Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, January 3, 1957—7:42 p.m.

Gadel 85. Re Delga 405.²Dept has taken careful look at SC enlargement problem light developments to date and comments contained Delga 386³ and 405. Situation appears us as follows:

1. Standpoint US position SC, maintenance present size SC preferable any increase. However with new membership maintenance present size would leave geographic pattern representation clearly unbalanced for number areas and would present serious annual problem making choice among candidates Western Europe and for seat now occupied Philippines. Increase of two, if allocated Western Europe and Far East, would go far remedy unbalance particularly if stature states involved rather than number considered, and would leave US some margin of safety in SC. We understand Asians as strongly opposed increase limited two as British and French are against larger increase.

2. If we were consider larger increase, we could not accept three because would result in Latin America being least adequately represented which clearly not in our interest. Increase of four would not seriously threaten our position provided majority requirement can be kept down and provided fourth seat allocated LA, and would give Asians representation to which they consider themselves entitled. However, any increase beyond two increases chances election members unfavorable US position and management problem in SC. Would also disturb Europeans who fear further shift UN balance of power toward Asian-African bloc. Moreover, even if agreement reached on increase of four there no indication any increase would in fact take place view Soviet threat non-ratification. In this event US would have wasted bargaining position to no avail, and pressure those states anxious for increase would soon be directed toward US reach accommodation USSR on Chinese representation issue, which of course out of question.

3. We would therefore be reluctant consider four unless some reason believe Afro-Asian pressure on USSR could assure ratification. Similarly would be reluctant consider four if UK or French opposition so firm as indicate one or both would refuse ratify, since results would then not warrant split with them this issue.

4. Taking account these various considerations Department believes:

a) Delegation should vote against any amendment LA resolution for larger increase (1) provided most LA’s and West Europeans, including UK and France, prepared stand firm on increase of two, and (2) provided defeat Afro-Asian draft resolution assured. Afro-Asian draft presents serious difficulties, even if amended to refer only to non-permanent seats, since it almost certain resolution would result committee discussion, if not recommendations, on permanent members question, including Chinese representation. While result this tactic may well be adoption no resolution this agenda item, US by support increase two would have shown accommodating spirit and onus for preventing enlargement would be widely shared.

b) If on other hand LA’s prepared themselves amend, or accept amendment, their resolution to take account Afro-Asian demand third seat or if defeat Afro-Asian draft cannot be assured, Delegation should consult LA’s, UK, and France view to reaching agreement on increase of four with majority requirement of nine votes, fourth seat to be allocated LA’s. We could not accept required majority of ten or any rotation fourth seat.

c) Regardless size increase Delegation should continue make clear US will not accept Soviet condition regarding Chinese representation and that unless Soviets withdraw this condition no enlargement will take place. If UK and France strongly resist enlargement beyond two, US should point out possibility firm stand for increase of two will produce greater risk deadlock and thus eventual success Afro-Asian committee proposal. While US will resist committee idea vigorously, might be adopted despite our opposition, thus complicating questions Chinese representation, Commonwealth seat, and permanent seats generally. Therefore if US continues stand by increase two, believe reasonable expect UK and France give us full support re Chinese representation and permanent seats questions.

d) If defeat Afro-Asian text not possible, Delegation should make every effort amend this text so that committee’s terms of reference clearly confined non-permanent seats. With this amendment, Delegation should vote for resolution; otherwise it should oppose.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/12–2756. Confidential; Priority. Signed for the Secretary by Wilcox.
2. Supra.
3. Document 56.