311. National Security Council Report1
NSC 5528
Washington, December 12, 1955.
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON ANTARCTICA
REFERENCES
- A. NSC 5424/12
- B. NSC Action No. 1437–b3
The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1437–b, is transmitted herewith
for consideration by the National Security Council at an early meeting.
Attention is invited to the three alternative courses of action set forth in
the enclosed draft statement of policy. Whichever of these courses is
adopted is intended to supersede NSC
5424/1.
A Financial Appendix covering Antarctica is also enclosed,4 and a map is being prepared for
later circulation.
It is recommended that the enclosed statement of policy, in the form adopted
by the Council, be submitted to the President with the recommendation that
he approve it, direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and designate the
Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.
[Page 633]
[Enclosure]
DRAFT STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ANTARCTICA
General Considerations
- 1.
- Antarctica is not readily accessible even during the brief
Antarctic “summer” and much of it has never been seen or explored.
In the past it has been thought to have little or no economic
importance and only remote strategic significance. Antarctica has
considerable immediate importance for scientific purposes; our
understanding of the physical structure of the world and its
atmosphere will be materially advanced by data obtainable only in
Antarctica. Moreover, Antarctica may have other potential values not
now determinable, so that its importance could conceivably increase
greatly with additional knowledge and new technical developments.
Furthermore, the recent Soviet decision to send expeditions to the
Antarctic is evidence of the interest the Soviets have in the area
and the importance they attach to it. This development is a cause
for concern to the U.S. and its friends and allies in the Southern
Hemisphere.
- 2.
- Formal claims to Antarctic territory have been made by the
Governments of Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand,
Norway and the U.K. The U.S. has
neither recognized any of these claims nor made any official claim
of its own, but has consistently sought to reserve all its “rights”.
The USSR has made no Antarctic claims but has asserted a right to
participate in any territorial settlement on the basis of the
claimed discovery of the continent by Bellingshausen in
1820–21.
- 3.
- The U.S. has a basis for claims to major areas in all of
Antarctica, as the result of discovery, exploration and unofficial
claims made on behalf of the U.S. The areas in which the U.S. has
been active lie with the U.K.,
Argentine, Chilean, Australian and New Zealand claims, as well as
within an unclaimed sector (90°W–150°W). Formal claims and sustained
activities by other claimants now threaten to weaken the basis for
U.S. claims in almost all parts of Antarctica.
- 4.
- In view of the long history of U.S. activity, public interest, and
the possibility that the Antarctic may later assume an importance
which is not now apparent, it would be inadvisable to allow U.S.
“rights” to deteriorate. The fact that other countries have long
standing claims in the Antarctic while the U.S. has none will weaken
any claim the U.S. may advance in the future. On the other hand we
do not have sufficient knowledge about the continent to permit an
informed choice of the best locations for U.S. claims now. Moreover,
[Page 634]
any decision to put
forward U.S. claims must take into account (a) the possibility of
objections by friendly governments, (b) possible adverse effects on
scientific cooperation in connection with the International
Geophysical Year, and (c) propaganda from unfriendly
quarters.
- 5.
Three practicable alternative courses of action are open to the
U.S. with regard to the Antarctic:
- Alternative A—Continue to
reserve U.S “rights” without recognizing the claims of
other countries.6
- Alternative B—Claim no more
than the unclaimed sector (90° to 150° W longitude) at
this time.
- Alternative C—Claim the
unclaimed sector and all other areas which can
appropriately be claimed by the U.S. on the basis of its
activity therein.
The arguments for and against each of these alternatives are
briefly suggested in the following paragraphs.7
- 6.
Alternative A—Continue to reserve U.S.
“rights” without recognizing the claims of others.
- a. Arguments for Alternative A:
- (1)
- It would permit freedom of action by the U.S. in
all parts of Antarctica.
- (2)
- It would not in itself increase the irritation of
other countries with the U.S.
- (3)
- Knowledge of the Antarctic is insufficient to
permit an informed estimate as to whether a claim
should ever be made or, if made, to determine which
areas should be claimed. More complete knowledge may
become available in the next few years.
- (4)
- The basis for future U.S. claims would be improved
by U.S. operations in the area, 1956–59.
- (5)
- It might not involve as much expense as the
maintenance of extensive claims.
- b. Arguments against Alternative A:
- (1)
- The present policy results in uncertainty and
irritation to other friendly nations. These
countries fear that the U.S. eventually intends to
pursue a policy of ruthless self-interest. In this
atmosphere the U.S. can do nothing towards a
reduction of tensions and as activities increase in
support of U.S. “rights”, irritations tend to
increase.
- (2)
- Of greater importance, perhaps, is the fact that
existing U.S. rights tend to weaken unless
investments in excess of those being made at the
present time are made over wide areas on the
continent. These costs may be larger than the price
of supporting claims to selected areas.
- (3)
- Waiting for a more favorable time to make a claim
is apt to be an illusory policy, since in practice a
politically opportune moment to make a claim tends
never to arise.
- (4)
- There is doubt as to whether exploration during
the next few years will permit a more intelligent
selection of U.S. claim areas.
- (5)
- The U.S. is and will continue to be at a
disadvantage with respect to the perfection of a
claim to Antarctica, so long as we do not officially
announce a claim, a step usually considered
indispensable in the acquisition of territory by
discovery or discovery and use.
