Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

38. Telegram From the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 31, 1956—6 p.m.

Delga 413. Re Kashmir (Deptel 450).²

1. Basic policy: (a) In light general background Kashmir problem, Indian refusal over long period of time to reach agreement on practical measures to bring about plebiscite, SC decisions reached with US leadership, and Pakistani participation SEATO and Baghdad Pacts, I believe we must give Pakistanis sufficient public support their position to make them feel we are not letting them down because of importance Indian world position. Pakistan has strong case which will appeal to sense of justice many delegations here.

(b) We should, of course, present our case and position in SC in moderate and statesmanlike manner so as to minimize negative reactions in India (New Delhi 1769),³ but we should recognize that we cannot please both sides on this question and should be prepared to take such Indian reaction as is inevitable. USSR will undoubtedly do what India wants in SC.

(c) Minimum results which might provide Pakistan with sufficient public backing would seem to be along lines UK suggestions (London 3450⁴ and Deptel 450) and paragraph c, Deptel 689, June 8.⁵

(d) At same time we should maintain attitude which privately encourages any mutually agreeable solution to problem, best prospects seeming to lie at present in some kind of partition and plebiscite combination.

2. Resolution: (a) Considering far-reaching nature of requests Pakistan will put before SC (Karachi 1731)⁶ we may have to make references to previous SC resolutions on plebiscite and constituent assembly more explicit than we had previously thought, i.e., to repeat some of their language, in order to give Pakistan backing it deserves.

(b) Department should also give immediate consideration to whom SC should send to subcontinent. We do not think it should be Hammarskjold, and Pakistanis have not been happy with idea of Graham again.

(c) Possibility some other solution than plebiscite should not be mentioned in res, as this would undermine Pakistan position. It should be left implicit in despatch of new representative to area.

(d) We should not accept any references to original responsibility. Although Pakistan is not completely clean on Kashmir question, responsibility for its origin is cloudy. While I appreciate reasons for thinking presented in New Delhi 1769, acceptance thesis original Pakistani aggression would unfairly reverse situation in UN in favor India.

3. Discussion: (a) I agree that discussion events 1947 should be avoided, if possible, on basis subsequent agreement on principle of plebiscite. This is unlikely, however, as Indians will undoubtedly rest large part their case on “aggression”. As SC has never accepted “aggression” argument of India and as factual situation surrounding period was quite complex it should be possible to make satisfactory reply which will not simply brush off Indian case.

(b) It also seems likely second important line Indian argument will be that situation has changed sufficiently since agreement on plebiscite to nullify it, laying heavy emphasis on Pakistan’s participation in military pacts and on US aid. We should be fully prepared to meet this contention.

(c) What we should say on pending action of India on Kashmir constitution also needs close scrutiny. Indian del will no doubt maintain previous contentions that accession of Kashmir to India in 1947 was definitive and that any action by India re Kashmir is domestic question. If this constitution goes into effect with approval of India subsequent efforts to achieve some agreed solution will be much more difficult. We will therefore probably have to delineate firm US attitude in debate if not in res.

(d) Pakistani suggestions for UN force, induction of plebiscite administrator and obligations of parties re plebiscite might be handled, together with other possibilities for mutually agreed solution, as issues better left until after visit new UN rep to area.

4. Other developments: (a) Earlier this year Pakistan was thinking of moving case through SC to veto and then transferring it to GA. This may still be in their minds, although acceptance despatch UN official to area would preclude this. Lall⁷ (India) has also expressed to mission concern that Pakistan intends transfer case to GA. He expressed hope big powers would not support this and seemed to think any such transfer would be under Uniting for Peace Res. We do not know whether India is fearful of GA debate nor whether it is reluctant to be protected in SC by Soviet veto, but if either is case India might be persuaded to accept or not strongly object to some such res as we have in mind.

(b) Lall is also reported to have told some persons here in July that foreign observers would be invited to be present at elections for Kashmir constituent assembly next spring to see their democratic nature. We have seen no further confirmation of this but, if true, this might be further tack Indian Del will take in SC.

(c) Graham has never presented his fifth report to SC. Should he be invited to do so? If so, would we want him to bring it up to date or not?

5. Department’s instructions would be appreciated as soon as possible so that we can work out details of res and tactics with UK Del soonest.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12–3156. Secret.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 690D.91/12–1956)
3. Supra.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12–2156)
5. Document 27.
6. In telegram 1731, December 20, Ambassador Hildreth conveyed to the Department the substance of an aide-mémoire given to him that morning by the Pakistani Foreign Minister setting forth Pakistan’s position for the upcoming U.N. Security Council consideration of the Kashmir dispute. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12–2056)
7. Arthur Lall, Indian Permanent Representative to the United Nations.