124. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1
Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to your letter of June 22, 1956 (S–0720), regarding certain aspects of the question of China trade controls, and other matters.
The Department of State and its missions in the field have been unremitting in the effort to maintain an effective multilateral control over trade with Communist China. The problem of maintaining such [Page 373] a control is, as you are well aware, a difficult and complex one, since it rests, and can only rest, on voluntary cooperative action among the participating countries.
Our objective is to preserve the multilateral control structure with the most significant level of control attainable. I am sure you appreciate that attempts at coercion of our Allies in this matter would seriously risk the collapse of the entire structure.
You mention in your letter the U.K. announcement that it intends to make extended use of the exceptions procedure. You will no doubt recall that for some two years the U.S. Government has been made sharply aware of the increasing dissatisfaction of most of the other participating countries with the China differential, and that the question of modification was formally raised by the British Government with the U.S. Government in November of last year and later by Prime Minister Eden with the President during the talks in Washington in January of this year. The British have inquired several times since then regarding progress on the review of this question which the President directed be undertaken. The British Government made it clear during the January talks that unless the differential could be modified by multilateral action it would be forced to some action on a national basis.
Any deterioration of the China trade controls is a matter of serious concern to this Department. It must be recognized, however, that each nation remains the final judge of its national interest, and retains freedom to act accordingly. I need not point out that the U.S. Government has itself had to act unilaterally on certain matters where we felt our interests to be involved. We cannot reserve one standard for ourselves and apply another to our Allies.
You have also mentioned in your letter the meeting of the China Committee that was scheduled for June 26. This meeting did not take place. Instructions were sent to our delegate to that Committee instructing him, had the meeting taken place, to oppose any weakening of the controls through the exceptions procedure.2 The U.S. delegate to the China Committee will continue to urge restraint upon the other participating countries in the use of the exceptions procedure.
As regards the general question of U.S. policy on China trade controls, this policy is, as you know, now under review at a high level among the interested Departments, including the Department of Defense. Involved in the review is the question of further approaches to the participating countries to reinforce the U.S. position [Page 374] as it has already been set forth in the China Committee. This Department favors such approaches.
I have, of course, kept the appropriate Congressional Committees informed of developments with respect to China trade controls, and I pointed out then that the practical effect of the exceptions procedure could not yet be gauged. In particular, it could not be concluded that the use of the procedure would break down the multilateral control structure. In this connection, we have just received word from the Embassy in London that the British Foreign Minister has issued instructions that the use of the exceptions procedure is to be controlled as tightly as possible.3
I also note that in your letter you have touched on the question of U.K. defense planning, stating that the U.K. is acting unilaterally with respect to its NATO defense commitments. We have recently been in touch with the British Government, reminding them of the need for consultation by that Government with its NATO partners before any major changes are made in its forces. The U.K. again emphasized, in Mr. Macmillan’s statement to the House of Commons on June 26, its intention to deal with NATO defense matters in concert with its Allies.
Finally, I think I need not stress the fact that the Anglo-American Alliance is one of the key-stones of our own security and that of the entire free world. I know of no actions or intention on the part of the British Government which warrant the conclusion in your letter that there seems to be a decision “on the part of the U.K. to pull away from a close alliance with us …”.4 From time to time there will undoubtedly be differences on particular issues between the British and ourselves. In deciding upon the U.S. course of action in such cases, we must have regard to the overall U.S. national interest, and not merely to one aspect thereof. The making of such judgments is, of course, the function of this Department, under the direction of the President. It is clear to me that any statement to the British along the lines you suggest in your letter, that “we may be forced to make a critical appraisal of the whole structure of our relations”, is not advisable in the circumstances to which you refer.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 493.419/6–2856. Secret. Drafted by Moline and Timmons; cleared with Kalijarvi, Howard Jones, MacArthur, and Elbrick.↩
- Apparent reference to Topol 1629 to Paris, June 22, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 493.419/6–2156)↩
- Apparent reference to telegram 5967 from London, June 26, not printed. (Ibid., 460.419/6–2656)↩
- Ellipsis in the source text.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.↩