Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

330. Memorandum From the Director of the National Security Council Secretariat (Boggs) to the National Security Council Planning Board¹

Washington, May 22, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Antarctica

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5424/1
• B. NSC 5528
• C. NSC Actions Nos. 1500 and 1705²
• D. Memos for Planning Board, April 18³ and 29, 1957
• E. Memo for NSC, “Interim Report on Antarctica”, April 26, 1957
• F. Record of Meeting of Planning Board, April 22, 1957³

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject⁴ and attached studies on “Establishment of a Condominium over Antarctica” and “Application of a UN Trusteeship over Antarctica,” prepared by the Department of State, are transmitted herewith for consideration by the Planning Board at its meeting on Friday, May 24, 1957, at 10:30 a.m.

Marion W. Boggs⁵

[Enclosure]

DRAFT STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON ANTARCTICA

General Considerations

1. Antarctica, comprising a vast continent and nearby islands, is not readily accessible even during the brief Antarctic “summer”, and much of it has never been seen or explored. It has little or no present economic value. However, it has considerable immediate importance for scientific purposes; our understanding of the physical structure of the world and its atmosphere will be materially advanced by data obtainable only in Antarctica. Moreover, Antarctica may have other potential values not now determinable, so that its importance could conceivably increase greatly with additional knowledge and new technical developments.

2. The existing U.S. policy on Antarctica, adopted in July, 1954 and amended in January, 1956, provided that the United States would not make a formal claim to any Antarctic territory, but would reserve and at an appropriate later time reassert all its rights therein. At that time, and in subsequent reconsideration of the policy by the National Security Council in 1956, the major emphasis of U.S. programs in Antarctica was placed upon scientific activities in support of the International Geophysical Year.

3. While Antarctica’s strategic significance appears to be remote, the arrival in the area of Soviet scientific expeditions in connection with the International Geophysical Year has aroused concern among our Antipodean Allies, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the United Kingdom, as to possible future Russian activities in that area… . Soviet expeditionary parties have already established scientific stations and semi-permanent installations in the area presently claimed by Australia, and there is evidence that they intend to remain in Antarctica after the International Geophysical Year.

4. The seven countries which thus far have made formal claims to territory in the Antarctic region are the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, France, Argentina and Chile. There are two extensive unclaimed sectors: One extending between 90° and 150° west longitude, and the other poleward of the Norwegian claim between 45° east and 20° west longitude. The United States has important potential claims based on discovery and scientific activity within the other national claims, and in the unclaimed sectors. The Soviet Union has not yet announced its tenuous claim, based on a single sighting expedition under Von Bellingshausen in 1819-21. However, extensive Soviet activity in the area during the past two years provides a basis for Soviet claims which the Western powers might find legally difficult to refute. Since World War II, the USSR has taken part in pelagic whaling in the area. Neither the United States nor the USSR has recognized the claims of other powers, or made claims of its own. However, the United States has reserved all its “rights” in the area, and the USSR has asserted the right to participate in any territorial settlement.

5. In 1948, the United States explored unsuccessfully with the claimant powers the possibility of placing the Antarctic under some form of international administration. The United States has neither reaffirmed nor rejected, publicly or to the present claimant powers, the position it took publicly in 1948 favoring the establishment of an international regime in Antarctica. Conversations with the other friendly governments who have advanced claims to portions of Antarctica have produced no agreement. Argentina and Chile take a pronounced nationalistic and emotional attitude toward their prospective and sometimes conflicting claims, which cover the Drake Straits and the Palmer Peninsula, and from a purely strategic point of view constitute most important areas in Antarctica. Argentina and Chile contest the claims of the United Kingdom to the same area, and their quarrel with Great Britain is exacerbated by Argentine sensitivity over the Falkland Islands dispute. However, there is reason to believe that both Argentina and Chile would resist Soviet claims to areas in the Antarctic. In summary, there is no present agreement among the claimant powers on any type of international administration of Antarctica.