- (6)
- A “waiting” policy would not advance the objective
of denying the area to the Soviets as adequately as
a policy of making U.S. claims before the Soviets
establish a basis for a claim.
- 7.
Alternative B—Claim only the unclaimed
sector (90° to 150° W longitude) at this time.
- a. Arguments for Alternative B:
- (1)
- It would be the ideal solution from the view point
of minimizing friction with other claimant
countries.
- (2)
- It would permit the U.S. to make constructive
proposals for the settlement of over-all differences
among the claimants.
- (3)
- It would concentrate U.S. Antarctic activities in
one sector and would avoid dissipation of effort
indiscriminately everywhere on the continent.
- (4)
- The cost of maintaining such a claim would be less
than a more extensive claim and perhaps less
expensive than present policy.
- b. Arguments against Alternative B:
- (1)
- A limited claim would eventually exclude the U.S.
from other areas which are found to be of value and
where the U.S. has had activity.
- (2)
- There is no way of knowing whether or not this
area is or will be of value.
- (3)
- Such a claim would still make it impossible to
work out a satisfactory arrangement with other
countries unless there were a willingness to
negotiate out other areas of U.S. interest.
- (4)
- Soviet plans for the International Geophysical
Year involve the establishment of bases only in the
sector claimed by Australia. Since there will be no
Soviet bases in the sector lying between 90° and
150° W longitude upon which to base a Soviet claim,
there appears to be no urgency requiring immediate
establishment of a U.S. claim.
- (5)
- A claim by the U.S. in the near future might
stimulate the USSR to make a claim and thus convert
the Antarctic into an area of U.S.–USSR
tension.
- 8.
Alternative C—Claim the unclaimed sector
and all other areas which can appropriately be claimed by the
U.S. on the basis of its activity therein.
- a. Arguments for Alternative C:
- (1)
- It would perfect existing U.S. “rights” most
effectively in the absence of an intention to make
larger investments than at the present time.
- (2)
- It would permit the U.S. to concentrate its
efforts on more limited areas rather than dissipate
them indiscriminately on the continent.
- (3)
- While the initial reaction of other claimants
would be one of irritation, a claim would provide a
basis for negotiations leading to a reduction of
controversy.
- (4)
- Regardless of value, the U.S. can justify claims
only where it has had activity. During the next few
years activity will continue to be concentrated in
areas of activity in the past.
- b. Arguments against Alternative C:
- (1)
- It would initially, at least, cause greater
irritation to other claimants than does present U.S.
policy or policy of claiming the unclaimed sector
only.
- (2)
- Knowledge of the Antarctic is at present
inadequate to permit an informed decision as to the
best areas to be claimed.
- (3)
- Maintaining such claims might be more expensive
than the cost of maintaining “rights”.
- (4)
- A claim by the U.S. in the near future might
stimulate the USSR to make a claim and thus convert
the Antarctic into an area of the U.S.–USSR
tension.
- (5)
- It would adversely affect international scientific
cooperation in connection with the International
Geophysical Year.
- 9.
- It may be of future strategic importance to the free world that
the Soviet bloc have no control over any portion of Antarctica. From
the standpoint of countering Soviet activities and future claims,
either of the two courses of action involving U.S. claims
(Alternative B or C) would be superior to the continued reservation
of U.S. “rights” (Alternative A). It must be recognized that,
however the U.S. acts, the Soviets are likely to make future claims
based on activity (including conceivably IGY activity), and cannot be prevented from doing so
or, in the near future at least, physically barred from the
subcontinent. However, a U.S. claim before the Soviets establish a
basis for claim, would set up a legal position opposed to that of
the Soviets and would permit the U.S. to work in the direction of a
common front of claimants. Hence, when the issue of sovereignty
finally comes to a head—either in the International
[Page 637]
Court, through arbitration or
otherwise—the U.S. would then be in a stronger position to prevent a
successful Soviet claim and to establish a structure wholly composed
of free world nations. From this standpoint, as between Alternative
B and Alternative C, B would be slightly superior, in that U.S.
claims in conflict with the existing claims of others would tend to
weaken our opposition to later Soviet claims likewise conflicting
and likewise based on activity.
- 10.
- It should be noted that adoption of either Alternative B or C
involving the advancement of formal U.S. claims might conceivably be
the first step in embarking the U.S. upon a course of defending vast
and remote areas which would be identified as U.S. territory and
accepted at home and abroad as requiring protection from trespass or
adverse occupation or use by the power and prestige of the U.S. The
future consequences of such a course cannot now be clearly
foreseen.
Objectives
- 11.
- Orderly progress toward solution of the territorial problem of
Antarctica in such a way as to minimize friction with and among our
allies.
- 12.
- Maintenance of control over the Antarctic by the U.S. and friendly
powers and denial of the area to the USSR.
- 13.
- Preservation so far as possible of U.S. freedom of action to
utilize in U.S. and free world interests such strategic potentials
as the Antarctic may turn out to have.
- 14.
- Freedom of exploration, of scientific investigation and of access
to such resources as may be discovered in the Antarctic for
nationals of the U.S. and friendly powers; and maximum interchange
of Antarctic mapping and scientific data.
[Here follow five pages that present in tabular form the three courses of
action presented in the body of the draft statement on policy.]
