81. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of
State1
Washington, September 11,
1957.
SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy with respect to Soviet Bloc Candidates in the UN
Discussion
In recent years, we have normally followed the practice of abstaining or
voting against Soviet-bloc candidates, depending on the circumstances in
each case. This has not usually prevented their election, the notable
exception being the Security Council, and it has created certain
problems for us in the pursuit of other objectives. (See attached
memorandum.) Our unwillingness to vote for the USSR has made it
increasingly difficult for us to argue convincingly that other members
should vote for China’s re-election to various UN bodies on which the permanent members of the Security
Council are traditionally represented. Moreover, it is to our advantage
to have the USSR represented on certain UN bodies, for example, the Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Committee on
Contributions. The Soviet-bloc candidate is sometimes, because of a
particular circumstance, a desirable addition to a technical body from
the standpoint of US interests in that body. Where Soviet-bloc
candidacies are uncontested and their success a foregone conclusion our
refusal to vote for them under any circumstances appears unduly rigid in
the eyes of other governments, particularly as the USSR and its
satellites do not follow a comparable practice with respect to the US.
In the case of Poland, our refusal to vote for Soviet-bloc candidates
appears inconsistent with our current policy toward that country. Such
problems as these have for some time cast doubt on the wisdom of our
continuing to follow a hard and fast line in this matter, and we twice
departed from our usual practice in 1956 by supporting a Czech for
Vice-President of the IAEA Conference
and Poland for election to the Economic and Social Council.
At the forthcoming General Assembly, the USSR will again be a candidate
for one of the vice-presidencies (as will the US, UK,
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France, and China) and presumably for
re-election to the Advisory Committee and the Committee on
Contributions. There will as usual be a Soviet-bloc candidate for one of
the seven main committee chairmanships. Czechoslovakia is a candidate
for election to succeed the Philippines on the Security Council, and
Judge Winiarski of Poland is a candidate for re-election to the
International Court of Justice. If the usual pattern prevails, all these
candidacies will be successful except that of Czechoslovakia for the
SC, where Japan is the rival
candidate.
Recommendations
- 1.
- That we vote for the USSR when it is a candidate for election to a
body on which the five permanent members of the Security Council are
traditionally represented or to a body where certain US interests
are served by having the USSR represented, subject to the
possibility of casting a negative vote, a blank ballot, or
abstaining if it is decided that circumstances make one of these
alternatives desirable in a given case;
- 2.
- that we vote for Poland where there is no rival candidate we
prefer unless we have special reasons for opposing the specific
Polish candidacy; and
- 3.
- that we abstain or vote negatively on other Soviet-bloc candidates
unless there are compelling reasons for an affirmative vote, in
which cases, the Department would decide on an individual basis
whether an exception to the general practice should be made.
[Attachment]
2
QUESTIONS RAISED BY US VOTING POLICY ON SOVIET-BLOC
CANDIDATES
FE has from the beginning (September
1953) expressed reservation about the policy of not voting for the
USSR in cases where the five permanent members of the Security
Council are traditionally represented because of the bearing of this
policy on our efforts to maintain unimpaired the Republic of China’s
standing within the UN as one of the
Big Five. In seeking the re-election of China to UN bodies, probably our most effective
argument with UN members who are
unsympathetic toward the Republic of China is that the five
permanent members of the SC are
traditionally represented. This argument becomes increasingly
difficult to use when it is
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generally known that we do not vote for the USSR in the same
circumstances.
The desirability of continuing this policy has also been questioned
in the case of the UN Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the UN Committee on Contributions, and the
Narcotics Commission, on the ground that some of our objectives in
these particular bodies are served by Soviet or Soviet-bloc
participation.
The U.S. Delegation to the Economic and Social Council in 1956 asked
for reconsideration of this policy on the ground that it interfered
seriously with the Delegation’s ability to negotiate acceptable
“slates” for the functional commissions and to secure the reelection
of China to these bodies.
This question also arose in 1956 in connection with our decision to
make exceptions and to support a Czech for Vice-President of the
IAEA Conference, as part of a
general agreement on the officers of the Conference, and to support
Poland for election to ECOSOC, in
view of changing Polish-Soviet relations.
It was raised again in 1957 before the spring session of the Economic
and Social Council. While EUR did
not consider the international circumstances at that time propitious
for any change in policy, it was agreed that this question should be
re-examined again before the 12th General Assembly.
Our policy of not voting for the USSR or Soviet-bloc candidates has
not in most cases, the notable exception being the Security Council,
prevented their being elected. Most UN Members believe that each geographic area in the
UN should be represented on its
various bodies and that the election of a country does not connote
approval or disapproval of its Government or its conduct.
With respect to the Security Council, US statements during the recent
GA debate on enlargement of the
Council commit us to accept the allocation of a seat to Eastern
Europe if agreement is reached on a suitable enlargement. The US
representative said in the debate that with the proposed increase in
the number of non-permanent seats, “it would be possible to provide
representation to Eastern Europe without denying equitable
representation to other geographic areas.” Within this context, he
said further that the US “would support an appropriate allocation of
all non-permanent seats in an expanded council.” The USSR had made
clear that it would not support any increase unless provision were
made inter alia for representation of Eastern Europe, which, in
informal discussions, it defined as including Yugoslavia but not
Greece, Turkey or Finland.
While agreement on the allocation of a seat to Eastern Europe would
not commit us necessarily to support the Soviet candidate for this
seat in an enlarged Council, it would certainly seem to preclude
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our supporting a candidate
from outside the area for this seat. We could of course abstain or
vote negatively on an unpalatable candidate from the area, but
active efforts to defeat this candidacy would not only almost
certainly prove futile but would undoubtedly be regarded generally
as contrary to the agreement allocating a seat to Eastern Europe,
except in the unlikely event of rival candidacies from within the
area.
Though our practice of abstaining or voting negatively on all
Soviet-bloc candidates is generally known within the UN, most of the votes concerned are by
secret ballot and therefore not likely, where the election of the
Soviet-bloc candidate is assured and there is no rival candidate, to
attract attention or receive widespread publicity. Moreover, many of
the posts involved are of such character that there is little public
interest in them.