6. At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Indian Delegation sought to have the question of Antarctica placed on the agenda, but later withdrew its proposal. It is possible that the Indians will again raise the issue at the next General Assembly. Apparently, the Indian Government believes that the Antarctic will become a ground of further international contention and thus contribute to a continuation of the cold war. In the event that a trusteeship should be proposed, it does not seem probable that the presence of the USSR as a member of the Trusteeship Council as presently constituted would cause insurmountable difficulty in the immediate future. However, the presence of the Soviet Union as one of the trust powers would be unacceptable.

7. …In this connection, Australia has suggested that the United States might assert a claim to Antarctic territory. Such a U.S. claim would not necessarily induce Soviet withdrawal, and might even have the opposite effect of stimulating a Soviet claim. A U.S. claim, however, would improve the legal position of the United States in opposing any Soviet claims which might be made in supporting Australia in any efforts to induce the Soviets to withdraw, and in participating in joint action with other Free World claimants. Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom seem to feel that the United States should claim the sector between 90° and 150° west longitude, and they would not be averse to the formal expression of wider claims by the United States.

8. …it would seem desirable, on balance, that the United States, irrespective of the Soviet position, make a formal claim to portions of Antarctica and be prepared to recognize claims by friendly Free World claimants.

Objectives

9. Orderly progress toward a solution of the territorial problem of Antarctica which would ensure maintenance of control by U.S. and friendly powers and serve to exclude our most probable enemies.

10. Freedom of exploration and scientific investigation in the Antarctic for nationals of the United States and friendly powers, and maximum interchange of Antarctic mapping and scientific data.

11. Access to natural resources which may be found to be useful.

Major Policy Guidance

12. The immediate question is not whether to assert a claim but when. It is generally agreed in the scientific and intelligence community that the present highly satisfactory cooperation among the countries participating in the IGY in the Antarctic, including the Soviet Union, might be jeopardized by the precipitate utterance of a U.S. claim to territory in the Antarctic. In consequence, unless the USSR in the meantime puts forward a claim, it is recommended that the United States refrain from announcing a claim in Antarctica until the close of the IGY in December, 1958. The tentative target date, therefore, for the putting forth of a U.S. claim is January 1, 1959. However, if before that time the USSR sets out a claim, or if UN action on Antarctica appears imminent, the United States should be prepared immediately to make public its claims.

13. The question then becomes one of what form the U.S. claim or claims to areas in Antarctica should take. The following possibilities suggest themselves:

a. The United States could put forward claim to the unclaimed sectors between 90° and 150° west longitude and poleward of the Norwegian claim (between 45° east and 20° west longitude) and reserve its rights to other areas based on U.S. discovery, U.S. scientific exploration, or other U.S. activity. This would have the effect of completing a 360° circle around Antarctica, with the result that the entire continent and its adjacent islands would have been formally claimed by the United States and the other seven Free World powers who are also allies of the United States. The corollary of a U.S. claim would be an expression by the United States of its recognition in whole or in part, and subject to negotiation with the other claimant powers, of the Antarctica claims of the seven Free World countries listed in paragraph 4 above.

b. In negotiating the claims issue with the claimant powers, the United States might, with respect to those areas in which its claims were in conflict with those of other claimant powers, express its willingness to establish a form of joint administration or condominium over the disputed areas with the individual powers concerned. For example, if the United States were to claim areas falling within the area claimed by Chile or Argentina or both, the United States might indicate its readiness to consider administering jointly with the power or powers concerned the area in dispute.

c. The United States could, in setting forth its formal claim to areas in Antarctica, simultaneously declare its readiness to merge its claims with those of the other Free World powers in a condominium with a suitable relationship to the United Nations. In the absence of an effective Soviet claim, such an international administration of Antarctica would thus ensure its retention in Free World hands and would obviate the necessity of negotiating out rival claims as between the eight Free World powers. However, there is reason to believe that both Argentina and Chile would strenuously resist the concept of a condominium. The nature of such an international administration and the arguments pro and con for a condominium are set forth in Tab A.

d. The United States likewise might, while expressing its formal claim to areas in Antarctica, declare its readiness to participate with the other seven Free World claimant powers in a United Nations trusteeship. It is probable, unless the USSR could get sufficient support for its own claim in Antarctica, that sufficient voting strength could be mustered in the United Nations to prevent any Soviet pretension to be considered as “a state directly concerned” in a UN trusteeship and to assure that such a trusteeship would be administered by all or some of the present Free World claimant powers. Conversely, the USSR might be able to prevent General Assembly approval of a trusteeship which excluded the USSR. Tab B sets forth the arguments in favor and against the application of a UN trusteeship of Antarctica.

