69. Memorandum of Discussion at the 348th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 12, 19571
Present at the 348th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (participating in Items 1, 3, and 4); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Under Secretary of State Herter; the Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; Special Assistants to the President Stassen, Larson, Cutler, Killian, and Dearborn; Assistant Secretary of State Smith; Mr. John H. Ohly, ICA (for Item 2 only); the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
1. Report by the Secretary of State on the NATO Meeting
Secretary Dulles began by pointing out that the forthcoming NATO meeting was being given what he called “a special character”.2 [Page 215] The meeting would be attended by the heads of government of fifteen countries. Moreover, this NATO meeting would be taking decisions of greater importance than usual. The decisions in question would be both of a specific and of a general character. The first specific, continued Secretary Dulles, would relate to the acceptance by the United States of the plan for a NATO atomic stockpile, which had been initially put forward by the French at Bonn last May.3 This proposal had now been formulated in terms acceptable to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The nuclear weapons with warheads would be located at points on the Continent to be selected with the advice of General Norstad.…
Secondly, said Secretary Dulles, the United States will set forth the content of its accelerated missiles program. We will not fix any specific date, but will state that our IRBMs will be ready to be deployed in the NATO area whenever the NATO nations are ready to receive them. As to the precise areas where the IRBMs will be deployed, Secretary Dulles indicated that there were differences of opinion, both military and political. It would presumably take some time to iron out these differences.…
Secretary Quarles commented, in response to a question from Secretary Dulles, that the latter’s summary had been accurate. He added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had made some preliminary selection in the NATO area of sites for launching IRBMs but that SACEUR had not yet acted officially on this selection.
Secretary Dulles then pointed out that there was a good deal of discussion being generated by the opposition parties in the various NATO governments with respect to the question of where to deploy these missiles. Indeed, there was a real danger that this could become a serious political issue.…
Thirdly, said Secretary Dulles, we would announce at the NATO meeting that our Atomic Energy Act would be amended in order to permit more liberal exchange of atomic energy information. We will certainly seek authority to exchange information with our NATO allies if it is of a character that we know the Soviets already have. In cases where such information is not of very great significance, we will seek to exchange information with our allies even if we are not sure whether the Russians possess such information or not.
Next we shall submit a project for the pooling of scientific knowledge with our NATO allies on nuclear energy matters, on missiles, on outer space developments, and the like.…
[Page 216]From a political point of view, Secretary Dulles stated that one of the most difficult issues which would confront the NATO meeting was the degree of consultation which should be sought in the NATO Council. It was harder for the United States than for other NATO nations to agree to full consultation on all policy matters, because of the world-wide commitments and interests of the United States. However, we will agree to increase the exchange of policy information in the future around the NATO Council table. After all, as far as the United States is concerned, we have no policies which we seek to hide or are ashamed to acknowledge. All our policies are designed to protect freedom in the world. Nevertheless, we do not want to be in a position where we are unable to act promptly if necessary for the reason that we are obliged to consult with the NATO Council before taking action. With a volatile and unpredictable individual like Khrushchev at the head of the Soviet Union, we must be able to act quickly in various parts of the world. Khrushchev will certainly try to test out the resolution of the United States in a variety of circumstances and places. We must be in a position to act almost instantaneously when confronted by one of these Soviet attempts to probe our resolution and will. If we do not react instantly to such a probe, the prestige of the Soviet Union would become committed, with much more serious results. Furthermore, there were some problems between members of NATO where it was plainly better to deal outside the NATO Council than within it. This was true of the Cyprus problem. Likewise, France does not want the Algerian question discussed in the NATO Council. Exceptions such as these seem to preclude a hard and fast rule that all such policy matters must be discussed in the NATO Council before a NATO nation acts. But in general, we would do more by way of consultation, we will increase the stature of our permanent representatives in NATO.
Thereafter, Secretary Dulles indicated that there would be discussions at the NATO meeting in the economic field. The Italians, the Germans, and the French are all particularly anxious for such discussions. NATO is no exception to the other international bodies, in that its members all desire to have a voice in determining how the United States spends its money overseas. We are trying to work out a compromise measure which will provide for some kind of international fund, but not such a fund for which the United States alone subscribes all the money.
There will also be discussion of Pella’s suggestion for a NATO fund to provide assistance to the underdeveloped areas of the Middle [Page 217] East. There are certain features in Pella’s proposal which we do not like,4 notably repayment in local currencies; but we may agree on some plan which would provide that help to underdeveloped countries should be undertaken through a multilateral approach. We may even want to set up a new mechanism for this purpose, although there are a lot of multilateral mechanisms already in existence which can serve the purpose.
Lastly, there would undoubtedly be a discussion of disarmament. In this field the United States proposed to re-affirm the proposals which it made last May, coupling this with an indication of some measure of greater flexibility.
Secretary Dulles concluded by stressing that the main importance of the meeting would arise from the presence at it of President Eisenhower. This should in itself provide a rejuvenation of NATO, which clearly needed it in many instances, notably in case of France, which was a very weak partner indeed in the NATO alliance and caused us all a great deal of anxiety. Secretary Dulles thought that the Gaillard regime might fall at any moment and possibly confront the French with a Hobson’s choice between a Gaullist regime on the one hand and a popular front of left-wing parties on the other.
Apropos of these remarks, the President said that one was almost compelled to take a strong attitude toward France. Changing his thought, the President wondered whether, at the open meeting at 12 noon on Monday, we should not emphasize a peace move and a disarmament move as a means of indicating our peaceful intentions.
The National Security Council:
Noted and discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State on the forthcoming NATO meeting.
[Here follows discussion of items 2–4, the United States security effort overseas in FY 1958 and 1959, significant world developments affecting United States security, and the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The last two sections are scheduled for publication in forth-coming Foreign Relations volumes.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on December 13.↩
- Dulles had briefed a bipartisan Congressional meeting at the White House on December 3 about the proposals the United States would submit to NATO at the December meeting. (Ibid., Staff Secretary Records, Legislative Conferences, 1957)↩
- See Document 56.↩
- Reference is to the “Pella Plan” for Middle East economic development.↩