Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

733. Letter 47 from Johnson to McConaughy¹

Letter No. 47

Geneva, October 17, 1956

Dear Walter:

1. I am starting this on Wednesday and will finish it tomorrow after the meeting.

2. I certainly have no objection to again bringing up the POW question here, but as Monroe said after his trip to Korea, I think the decision revolves around whether we believe there is any chance whatever of obtaining any more information and, if not, whether we then intend to use the issue further publicly to indict the Chicoms. If it is solely the latter I believe Geneva to be the best forum. I do not agree with the statement in the draft memo enclosed with your letter (No. 56) that Geneva offers a slightly better chance than Panmunjon for obtaining an accounting for at least a few of the 450. I can build up a good public record on the subject here and can probably embarrass Wang to a certain degree, but he is never going to give me any accounting for individuals here, and we should not raise the subject here on the assumption that there is any possibility he will do so. He has frequently and strongly taken the position that the lists he gave me at the outset of the talks accounted for all Americans in China and it cannot be expected he will reverse that position.

3. As a minor point with respect to numbered para (2) of the draft memo, I did in fact allude to the POW question at our 56th meeting (para 16 mytel 173) and drew a response from him on it.

4. With regard to the less likelihood of their countering with our failure to account for communist prisoners if the subject is raised here, you will recall that when I first raised the suject here he fortunately countered only with the 14,000 sent to Taiwan which was not hard to handle, but he may now be better prepared to counter with others and I will have to be prepared immediately to reply if he does so. Of course, by raising the subject here we will probably avoid the more difficult subject of the Koreans released by Rhee.

5. In this connection it is my recollection that their list may be wholly or primarily based on the lists of notification of capture that we transmitted through the ICRC. It is also my recollection that a large discrepancy in these lists arose from the fact that a capture form would be made out at the time the man was taken with a copy to the ICRC. On arrival at Kojedo the man’s tag would be missing and another would be made out with another copy to the ICRC. Because of the language problem, difficulties of transliteration, and sometimes through the POW giving a different name, the name would not appear as identical with the first report. Thus ICRC would receive and transmit to the Communists two names covering the capture of only one man. I do not recall whether this appears anywhere in the records, but I know it was explained to me when I made my “POW trip” to Korea with General Hull.

6. Also pertinent to all of this was an exchange of numbers of persons held in the early days of the armistice negotiations. My memory on this is dim but I believe we gave the Communists some definite numbers on those we held.

7. I do not recall what the circumstances are and when the communist list of missing personnel mentioned in the last sentence of the first para of the draft memo was presented or of what it consisted. My only point is that before terming it “in large part fictitious” I would want to be sure that it is not in fact based upon names originating with the UNC.

8. My memory on our exchanges of lists of names of POWs with the Communists is also very hazy. Not that it is likely to come in any detail here, but to avoid possible mistakes I would appreciate a short summary of the facts in this regard. I have a feeling we gave them some list early in the armistice negotiations, and that they gave us one but I am just not sure whether this is correct or of what they consisted. Were there also not lists given the NNRC which were passed on to the Communists? I do not want anyone to go to any great trouble on this but perhaps there is a pertinent summary already made up. Perhaps HD would have it available or could readily make it up.

9. Whether the subject is raised here or Panmunjon it will be important that the information with respect to individuals reflect the “accounting” set forth in CINCUNC’s message of March 2, 1956. That is, in our best documented cases of their at one time being alive in Communist hands, the March accounting attempted to dispose of them by saying they had “escaped”. Thus in these “escaped” cases the issue is no longer whether they were at one time alive in Communist hands, by saying they “escaped” they have admitted this, but rather being able to demonstrate that such an accounting is false. This is very well set forth in detail in the memo enclosed with Dave’s letter of August 23. My reason for mentioning it is that while the Memo to the Service Secretaries enclosed with your letter encloses what I presume is the substance of Dave’s memo, the attached “Suggestions” do not appear to take account of this important point of which I would have to take account before again raising individual cases here. For our purposes here I would not need any large number of cases, a half dozen or so would probably serve my purposes, although, of course, the more I have in my pocket the better. My suggestion would be to have Ralph and Col. Monroe pick out a few of the most promising cases and exhaustively run them down with the services rather than spreading the effort too thin.