14. It is recommended that, keeping in mind the need for action before or on the tentative target date of January 1, 1959 for putting forth a U.S. claim to Antarctica, and having due regard for the possibilities analyzed in the preceding paragraph, the United States commence forthwith diplomatic conversations among the seven Free World claimant powers. In these conversations the United States would indicate its intention to put forth a formal claim to the unclaimed sectors of the Antarctic and all other areas to which it has rights derived from discovery, exploration, or other authority, and would discuss among the seven Free World powers the alternatives set out in paragraph 13 above. Following these conversations, it should be possible to develop agreed positions both as to timing and the form the U.S. and other claims should take, particularly in respect of such international administration of Antarctica as meets with the greatest support by the Free World powers interested in that continent.

15. Meanwhile, the United States should continue its scientific, logistical, and financial preparations for its continuing presence in Antarctica through the IGY and for some years beyond. One basic principle of polar resupply is that each station should have at all times sufficient supplies to last two years. In this way the failure of one resupply expedition will not interrupt the following season’s operations. If the United States expresses a formal claim over areas in Antarctica either before or on January 1, 1959, the principle of resupply requires that this year’s expedition—Deep Freeze III— should carry with it emergency supplies for any station that will remain active after 1959. Depending upon the status of Free World versus Soviet claims, the United States should be prepared to maintain further, but possibly not as extensive, expeditions in recurring two-year periods. Looking further ahead, preservation of our rights and protection of our potential interests will require U.S. activity in Antarctica for a long time to come.

16. The Executive Agent for the U. S. Government in supporting scientific and other expeditions to Antarctica should be _. The responsible Agency for conducting the diplomatic negotiations precedent to the expression of a formal claim will be the Department of State.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

SUBJECT

• Establishment of a Condominium over Antarctica

1. The U.S. in 1948 explored without success the possibility of establishing a UN trusteeship over Antarctica. The U.S. thereafter suggested for consideration and transmitted to the seven powers a draft agreement proposing an international administration in the form of a condominium for the Antarctica whereby the parties would merge and join their claims to and interests in the area in a special regime which would cooperate with appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN. This approach was equally unsuccessful.

2. Arguments for establishing a joint administration for the Antarctica comprising the U.S. and the seven claimant powers would include:

(a) Such a regime would have the advantage of placing the U.S. and the seven powers in a position to maintain that they had de jure right to and control of the Antarctic region.

(b) At the same time, agreement on the part of the U.S. and the seven powers to cooperate with the appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN and to administer the Antarctic area in accordance with Article 84 of the Charter in the maintenance of international peace and security (both of which provisions were provided for in the 1948 agreement) would tend to blunt or reduce concern in and outside of the UN over the possible use of the Antarctic by the condominium powers for other than peaceful purposes.

(c) The establishment of such a regime for the Antarctic would in no way preclude the U.S. and the seven powers from reaching agreement at a later time to apply voluntarily for the application of a UN trusteeship to the Antarctic area if they should so wish.

(d) The conclusion of a joint administration would resolve the conflicting claims issue as between the seven claimant powers and would eliminate the necessity of the U.S.’s having to decide now upon the entirety of the area to which it might wish to lay claim in the Antarctic. As was contemplated in 1948, the U.S., under such an arrangement, would lay claim to areas in the Antarctic to which it had right (presumably but not necessarily limited to the unclaimed areas), to place it on an equal footing with the seven powers. Thereupon the U.S. and the seven powers would merge and join their claims to and interests in the area in a special regime dedicated to administering and developing the area as a unit, not as individual segments. As matters stand now, the U.S. is reluctant to lay claim to areas in the Antarctic until it is in a position to ascertain more precisely all the areas to which it might wish to lay claim. By seeking a condominium agreement, the U.S. and the seven powers could move before Antarctica becomes a subject for continuing discussion in the UN and not be retarded by the conflicting claims issue. Under such an arrangement, the announcement of a U.S. territorial claim would occur approximately simultaneously with the announcement of the conclusion of a condominium agreement.

