Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

35. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 13, 1956¹

Washington, August 13, 1956

SUBJECT

• NATO Force Levels

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Dulles
• Under Secretary Hoover
• Mr. Bowie (S/P)
• Mr. Murphy (G)
• [Mr. Howe (S/S)]
• Secretary of Defense Wilson
• Admiral Radford
• General Gruenther

Secretary Dulles opened the discussion with a reference to the need for a review of NATO force levels with special reference to American forces in Europe. Mr. Wilson expressed himself as being in thorough sympathy with the idea of a review looking to a reduction of American personnel stationed in Europe. There was an exchange of comments regarding German participation and a review of the position by General Gruenther. Secretary Wilson said he had made it quite clear to the Germans at the time of their recent visit² that the German contribution of 500,000 men should be considered in ratio to the United States’ contribution. He had pointed out that our force level was now 2 million 850 thousand, and that in ratio to our population, if our contribution were to be comparable to the one asked of the Germans, we would have a force level of only 1 million 650 thousand. Secretary Dulles explained that he had made the same point to the German Ambassador in a recent conversation.³ There was considerable discussion with General Gruenther regarding the makeup of the American forces stationed in Europe, the size of the divisional slice, which was estimated roughly at 40,000. General Gruenther laid emphasis on the morale factors involved which required services relating to schooling, commissaries, housing, dependents, etc., the importance of which he said should not be overlooked.

Secretary Wilson inquired as to how many American personnel are stationed in Europe at the present time and the Defense representatives were unable to give a figure, Admiral Radford saying that he was not certain, and General Gruenther indicating that it might be in the neighborhood of 400,000. There seemed to be agreement between Secretary Dulles and Secretary Wilson that a reduction in the size of the American establishment in Europe is possible and should be effected, although this should not necessarily take the form of a reduction of units but rather decreases in unit strength.⁴ General Gruenther emphasized that this would have to be studied very carefully as the effectiveness of the units would of course be reduced and many technical questions regarding handling of equipment would be raised. Admiral Radford was distinctly noncommittal. There was some conversation about the possibility of reducing the divisional strength by “X” number of thousands and the possibility that this might amount to as much as 5 to 10,000 based on a divisional slice of 40,000. There was no agreement on this point. General Gruenther referred to an extensive study which is being made by the Army involving, he said, some 600 men. Secretary Wilson said he thought the question could be settled much more effectively by five or six men than by 600. Secretary Dulles and Secretary Wilson recalled that reductions of our forces in Japan and Korea had been effected notwithstanding grave apprehensions expressed at the time, but the reductions had been made and the situation seems to have developed satisfactorily since then. They both expressed the opinion that a similar operation could be successfully accomplished in Europe, but there was no specification as to the magnitude of the reduction.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/8–1356. Top Secret. Drafted by Murphy.
2. Chancellor Adenauer made an official State visit to the United States, June 9–14, 1956.
3. A memorandum of conversation by Reinstein, July 17, is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.
4. At a meeting at the White House on August 12, the President discussed the question of American force levels in Europe with John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, Gordon Gray, Admiral Radford, General Gruenther, General Persons, Arthur Flemming, and Dillon Anderson. In a memorandum for the record dated August 13, Anderson recorded the President favored a reduction and wrote as follows: “The President said that he was speaking about units reduced in size and overhead but with equivalent strength through increased fire-power as a result of tactical atomic weapons. Secretary Dulles observed that we had a job of changing the German psychology from the present feeling that if we did make any reduction whatever, we are abandoning them. With this thought, the President expressed hearty agreement, and pointed out that the entire responsibility for German defense could not be construed to be our own.” Dillon concluded, “I gathered that the line of decision was the President’s request that there be further work on ways and means of reducing the size of our forces without reducing strength, by the use of tactical improvements in weapons, and effort should likewise be made to reduce the number of overhead or supporting elements.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

5. Fisher Howe’s record of this meeting, dated August 14, which received the concurrence of Murphy and Bowie and the approval of Dulles, reads as follows:

   “NATO Review—Agreed with Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford, as general conclusions, that a) it would be unwise at this juncture for NATO to adopt a new political directive to underlie a revision of NATO military force levels; b) it would be a mistake to withdraw any US/UK divisions from Europe at this time although c) we should consider reducing in the order of 25–50,000 the troop strength within existing divisions and in service troops; and d) the above conclusions could serve as a basis for the talks with the UK now scheduled for September.” (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/8–1456)