Office of the Historian

68. Memorandum From Arthur Z. Gardiner of the Office of South Asian Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree)1

Washington, November 15, 1957

SUBJECT

  • “Package Deal”—Pakistan-India

My views on the proposed “package deal” designed to ease tensions between Pakistan and India follow:

1.
I think that economic and military aid should be linked to specific objectives, including settlement of the canal waters dispute.
2.

I think that in the Kashmir case, which involves not only India and Pakistan but also Kashmiris and the United Nations, a change in our policy abandoning a course to a U.N. plebiscite would:

A.
Cause serious trouble in Pakistan, if proposed to the Pakistanis.
B.
Run counter to the principle that the Kashmiris themselves should have a voice in their future.
C.
Denigrate the position of the United Nations.

In any case I doubt that the leaders of Pakistan ever could or would agree to abandon the claim of self-determination for the peoples of Kashmir.

3.
As the IBRD now is working on a new plan for over-all development of the waters of the Indus Basin, I think their technical work should proceed to certain tentative conclusions at least before the United States takes any position. It should be made clear to India and to Pakistan that in furnishing them with present or future financial assistance, we expect they will cooperate with the bank’s plan and with its execution.
4.
The “arms race” is at least in part conditioned by the U.S. commitment made to Pakistan in October 1954. It appears to me that the preferable course would be to work with the Pakistanis on their military budget and related matters, with a view towards reduction of our future liabilities. Any reduction in the military program to Pakistan should, in view of the intimacy of the relationship, be discussed with Pakistan prior to any conversations with India on this subject. It would be an error to fail to recognize that our relationships with Pakistan in matters of this kind are more intimate than our relationships with India.
5.
In general, it is my judgment that an over-all settlement of all issues cannot be worked out, as the Kashmir problem is intractable. It follows that we should not commit the prestige of the U.S. to a course of action (the package deal) which has little chance of a successful outcome. Sooner or later the fact of the proposed intervention would leak out, and we should then be faced with a public failure.

  1. Source: Department of State, SOA Files: Lot 60 D 545, India–Pakistan Relations. Secret.↩