(e) A joint as distinguished from an individual country or segment approach to Antarctica would appear to be the most effective and least burdensome way financially to further scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena. (This could be either a condominium or a trusteeship.)

(f) There is no reason why an agreement between the U.S. and seven powers to establish a condominium over the Antarctic designed to facilitate the further development of the area in the interest of all mankind could not be presented as a dramatic Free World initiative. Access to the area for scientific purposes would be open to all members of the UN or specialized agencies; however, it would be subject to the controls and regulations promulgated by the joint administration.

(g) Although the establishment of a condominium would not preclude the Soviets from claiming the right to participate in the administration of the area based on such claims as it might make, and while it would not force or necessarily bring about the withdrawal of Soviet personnel from the area, it would provide a basis for the U.S. and the present claimant powers to question its validity of the Soviet presence in the area.

3. Arguments against establishing a joint administration for the Antarctic comprising the U.S. and the seven claimant powers would include:

(a) It is considered unlikely that the present claimant powers to territory in the Antarctic, particularly Chile and Argentina, could be persuaded to give up their individual “sovereign” rights even to a joint administration or condominium limited to the U.S. and themselves. However, it is thought that this could be presented to them as a more palatable alternative to UN supervision within the trusteeship system.

(b) The Soviets and the Indians, for example, would likely attack in and outside of the UN a condominium proposal as inconsistent with IGY objectives and as an attempt to exclude all other countries from the area as a part of the development of the Antarctic as a Free World military base.

(c) The announcement of the establishment of a condominium over the Antarctic would probably precipitate Soviet counter-action in the form of a claim to territory in the Antarctic. On the basis of this claim they might either seek participation in the condominium, or merely continue to administer their own zone.

(d) The establishment of a condominium would not bring about or necessarily lead to the withdrawal of USSR personnel from the area or make the USSR more responsive to such control measures as might be promulgated by the condominium administration. Moreover, because of the difficulty of policing boundaries in the Antarctic area, it seems probable that the USSR would have access to considerable territory adjacent to their area as well. The right of the USSR to maintain a military base within the area of its claim would be difficult to challenge on legal grounds, and could, as a practical matter, continue to be exercised whether challenged or not.

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

SUBJECT

• Application of a UN Trusteeship over Antarctica

1. The NSC Planning Board has requested the Department of State to study and report on whether there could be developed some type of UN trusteeship over Antarctica which would protect friendly Free World claims and rights in the area, and to set forth in such report the advantages and disadvantages of the Free World’s initiating such a proceeding.

2. While the trusteeship system was established primarily for the development of peoples, there is nothing in the Charter excluding the application of a UN trusteeship to uninhabited areas. It could be justified by the first of the four basic objectives of the system as stated under Article 76, viz., “to further international peace and security”. (This has particular interest now since India’s current interest in obtaining GA consideration of Antarctica derives in large part from India’s concern that Antarctica might become a possible area of East-West tension as well as a possible nuclear testing site.) Under Article 77(c) of the Charter the trusteeship system may be applied to territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. (Those countries having made official claim to territory in the Antarctic consider themselves sovereign within the areas of their claims and hence could be expected to consider themselves as states responsible for administration within the meaning of Article 77.) The Charter also provides that territories held under mandate as well as territories detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War may be placed under the trusteeship system; however, these are not possibilities in the case of Antarctica.

