Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

859. Letter 1 from Clough to Martin¹

Letter No. 1

Washington, December 23, 1957

Dear Ed:

With Alex’s departure as the American protagonist in the Geneva discussions, I decided it would only be fitting to start a new letter series of which this is No. 1.

Judging from the length of time it is taking Peiping to reply to our proposal to shift the talks down from the ambassadorial level, we must have presented them with a difficult decision. They may react in one of three possible ways: (1) break off the talks entirely with a violent blast at us; (2) inform us they desire to continue the talks but only when we appoint an ambassador to meet with them or (3) agree to continue the meetings as proposed by us. The first alternative I consider very unlikely. The second however is quite possible and appears to be Alex’s choice as the most probable. We have prepared a draft press release for use in this eventuality and I enclose a copy. I should appreciate any comments or changes you may suggest. As you will see, the purpose of the release is to imply that the downgrading of the talks resulted from our dissatisfaction with the Chinese Communist response to our initiatives in the talks. At the same time we want to make clear that we are not breaking off the talks. That we have appointed an experienced officer to continue them and by not explicitly relating our action to failure of the Chinese Communists to do what we want them to, we leave the way open to appoint an ambassador whenever we consider it desirable to do so.

It is possible that the Chinese Communists may accept our proposal and appoint someone to meet with you. It seems to me that the likelihood of this happening diminishes as time passes without a response from Peiping.

It is probably premature as you suggest in your letter of December 17 to decide the adviser question until we know what the Chinese Communist response is. If you feel that you could manage with Cameron LaClair and Sue Gross that would of course simplify matters administratively. I suppose it is true that at a lower than ambassadorial level, the Communist statements at the meetings are likely to be even more routine and predictable than they have been in the past.

Orders are being written for Dexter to leave for Geneva the first week in January. We hope by that time to know what Peiping intends to do. It would be very awkward to have spent a year and a half training Dexter as a Chinese interpreter just to have him assigned to Geneva as a general service officer with no interpreting to do. We had such a difficult time working out some way of assigning him to Geneva that we are reluctant to suggest delay at this point for fear the arrangement might break down.

I agree entirely with your suggestion that some sort of official recognition be extended to Alex for the unique contribution he has made at Geneva to our diplomacy. I discussed the matter with Sam Gilstrap of FE/EX who suggested a letter of commendation from the Secretary to be followed by a recommendation to the Awards Committee for a superior service award.

Whether or not the Chinese Communists decide to appoint someone to continue the Geneva talks with you, I am sure you will be pleased to know that Mr. Robertson has great confidence in your ability to carry on the discussions, and it was he who recommended to the Secretary that you be selected for the job.

With best wishes for a happy New Year to you and Emma Rose and the children,

Sincerely,

Ralph N. Clough

Enclosure²

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

At the meeting in Geneva with the Chinese Communist representative on December 12, Ambassador Johnson informed him that he was being transferred and that the United States Government had designated his assistant, Mr. Edwin W. Martin, a senior Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American Embassy in London, as the United States representative in the talks. Mr. Martin is a Chinese language and area specialist with sixteen years’ service, who was a member of Ambassador Dean’s staff in the negotiations with the Chinese Communists in Korea in 1953–54. He took part in the conversations with the Chinese Communists in Geneva in 1954 concerning the Americans imprisoned in Communist China and was Ambassador Johnson’s advisor at the outset of the ambassadorial talks which began in Geneva, August 1, 1955. He has served as Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in the Department of State and has acted as Ambassador Johnson’s assistant at the meetings in Geneva since July, 1957.

The Chinese Communists have announced that they are unwilling to continue the talks except at the ambassadorial level. The United States is not prepared at this time to designate an ambassador for this purpose. However, it should be emphasized that the United States is not breaking off the talks. Mr. Martin will meet with a Chinese Communist representative at any mutually agreeable time.

The ambassadorial level talks at Geneva convened an August 1, 1955, with the mission of settling, first, the question of the return of civilians desiring to do so. What seemed to be a satisfactory solution was reached on September 10, 1955, when the Chinese Communists publicly announced that they would take appropriate measures to permit Americans desiring to do so to return “expeditiously” to the United States. Now, nearly two and a half years later, six Americans are still held by the Chinese Communists. The next question the two Ambassadors took up was the matter of a mutual renunciation of force. The Chinese Communists, while stating that they accept the principle of the renunciation of force, refused to agree that it is without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self defense and that it is applicable to the Taiwan area. For the past year and a half, the Chinese Communists have refused even to enter into a substantive discussion looking toward a meaningful declaration of the renunciation of force. The American Ambassador has also repeatedly attempted to obtain from the Chinese Communist representative an accounting for the United States military personnel missing and unaccounted for from the Korean hostilities, as well as any other American personnel missing in or near Chinese Communist territory of whom the Communists have any knowledge. The Chinese Communist representative has not only refused to provide such an accounting, but has rejected this matter as a subject for discussion in these talks, insisting merely that his authorities are not now holding any American military personnel.

1. Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Official–Informal.
2. No classification marking. Drafted by Clough on December 22.