42. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1

1924. Summoned to Prime Minister’s this noon following Cabinet meeting….

. . . . . . .

Prime Minister … referred to report Nehru had said Pakistan was not really serious about Kashmir and Prime Minister wanted me and USG to understand Pakistan was serious about it and would keep at it for one, five, ten or fifty years until just solution had been reached. He then calmly but deliberately said this was time when Pakistan was going find out who were its friends and who were merely giving lip service. He then became the lawyer and elaborated making following points:

1.
There is no room for negotiations on the principle of free plebiscite under auspices UN and were three minimum points that must be made by UN2 at this time:
(a)
reaffirmation support of free plebiscite under UN;
(b)
rejection Indian contention that Kashmir situation changed by military aid to Pakistan or by Baghdad Pact; and
(c)
reaffirmation of resolutions in such manner as to leave no doubt that UN record would brand Indian attempt annex Kashmir on January 26 as illegal.
2.
With the above points as a minimum then there might be room for negotiations on many points.

He then launched into a calm but very serious appraisal of effect of failure of USG to support just position of GOP. It was touched at times with anger and sometimes despondency but the net effect was that the lack of support would have grave effect on GOP and people of Pakistan as far as bonafides of USG and its assertion that it will give a fair deal. It will create grave tensions and hopelessness in minds of Pakistanis affecting many things besides Kashmir issue. It would be considered an unfriendly act with grave repercussions bearing on its foreign policy.

I assured Prime Minister I had not been told exact position of USG and neither had Embassy Delhi. Department wished avoid risk of same words getting two different interpretations at two different [Page 115] capitals. USG position would be made clear in front of both GOP and GOI Representatives in UN.

I pointed out Foreign Minister cable was his interpretation of situation and not statement of USG position and I doubted if USG would merely take position the troublesome issue must be settled by negotiation between the two countries. I ventured opinion that Lodge may have been merely sounding out Noon and not indicating USG position.

Prime Minister said he could understand and sympathize with difficult position of USG but it was question of whether USG was going to support just principles and support its proved friends or succumb to appeasement to power politics.

Comment: If UN satisfies Pakistanis on (a) and (c) Pakistanis probably would be willing forget UN police force; what would be intolerable would be dispatch of UN representative without specific instructions devise methods conduct plebiscite. Among other casualties in GOP and Pakistan public of unsatisfactory or indecisive outcome of Kashmir case will be reputation of UN as a body that can work for peaceful solutions of difficult problems.3

Hildreth
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.153/1–1657. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to New Delhi; Department passed to USUN.
  2. The Security Council discussed the Kashmir dispute January 16–February 21.
  3. In telegram 1672 to Karachi, January 18, the Department informed Hildreth that it approved the line he had taken in his conversation with Suhrawardy. The Department noted that since Suhrawardy may have acquired a misconception regarding the U.S. position toward Kashmir, Hildreth could reiterate to him that U.S. policy had not changed and that the United States continued to support a solution to this problem based on U.N. resolutions unless and until another solution was agreed upon by both parties. The Department emphasized that it did not accept the allegation that Pakistan’s acceptance of military aid and adherence to SEATO and the Baghdad Pact changed the situation in Kashmir; it believed, on the contrary, that prior U.N. actions continued to be valid. The Department of State expressed concern with the strongly implied threat of Foreign Minister Noon that Pakistan would decrease its cooperation in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact if the United States did not take a position on Kashmir satisfactory to the Pakistanis. “We consider Pakistan membership in pacts rests on basis such membership in national interest of Pakistan and not because US desires,” the telegram concluded. “At appropriate occasions you requested reiterate this to Pakistanis.” (Department of State, Central Files, 330.153/1–1657)