Under Article 79 of the Charter, the terms of trusteeship shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned. (The exact criteria for determining a “state directly concerned” have not been agreed upon in the UN.) Article 81 provides that the trusteeship agreement shall include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority may be one or more states or the Organization itself. (In the latter case, the Organization would designate an administering agent.) Thus the terms of trusteeship agreed upon between the U.S. and the seven claimant powers could provide for the designation of one or more of their number as the administering authority, or the United Nations Organization itself as the administering authority. Moreover, the seven powers and the U.S. could agree to designate part or all of the Antarctic region as a strategic area; however, all functions of the UN relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreement, are exercised by the Security Council and would be subject, therefore, to the Soviet veto (Article 83). Additionally, designation of the Antarctic as a strategic area would likely be interpreted by some nations as being in conflict with the objective of peaceful utilization of Antarctica. On the other hand, the functions of the UN with regard to trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of trusteeship agreements, are exercised by the General Assembly. The question of the approval of a proposed trusteeship agreement by the General Assembly requires a two-thirds vote. The UN, however, could not impose a trusteeship on a part or all of Antarctica in the absence of the agreement of the state or states directly concerned.

All of the foregoing considerations would apply equally if one or more of the claimant powers were to seek individually rather than jointly the application of a UN trusteeship to an area or areas of Antarctica. It is doubted, however, whether any of the claimant powers would be prepared to seek the application of a UN trusteeship to a part of the Antarctic region in the absence of a common agreement with respect to such an approach. Nor could an initiative by one power to seek a UN trusteeship for its claimed area provide a basis for the UN’s imposing a trusteeship on other parts of the Antarctic.

3. While a trusteeship over Antarctica would be possible in principle, whether it could be established as a practical matter would depend upon whether the U.S. and the present claimants to territory in the Antarctic, viz., Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the UK, could reach common agreement both in principle as well as upon the terms of trusteeship to be submitted to the UN for approval. The latter would include the designation of the administering authority.

4. There has been no attempt made thus far within the UN framework to urge the states most directly concerned with Antarctica to explore the possibility of establishing a UN trusteeship over the area in the common interest. India placed Antarctica on the provisional agenda of the 11th GA with a view to obtaining the adoption of a resolution calling for the peaceful utilization of Antarctica. India insisted that it had no wish to raise the question of the status of territorial claims in Antarctica but was concerned over the possibility of Antarctica’s becoming a scene of “cold-war” conflict. India withdrew the item when it became apparent that there might not be a majority for inscription. It is anticipated that India will try again to raise Antarctica at the 12th GA. If Antarctica should become a subject for discussion in the UN under these circumstances, it would appear inevitable that attention will be focussed on the political aspects of this problem which could lead to pressure for the establishment of a UN trusteeship over Antarctica with a view to furthering international peace and security. However, the GA could only recommend such action to member states concerned. It could not establish a trusteeship over the Antarctic with itself as the administering authority in the absence of the agreement of the states directly concerned.

5. The U.S. in 1948 explored without success the possibility of establishing a UN trusteeship over Antarctica. The U.S. proposed to the UK, Chile and Argentina for consideration the possible establishment of a voluntary joint or collective non-strategic UN trusteeship for Antarctica, the terms of which were to be agreed on by the U.S. and the seven claimant powers before submission to the UNGA for approval. The trusteeship was to be a joint trusteeship administered by the foregoing powers who were to merge and join their respective claims to and interests in the area in a special regime. To place itself on an equal juridical footing with the other powers, the U.S. contemplated making at an appropriate time an official claim to areas in Antarctica to which it had the best rights. The proposed trusteeship agreement also contemplated free access to, and freedom of transit through or over the area of Antarctica under such rules as the special regime established by the administering authorities might prescribe. Additionally, the administering authorities were to take all necessary measures in the trust territory, within the terms of Article 84 of the Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Since this proposal met with some opposition from the British and was not well received in either Argentina or Chile, the U.S. then suggested for consideration and transmitted to all seven claimant powers in early August, 1948, a draft agreement proposing an international administration (condominium) for the Antarctic whereby the parties would merge and join their claims to and interests in the area in a special regime which would cooperate with appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN. Only the UK and New Zealand accepted the proposal as a basis for discussion. Australia, Argentina, and Chile rejected on grounds of sovereignty. The latter took the position as well that internationalization was inconsistent with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance although the U.S. took exception to this. France favored some scheme of internationalization that would not involve the surrender of individual sovereignty; and Norway viewed internationalization as unnecessary.

