Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

95. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Adams) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox)¹

Washington, November 21, 1957.

SUBJECT

• IO Comment on Collective Security Paper

IO will within a week or two be expected to comment on a paper on Collective Security prepared by L–Mr. Becker on the basis of a memorandum drafted by the Secretary, copies of both are attached, directed essentially toward exploration of the idea of an Article 51 Pact.² Mr. Owsley attended a working party meeting convened by L yesterday, and we are preparing IO comment, but thought you might like to know now of the existence of the project and of the Secretary’s interest in it.

[Attachment 1]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

#5

Washington, August 28, 1957.

1. There is a great need at this time that the free nations should take some further significant and dramatic step to advance the society of free nations along the path of law and order. This is necessary for several reasons.

One reason is the fact that the present system is inadequate. It will deteriorate and may fall apart unless it is strengthened.

Another reason is the fact that nuclear power, which now approaches the power of annihilation, should not be the weapons tool of individual nations but should be made to serve the interests of world order by becoming an impartial and effective deterrent to the international crime of armed aggression. It seems unlikely that this result can be achieved on a universal basis with the Soviet Union. But that makes it the more important that the free nations should set themselves to the task.

Finally, it is always incumbent upon the leadership of the free world to demonstrate a capacity to think and act creatively. We cannot safely stand still, with so much that needs doing. Positive action is necessary in order to counter the dynamic approach of Communism which seeks to build a world-wide international order of its own fashion.

2. Any new step should meet the crying need for (a) a more developed body of international law; (b) more solid and dependable processes for peaceful settlement of disputes; (c) a more effective and dependable system of international force to deter, and if need be resist, those who would violate agreed principles of law, and (d) the organization and control of armament, particularly nuclear weapons.

3. It was expected that some of the developments referred to in No. 2 above would be accomplished through the United Nations. The Charter prescribes certain basic principles of international conduct (Article 2) and contemplates a further codification of international law. It calls for the establishment of air, land and sea military contingents and facilities for the use of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security (Articles 43 and 45). It establishes procedures for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and created the International Court of Justice as the body to which legal disputes should normally be referred.

However, these Charter provisions have fallen short of practice of producing the desired result. This has been largely due to the abuse by the Soviet Union of the veto power and its influence in the organization in favor of stirring up disputes, not settling them. The collective security system contemplated by the Charter has never even begun to be established. Also it seems that the Soviet Union will block any effective control on a universal basis of nuclear, or other, weapons.

4. As a “makeshift” substitute the United Nations collective security system of free world nations has organized a series of collective defense arrangements under Article 51 of the Charter. There are 45 free world nations parties to such pacts which include the Organization of American States (OAS), NATO, SEATO, Brussels (WEU), Baghdad, ANZUS, and four United States bilaterals.

5. These arrangements are an important step in the creation of collective security, but they are inadequate in that:

(a) The parties do not uniformly understand and accept the proposition that these arrangements are in fact designed to promote collective security under law. Some of the parties regard these arrangements primarily as political alliances of the old-fashioned type;

(b) The arrangements are not uniform and the applicable international law is not adequately set forth;

(c) Except for the Brussels (WEU) Treaty, there is no control of armaments;

(d) There is no dependable collective mechanisms to assure the coming into play of the security elements;

(e) There is no rationalized approach to the problem of respective contributions to collective security;

(f) The situation is fragmentized by being reflected by a series of ten treaties, and some beneficiaries of present security treaties are not formal parties thereto.

6. Consideration should be given to attempting to bring together, in a new Pact or convention, all of the present free world parties to collective security pacts under Article 51, and any others which wish to join. It would:

(a) Set forth applicable international law as may be acceptable along the line of the United Nations Charter, but preferably going somewhat beyond this;

(b) Establish a consolidated scheme which, as between the parties would somewhat parallel the United Nations concept (Articles 43 and 45) of a collective security force and facilities, under the direction of a small council chosen to represent all the parties;

(c) Establish armaments control along the lines of our United Nations proposals, as far as applicable, and of the Brussels (WEU) Treaty;

(d) Establish procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes as between the members. These would supplement, and need not be in replacement of, arrangements already provided by OAS and NATO. These procedures should include use of the International Court of Justice.

7. It is obvious that such a program is far reaching and that many difficulties would be encountered. There would be the problem of the willingness of the present parties to mutual security arrangements to enter into a new arrangement. There would be the problem of relations with the United Nations. There would be the attitude of the Sino-Soviet bloc and of “neutrals”. There would be the question of fitting some, at least, of United States military power into a tighter international framework. There would be domestic political considerations. There may be lacking the sense of danger and urgency which is usually required to accomplish major political goals, although the state of the United Nations disarmament talks makes apparent the need for a constructive alternative.

On the whole, we believe that the need is sufficiently evident, and the prestige of President Eisenhower a sufficient asset, to justify at least preliminary explorations of this project.