10. My 362 did not imply that I had changed my estimate that they are most likely to make a major move shortly after the elections and the opening of the UNGA. With two weeks between meetings, the “next few meetings” mentioned in my 362 brings us up to that point. What I have been and continue to say is that they are very obviously putting themsleves in a position to carry out such a move at about that time. Whether they do so, of course, remains to be seen. I simply want to be sure that the Department understands and is prepared for the contingency and does not desire to take any further action to forestall it. Incidentally, while our position through the Suez crisis has been very consistent with the position on renunciation of force I have taken here, the statements of the French and British have certainly not given too much support to the “universally accepted” nature of the principle.

11. I was very interested in your account of the Chinese Communist initiative in the publications field. Do our Treasury regulations operate so as to prevent any such shipments? (I have subsequently seen the CA notice which I am glad to note is encouraging the licensing for non-technical publications.)

12. I had been deploring publicity under my previous instructions but had also tried to make it clear we did not fear it. I entirely agree with Walter’s views and will act accordingly in the future.

13. The guidance for tomorrow has just come in. It is very complete and I certainly agree we are on a strong wicket in the disgraceful McCarthy affair. I just can’t understand why they have done it.

Thursday

14. Back from the meeting and have just sent off my summary to you. I do not think there can longer be much doubt as to the course of action they have laid out for themselves. The only question now is the timing—that is will they carry out their move at the next meeting just before the elections and the UNGA or will they wait until the following meeting just after the elections and the UNGA. In any event, there will in all probability be a public statement following the next meeting, which will make the threat to break, with the break carried out at the following meeting. One can never dismiss the possibility of a bland reversal but I just do not think it is likely as they have now gone almost out to the end of this limb. I hope that the Secretary will have time carefully to consider the situation and that my guidance will be as explicit as possible.

15. I deliberately did not try further today to develop the threat implicit in the last sentence of his prepared statement, leaving that for next time when I will want to make a very carefully considered and comprehensive statement in reply to his of today. I would hope that my guidance will also cover whether it is desired I try to steer things in the direction of an indefinite recess or a clean break, if the next meeting goes in that direction.

16. I should think it would be nice to get out our statement on implementation before the next meeting. I think it would place us in a much better position to meet their next move. (Incidentally, I hope you will get it to us here well before release time so that we know what has been said and I can get a copy over to Wang at approximately its release time.) I should also think that at our next meeting I should be prepared to say something on the missing POWs without getting into any details.

17. I am enclosing for comment a draft break statement which I would plan to issue immediately following any meeting at which a break would occur. It might, of course, be necessary somewhat to modify it to meet the exact situation but I would plan to stick fairly close to its general line. As this would ostensibly be an extemporaneous statement as I left the meeting room it must be short and simple.

18. In the quite likely event he does not break at our next meeting but very shortly thereafter and issues a statement along the lines of his prepared statement today I would propose to promptly comment along the lines of para 2, 3, and 4 of the enclosed break statement with such changes as the circumstances require.

Regards to all,

Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

P.S. Just an afterthought. If they are planning something timed to our elections I might throw them off step and somewhat spike their guns by asking for a postponement of the next meeting to Monday November 5. I am in a good position to ask for it as I have never cashed in on the times I have agreed to his requests for postponement. I would, of course, do it at the last minute, that is on Wednesday or Thursday before the meeting and all I would have to do is send him word that it was “impossible” for me to meet until Nov. 5.

UAJ

Enclosure²

DRAFT STATEMENT

I regret to announce that at today’s meeting Ambassador Wang refused to agree to any date for our next meeting. (or refused to meet further with me).

In effect, he refuses to meet further unless the U.S. capitulates to their demand for a Foreign Ministers conference under the continued threat that the Chinese Communists will resort to force if they cannot otherwise achieve their ambitions in the Taiwan area. Ambassador Wang has also demanded that the U.S. remove its existing controls over trade and travel between the U.S. and China.

I have told Ambassador Wang that I hope he will reconsider this peremptory attitude and for my part I stand ready again to meet at any time to resume with him in a genuine negotiating spirit search for agreement on an unconditional declaration which would remove the existing threat of the Chinese Communists to resort to force in the Taiwan area and agree that our differences will be settled by peaceful means only.

The U.S. continues to expect the Chinese Communists to carry out their commitment of September 10, 1955 and promptly to release the 10 unfortunate Americans still held in their prisons in violation of that agreement.

I have informed Ambassador Wang that any communications can be transmitted through our respective consular offices here in Geneva.

1. Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. Johnson signed the original “Alex.”
2. No classification marking.