6. The U.S. has neither reaffirmed nor rejected publicly or to the seven friendly power claimants to territory in the Antarctic the position it took in 1948 favoring the establishment of an international regime in Antarctica.

7. It is anticipated that the USSR might claim all or a part of the unclaimed sector of Antarctica in the near future. Since neither the USSR nor any of the states presently claiming areas of Antarctica have succeeded in establishing the permanent occupation and control normally required by international law as a basis for the establishment of sovereignty over terra nullius, the USSR claim might well stand on the same legal footing as the other claims.

8. Arguments for seeking the application of a UN trusteeship administered by one or more of the states claiming territory in the Antarctic would include:

(a) A proposal by the U.S. and the seven claimant powers for the application of a UN trusteeship to Antarctica would reduce appreciably Indian and international concern manifested in the UN as regards Antarctica’s possibly becoming a scene of East-West conflict or being used for military or nuclear development purposes.

(b) Agreement by the U.S. and Free World territorial claimants on internationalization under a trusteeship arrangement would eliminate friction arising among them because of conflicting claims.

(c) If the proposed trusteeship agreement designating the U.S. or one or more of the seven claimant powers as the administering authority were approved by the GA, the USSR would be excluded from participation in the administration of Antarctica although it might be expected to argue for its inclusion as a power directly concerned and to subject the Antarctic trust administration to annual criticism in the Trusteeship Council. However, it is not thought that the Soviets could pursue this line beyond seeking detailed reports and their inclusion in visiting missions to the area.

Once the USSR had made a claim, however, its insistence on the status of a “state directly concerned” would be difficult to dispute on legal grounds. The USSR could be expected to seek participation in the preparation of the trusteeship agreement and the administration of the territory. However, if the U.S. and the seven powers were to agree to the designation of the Organization as the administering authority, this would appear to offer the most effective way of excluding the Soviets from participation in a joint administration of the Antarctic.

(d) The approval of such a trusteeship agreement would reserve to the Western powers primary control over the strategic use and economic value of the area although it would envisage free access to the area for scientific purposes under conditions prescribed by the administering authorities.

(e) An international or joint administration for Antarctica could serve to promote most effectively the further scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena as well as permit an equitable sharing of the financial burden. Such an administration would facilitate the correlation of meteorological observations.

(f) If the U.S. and the seven claimant powers were to be able to reach common agreement on such a proposal to submit to the UN, it would be a dramatic move in terms of demonstrating a Free World initiative within the UN framework dedicated to the development of a largely undeveloped continent in a way best designed to further the scientific knowledge and well-being of all peoples. Such a move would strengthen the UN in that it would constitute evidence of Free World faith in UN institutions.

(g) While the approval by the Assembly of a trusteeship arrangement for the Antarctic to be administered by the U.S. or one or more of the present claimant powers would not necessarily result in the physical exclusion or withdrawal of the Soviets from Antarctica, UN pressure could be mustered to facilitate the exercise of control over Soviet activities in the Antarctic.

9. Arguments against seeking the application of a UN trusteeship administered by one or more of the states claiming territory in the Antarctic would include:

(a) It is considered not only unlikely but improbable that the present claimant powers to territory in the Antarctic, particularly Chile and Argentina, could be persuaded to give up their individual “sovereign” rights in Antarctica and to accept voluntarily such UN supervision over the Antarctic as might be exercised by the Trusteeship Council. Chile and Argentina, backed by the entire Latin American bloc, as well as the UK, Australia and New Zealand, strongly opposed consideration of Antarctica at the last GA session even though India made it clear that its initiative was in no way intended to raise the question of territorial claims. (The U.S. also decided to oppose inscription.) It is believed that the reaction would be even more negative if the suggestion were made that the trusteeship be administered by the UN. The position taken by the present claimant powers would also appear to preclude the possibility of one or more of the claimant powers’ seeking an individual trusteeship arrangement for its claimed area.