[Attachment 2]

Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Becker) to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 3, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Collective Security Project

The Problem

In your Draft #5, dated 8/29[28]/57, you have suggested that consideration should be given to an attempt to bring together in a new Pact or Convention all of the present free world parties to collective security pacts under Article 51, and any others which may wish to join. In that same paper you have indicated in general terms the types of provisions that should be included in such a Pact or Convention.

Recommendations

1. That the immediate objective be changed from a single free world collective security arrangement to three regional collective security organizations, namely: OAS, NATO (including WEU), the Organization of Pacific States, and the Organization of African and Middle Eastern States.

2. That provision be made in each of the Pacts governing these organizations, respectively, for consultation through the regional councils or equivalent organs, in contemplation of joint or collective action by the regional organizations.

3. That in all other respects, each of such Pacts be negotiated or amended to conform to the requirements outlined in your said memorandum.

Discussion

Forty-four free world nations are parties to collective security pacts supplementary to the Charter of the United Nations. These pacts include OAS, NATO, SEATO, WEU (Brussels), Baghdad, ANZUS, and four United States bilaterals (Japan, Republic of China, Philippines and Korea). The parties to these pacts constitute a majority of the members of the United Nations, who cannot fairly be said to be located in any single “region” unless all of the world outside the Sino-Soviet orbit be regarded as such a “region”.

In Article 52, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, it is provided in pertinent part:

“Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of national peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, … .”

It could well be argued that the setting up of an arrangement or agency for dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security which has as participants a majority of the members of the United Nations, who, in turn, have territories located on every continent and bordering on every ocean, is not the creation of a regional organization within the meaning of Article 52, paragraph 1. Because of the express limitation on the activities of such regional organizations contained in Article 52, paragraph 1, a convincing argument could be made that an organization having a broader geographical function is impliedly prohibited by the United Nations Charter, since such an organization must of necessity be in the nature of a rival or rump United Nations. In my view, these objections are serious and an attempt to go forward with such a project despite them could be widely interpreted, even by nations friendly to us, as reflecting a United States determination that the United Nations should be replaced by a free world United Nations, leaving out the Soviet bloc nations and the so-called “neutrals.”

There are, however, certain alternatives through which a substantial part, if not all, of the desired objectives could be accomplished without exposing us to such a charge. Perhaps the best of the regional collective security arrangements now in existence is the OAS. The Charter of the OAS contains provisions which closely approximate the requirements laid down in your draft #5, save for disarmament provisions and a collective security force in being. If the Brussels (WEU) pact be read with NATO, the European collective security arrangements, as they presently exist, could be said to include both disarmament and collective security force provisions. Nothing comparable is to be found in existing collective security pacts in the Middle East and in the Pacific area.

As a point of departure, I would suggest, first, an attempt to consolidate our collective security pacts with the free world nations in and about the Pacific area into a single treaty. As far as existing provisions are concerned, this could be done with a minimum of revisions because of the almost identical language used in most of these treaties. In view of the necessity of renegotiation, however, thought should be given to the question of whether it would be advisable to suggest a regional arrangement comparable to the Charter of the OAS. Whichever is determined upon, the new Pacific Treaty would contain, in addition to provisions of the types suggested in your draft #5, a provision or provisions calling for the Council or other Organ established by the Treaty to maintain liaison and consultative relations with the corresponding Organs of the other regional collective security organizations, such as OAS and NATO (cf. Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance which would have to be expanded and strengthened). These provisions could be drafted in such a manner as to indicate that one possible result of such consultation could be joint or mutual action by two or more of the regional organizations.

Such relationships would not appear to be inconsistent with the provisions of Article 52, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, since it is a legitimate function of a regional collective security organization to keep itself informed and, if necessary, to take action with respect to aggression or other activities in other regions which may by chain reaction affect regional peace or security.

Simultaneously, or immediately thereafter, steps could be initiated to amend the Charter of the OAS and the NATO Treaty, as required, to make their provisions conform in substance with the new Pacific States Collective Security Pact.

The last gap to be closed would be the Middle East and Africa. In that connection, the optimum objective would be to negotiate a collective security arrangement containing provisions comparable to those contained in the pacts covering the other regional arrangements, while, at the same time, negotiating a political settlement or modus vivendi between the Israelis and the Arabs.

[Attachment 3]

Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the Legal Adviser (Becker)

Washington, October 7, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Collective Security Project

I have read your memorandum of October 3, commenting on my memorandum of September 29,³ on the above subject.

I suggest as a next step that you form a working group under your chairmanship to explore and develop the concepts put forward in the two memoranda. I would suggest that this working group be composed, in addition to yourself, of a representative from IO,S/P, EUR, FE, ARA and NEA.

This project should be treated as tentative and highly confidential.

John Foster Dulles⁴

1. Source: Department of State,IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Memoranda, General, 1957. Confidential. Also sent to Walmsley and Hanes.
2. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides for regional and international collective defense arrangements within the U.N. framework.
3. Presumably a reference to draft #5, dated August 28, Attachment 1 above.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.