Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

79. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Walmsley) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague)¹

Washington, August 20, 1957.

Dear Mr. Sprague: As you are aware, considerable interest has been expressed in Congress and elsewhere in the United Nations Emergency Force as a possible prototype or forerunner to a multinational United Nations Force to deal with such matters as political disputes and actual or potential armed conflicts. A number of resolutions have been submitted in the House and Senate calling for the establishment of a permanent United Nations Force for these purposes.

The existence of various situations where the carrying out of observation or patrol operations by a United Nations body might either deter the outbreak of hostilities or facilitate the cessation of hostilities after they have broken out suggests that the UNEF experience might now constructively be built upon to augment the available tools for dealing with international disputes, particularly those in the non-Communist world.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, the Department of State is considering whether it would be desirable and feasible to sponsor or support a proposal in the 12th General Assembly for the development of a permanent UN force. The Department has developed some very preliminary ideas of a possible proposal for the establishment of a permanent force along the lines of the attached paper. You will note that the concept which we have in mind is very general in form; it is intended to be only a starting point for tentative discussions with other Departments of Government which might be concerned.

I would suggest that a discussion might be arranged between staff members of the Departments of State and Defense for the purpose of examining these ideas and, if they are found to have merit, of developing them further. If the eventual outcome of the discussions should be an agreed US Government position on the matter, we would propose that Ambassador Lodge should be consulted regarding the desirability of introducing an appropriate proposal in the 12th General Assembly. A decision could then be reached in the light of all available facts as to whether to take such an initiative, and if so, when.

I would appreciate it if you would let me know at your earliest convenience whether the Department of Defense would be prepared to nominate a member or members of its staff to enter into discussions such as I have suggested.

Sincerely yours,

Walter Walmsley²

[Enclosure]

³

UNITED STATES VIEWS REGARDING POSSIBLE UN CORPS FOR OBSERVATION, PATROL, AND RELATED FUNCTIONS

Governing Principles

1. Standing arrangements should be developed enabling the UN in appropriate circumstances to provide international military personnel to give “on the ground” support to efforts toward the pacific settlement of disputes by the General Assembly (or Security Council), including the patrolling of disputed boundary lines or areas, supervising and maintaining cessation of hostilities, and observing situations which threaten the maintenance of peace and security.

2. It would be neither a purely “paper” corps on the one hand, nor a large standing force on the other. It might most feasibly take material shape in the form of a UN Corps training center. This might be established within a “neutral” nation, such as India, Sweden, or even Switzerland, possibly by leasing or purchasing an already existing military school facility. Alternatively, it could be located in e.g. Canada, relatively accessible to UN Headquarters. A permanent cadre of UN officers, directly hired or seconded by Member governments, would constitute the permanent party. Member States would be eligible to detail a small number of officers and non-coms for suitable training periods, on a rotational basis. These cadres would return to staff and train elements of company or battalion size within the various national military establishments, such units to be equipped with UN helmets and armbands.

3. Upon call of the Assembly (or Security Council) various of these trained and earmarked units would be immediately available to carry out UN observation and/or patrol duties, the composition of a particular force to be guided by political and other desiderata.

4. It would not at this stage include personnel from the five permanent members of the Security Council, nor would the Security Council or Military Staff Committee have any supervisory role.

5. It would be stationed on the territory of a Member State only with the consent of that State. (This does not imply U.S. acceptance of the doctrine that the consent of a state is legally necessary for the entry of UN forces in any case not covered by Chapter VII of the Charter).

6. It would constitute new machinery, not a continuation of UNEF as such.

7. It would not be regarded as a continuation of efforts of the Collective Measures Committee or efforts under Article 43 regarding military forces for enforcement purposes, but rather as an adjunct of pacific settlement machinery under the Charter.

8. It might be known as “UN Corps for Observation and Patrol” (UNCOP), or possibly “UN Patrol”.

Organization

9. It would take the form of a new UN instrumentality, under the administrative director of a Chief of Staff named by the Secretary General with the consent of two-thirds of the Assembly. The corps would establish its own internal organization, TOs, equipment requirements, tactical doctrine, training and orientation curriculum, communications procedures, staff operations, etc. with assistance of experts seconded from Member States as requested, and with the guidance of an advisory committee of governments.

10. Training and indoctrination would focus on language, inter-unit coordination, observation and patrol techniques, and other special skills essential for a multi-national non-fighting military body operating under international directives.

Financing

11. Such a force could be financed either by the participating states, through the UN regular budget, or as a special budget. The US doctrine of logistical support for contributing nations, evolved after the Korean experience, suggests that the US might wish to assist financially, and rules out the first alternative. Moreover, such a force would clearly be in the US interest, and we should not leave the full financial burden to the lesser powers. The principle of shared costs should be followed, under the regular assessment scale.

12. The principal cost would be the acquisition and operation of the training center, and support of the permanent party. When units were actually on UN assignments, the UN would cover all expenses other than basic pay, uniforms and personal gear, including small weapons, which would be supplied by the contributing nations, who would receive appropriate credits against their assessments. The UN would pay a standard allowance to troops on patrol assignment. Where a nation furnished manpower but was unable to finance its equipment, a special working capital fund could be established to supply grants as appropriate. Costs would also include airlift and sealift facilities which countries such as the US would be called upon to furnish in actual operational assignments.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5700/8–2057. Confidential.
2. Wilcox’s name is typed in the signature block, but is crossed out by hand and Walmsley’s name inserted.
3. No drafting information is given on the source text; a typewritten notation reads: “State Department Draft, August 15, 1957.”