Office of the Historian

114. Memorandum of a Conversation, Governor General’s Residence, Karachi, March 9, 1956, 8:15 a.m.1

Karachi, March 9, 1956, 8:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • Major General Iskander Mirza, Governor General of Pakistan
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Ambassador Horace A. Hildreth
  • (Part of the time: Begum Iskander Mirza)

SUBJECT

  • 1. Afghanistan
  • 2. Middle East
  • 3. Iran
  • 4. Pak/American Relations

Pursuant to the plea the Governor General made the day previous, Secretary Dulles and I had breakfast with the Governor General and his wife on the morning of the Secretary’s departure and just prior to the Secretary’s private conference with the Shah of Iran. In the mingled social and political conversation, the important points touched are as follows:

1. Afghanistan: The Secretary said it did not make much sense to just sit around doing nothing and let Afghanistan pass by default into the control of the Soviets. On the other hand, the Secretary said it would seem to be up to Pakistan to come up with some specific plans with some evidence that they might be capable of execution in a way that would achieve desirable results. The Governor General said he thought the best thing to do was to wait until he went to Kabul and he thought then he could really find out what the situation was and what prospects there might be for activity. He said he did not expect to get much from the King, but the King’s uncle, Shah Mahmoud, was an old and good friend of his and he hoped he might get much favorable information from him. He also indicated he had other long standing friends from whom he could get helpful information. On the other hand, he said we, meaning the American Embassy in Karachi, had indicated that the information from our Embassy in Kabul was to the effect that the invitation he had been expecting from the King to visit Kabul had not been forthcoming because they were waiting for the result of the Presidential election.2 Also, there was indication of a stumbling block due to the [Page 227] condition that diplomatic representation must be restored and since Kabul had withdrawn its representation in protest against One Unit the Kabul authorities did not see how they could restore diplomatic representation with One Unit still in existence. Of course now we had to see what the results of the SEATO final communiqué3 would have on the Afghan Government.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 2–4.]

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/3–956. Secret. Drafted by Hildreth. Enclosed in despatch 647 from Kabul. Another copy of this memorandum is ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.↩
  2. Reference is to the Pakistani election of March 5 in which Mirza was elected President. On February 29, the Pakistani Constituent Assembly had adopted a new constitution which made Pakistan a Republic as of March 23, 1956.↩
  3. This communiqué, dated March 8, stated that “the members of the Council severally declared that their governments recognized that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line, the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it was consequently affirmed that the Treaty area referred to in Articles IV and VIII of the Treaty includes the area up to that line.” The full text of the communiqué is printed in Department of State Bulletin, March 19, 1956, pp. 447–449.↩