SSNP now attempt coup in Syria and fail, regardless of real US attitude US will inevitably be blamed, with unpredictable consequences. It is therefore in US interest either to discourage SSNP from any attempted coup or to insure coup’s success.

(2) Embassy does not know how far … are committed to help SSNP or vice versa. If … have promised help, any US decision should take into consideration probable effects of US attitude… .

(3) SSNP attempt might also have side effects in Iraq, in Egypt, in Israel, in the UN and elsewhere which we are in no position to evaluate.

(4) The anti-Communist record of … SSNP and of Shishakli give them outward basis for cooperation in anti-Communist coup in Syria. Estimate of the motivation of different elements, however, should include further information about Shishakli in last two years. Appraisal of leadership of SSNP, a quantity unknown to Embassy.

(5) A decisive consideration, of course, is capability of SSNP (A) to carry out successful coup and thereafter (B) to install and maintain (with western help) a government in Syria which will be genuinely cooperative with west. This capability involves SSNP relationships with more conservative Syrian elements; relationship between SSNP and Shishakli; extent to which SSNP plans are known to Syrian G2; how far SSNP, largely Christian in membership and based in Lebanon, will arouse Christian-Moslem antagonisms; numerical strength and strategic position of SSNP membership inside workings of SSNP; propaganda aspects of plan; help expected … from other countries; and related questions.

. . . . . . .

Information available here does not yet enable Embassy properly to evaluate SSNP plan. Rapid spread Left Wing influence in country, however, makes it prudent to consider carefully this or any other movement which holds out promise of improving situation.

ArmAtt … concur in foregoing.

Moose

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/1–856. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.
2. Presumably Rountree.

3. Telegram 498 to Damascus, January 4, requested Ambassador Moose’s comments on recent ArmAtt reports. (Department of State, Central Files, 121.832/1–456) Copies of the ArmAtt reports (telegrams SA 932 and SA 936) have not been found in Department of State files. Evidently in these telegrams, the Army Attaché in Damascus, Colonel Molloy, conveyed a report received indirectly of an SSNP proposal for a coup in Syria.

   On January 5, the SSNP proposal was discussed at an interagency meeting attended by Wilkins, Boardman, and others. During the discussion, it was pointed out that the proposed action would be very dangerous because of its poor chance of success and because an attempted coup would create further instability. It was recommended that the plan should be discouraged, and after additional discussion, all agreed that the United States should disengage from the proposal. It was decided, however, to defer sending instructions to this effect until Moose’s comments arrived. (Memorandum of conversation by Boardman, January 5; ibid., 783.00/1–556)

4. See Document 312.