(b) The establishment of a UN trusteeship administered by the U.S. and the seven powers would not further the attainment of the present U.S. policy objective which seeks to ensure control of Antarctica to the U.S. and friendly powers and exclude its most probable enemies from the area. Although U.S. and claimant powers under a trusteeship agreement would have primary control over the area, they would find it difficult as trust powers to exclude any power including the USSR from access to the area for scientific purposes, etc. Moreover, the administering authorities would have to be prepared to accept a continuing and close UN interest in the area.

(c) It cannot be assumed that a UN trusteeship is the only or even the most effective way of furthering scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena as well as facilitating the correlation of meteorological observations.

(d) If the U.S. and the seven powers were to agree to request application of a UN trusteeship to Antarctica on the basis of terms proposed by them, it is anticipated that the USSR would endeavor to establish its status as a “state directly concerned” under Article 79; and, at a minimum, try to modify the proposed terms of the trust agreement, particularly as regards provisions for the future admission of additional states to participate in the international administration. While it is possible that the Soviets might be able to line up a blocking one-third vote to prevent the approval of the proposed trust agreement, the Free World powers could likely block similarly any amendments unacceptable to them. Such an impasse, however, would hardly contribute to a lessening of tension over Antarctica.

If, as is anticipated, the USSR had claimed part or all of the presently unclaimed territory in Antarctica, its claim would be on a legal basis equivalent to that of the other claimant states, and a U.S. position that the USSR alone, of all the claimants, is not a “state directly concerned”, would be difficult to support. If the USSR’s status as a “state directly concerned” were accepted it could claim the right to participate in the drafting of the terms of trusteeship and would have a strong basis for claiming a right to serve as one of the administering powers in view of its claim to a sector of the territory. An attempt to deny them this status might result in an impasse in the Assembly in which no trusteeship agreement could obtain the necessary two-thirds majority.

10. Arguments in favor of the claimant powers’ seeking a UN trusteeship administered by the Organization rather than by themselves include:

(a) A UN trusteeship administered by the Organization, as prescribed in Article 81, would exclude the USSR from direct participation in the administration of the area. If the USSR were to be considered a “state directly concerned”, it could claim the right to participate in the preparation of the trusteeship agreement under Article 79, but it would have no direct role in the administration of the area.

(b) If such a trusteeship were proposed by the present claimant states the USSR would experience difficulty in organizing an effective opposition to it in the Assembly without assuming the role of a selfish obstructionist. A number of states which would support the USSR in its objections to a trusteeship administered by the other claimant powers but excluding the USSR, such as India, would be unable to support its objections to a trusteeship administered by the Organization.

(c) A trusteeship administered by the Organization would appear to offer an effective means of controlling the activities of the USSR in the area. The USSR could not undertake activities in the area contrary to the wishes of the UN without damaging its international posture. This would require the USSR to justify the activities which it proposed to take and would preclude military activities by them in the entire area.

11. Arguments against the claimant powers’ seeking a UN trusteeship administered by the Organization rather than by themselves include:

(a) It is considered even more improbable that the present claimant powers to territory in the Antarctic, particularly Chile and Argentina, could be persuaded not only to accept voluntarily the application of a UN trusteeship over Antarctica but to give up as well the right to participate in the administration of the area in favor of an administering authority selected by the UN. This would dilute even further whatever claims and rights the U.S. and the present claimant powers have in the Antarctic.

(b) While the designation of the Organization as the administering authority would eliminate the possibility of the USSR’s participating in the administration of the area, it would also eliminate by the same token the present claimant powers and the U.S. This would likely be considered too high a price to pay by the present claimant powers.

(c) While the designation of the Organization as the administering authority would provide an effective means of controlling Soviet activities in the Antarctic this could operate to limit the activities of the U.S. and the present claimant powers in the area as well.

1. Source: Department of State,S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica—NSC 5715. Secret.
2. See footnote 7, Document 313, and footnote 4, Document 328.
3. Not printed.
3. Not printed.
4. A completed draft policy paper on Antarctica was submitted to Deputy Under Secretary Murphy on May 20, by Bowie. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica—NSC 5715)
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.