70. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 23, 19571
SUBJECT
- SC Consideration of Kashmir Problem
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Feroz Khan Noon, Foreign Minister of Pakistan
- Mr. Mohammed Ali, Ambassador of Pakistan
- Mr. M.S.A. Baig, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan
- The Secretary
- NEA—Lampton Berry
- SOA—Frederic P. Bartlett
Regarding the current consideration of Kashmir in the Security Council, the Secretary noted that the United States had collaborated closely with the Pakistan representatives, but not with the Indian. The United States had special ties with Pakistan. The United States also thought Pakistan had a meritorious case. Actually the Soviets had threatened to use their veto only to gain credit with India. Although the Secretary himself thought that the ultimate solution to the problem would only be through quiet, diplomatic action, this did not mean that the United Nations should not try to be helpful in creating and strengthening the right kind of public opinion.
In the Secretary’s view the present resolution should be pushed to a Soviet veto. It should not be rewritten, for a veto would put India in an awkward position in relation to world opinion and, therefore, Pakistan would be the one to gain from it. After a veto Pakistan must be its own judge as to whether to introduce another resolution or to have one introduced for it, but a weak resolution would be bad. The Secretary would not himself compromise on a “milk-sop” resolution because the objective of the present Security Council action is to create a favorable and strong world opinion looking toward the eventual solution of the Kashmir problem. Yet the Secretary explained that actually the Security Council—no matter what action it took, whether its resolution was hard or soft—could not really solve the Kashmir question as long as the GOI basically disagreed with the Security Council’s approach.
Whether Pakistan should eventually bring the matter to the General Assembly was an important question. It would be necessary, before deciding it, to count potential supporters carefully because a new GA resolution might well wipe out the protection which Pakistan currently enjoys under the present UN resolutions. This [Page 157] was a definite risk. The Secretary did not know the answer. India, he speculated, might be able to command only 25 or so votes, but on the other hand Pakistan might not be able to muster the necessary two-thirds. The Secretary did not feel qualified to give the Foreign Minister any advice on this matter, except that he certainly would not recommend going precipitously to the General Assembly and then thinking it over afterwards. Naturally, if the United States representatives could be helpful in assessing the voting position in the GA, they would be glad to do so, but Pakistan must take the primary responsibility for evaluating the situation, particularly as regards the voting possibilities of the Afro-Asian bloc. Pakistan should not, the Secretary repeated, make any final decision until it had thought through the whole problem thoroughly.
The Foreign Minister thanked the Secretary for his valued views.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/11–2557. Secret. Drafted by Bartlett.↩