622. Letter from Osborn to Clough1

Dear Ralph:
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If we are not inclined to talk on the basis of Wang’s May 11 draft, I think the best way of avoiding it is to submit a new draft. I don’t think the April 19 revision is adequate for this purpose. It is too close to our January 12 revision, for one thing, and is not the kind of dramatic “effort” to reach agreement that would really look good in the record. For another thing, in point of timing we need something that postdates their May 11 draft.

A second reason for submitting a new draft (the first being our possible reluctance to talk on the basis of their May 11 draft) is that this would keep Peiping off balance with respect to a break-off, and possibly even with respect to a resort to the public. They would want to have the last word—as usual—and might be reluctant to face the public on the basis of a record showing the United States had made the last concrete effort to reach agreement. The effectiveness of our new draft in accomplishing this purpose would, of course, depend on how good our “effort” would look in the record.

Possible New Draft—December 1 with a Codicil:

We have preserved a position in the talks from which we can consistently say that we have, from the time of its submission, considered [Typeset Page 1005] Wang’s December 1 draft an acceptable form and framework for a declaration renouncing the use of force; but we have, also from the time of its submission, been concerned about certain ambiguities therein which make it possible for the December 1 draft to mean one thing to one side and another to the other side.

Our successive efforts since January 12 have been [Facsimile Page 2] directed at removing the ambiguities of the December 1 draft. We could argue that Wang, by his submission of his May 11 draft, has in effect acknowledged his own concern about the ambiguities of his December 1 draft.

Wang’s May 11 draft (we could argue), in trying to overcome the ambiguities of his December 1 draft, unfortunately sacrifices too much of what was good in the December 1 draft. Wang has thrown out the baby with the bathwater.

What we ought to do is to concentrate on the essential task of turning the December 1 draft into a meaningful declaration by removing its ambiguities while preserving this mutually acceptable form and framework.

How to do this? In regard to what points do both Ambassadors agree the December 1 draft requires amplification or specification? First, both Ambassadors seem to be in agreement that it is desirable to make it clear that the declaration does not prejudice the rights, or the positions and views of one side or the other. Various ways, none of them completely satisfactory to both sides, have been suggested. And yet, in answer to the direct question “should the proposed declaration be interpreted as in any way prejudicing the rights of either side, or the position of either side with respect to the merits of this dispute?” both Ambassadors would certainly say it should not.

Secondly, both Ambassadors have suggested ways in which the declaration should be related to the Taiwan area. There has been much discussion on this point, but surely both Ambassadors would agree that the Taiwan area dispute should be included in the disputes referred to in the proposed declaration.

Our suggestion in presenting the enclosed draft would be that the way to agreement on a declaration acceptable to both sides is to take the acceptable form and framework of the December 1 draft and let it stand, with the addition of an “Agreed Understanding” (or some other name for Codicil) on the two points mentioned above.

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I would presume that our initial draft “Agreed Understanding” would contain only the two paragraphs. If Wang insisted on a third paragraph relating to a FMC, we might be prepared to move towards something like the bracketed third paragraph of the enclosure.

On the whole, I am inclined to think this approach might be better—safer and more under our control, also less defensive—than the approach outlined in paragraph four of my May 14 letter.

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Regards to all. Hope Walter is not too tired from his trip West.

Sincerely,

David L. Osborn

P.S. It looks as though I may at last get some substantive work to do—writing up some reports, attending some conferences—in the Delegation’s Economic Section. Hope so.

DLO
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Enclosure

Draft Agreed Announcement With Codicil2

AGREED ANNOUNCEMENT ETC.

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the Peoples’ Republic of China, agree to announce:

The United States of America and the Peoples’ Republic of China are determined that they should settle disputes between their two countries through peaceful negotiations without resorting to the threat or use of force;

The two Ambassadors should continue their talks to seek practical and feasible means for the realization of this common desire.

AGREED UNDERSTANDING OF THE TWO AMBASSADORS:

1. Neither this Announcement nor any of its provisions is to be construed as in any way prejudicing the rights of either side or the position of either side with respect to the merits of their disputes;

2. This Announcement applies to all disputes between our two countries, including that in the Taiwan area.

[3. With reference to the last paragraph of the Announcement, the two of us shall not only continue to discuss and strive to settle the practical matters at issue between us, but shall expeditiously consider and arrange for such other practical and feasible means, including the holding of negotiations at a higher level, as may be [Facsimile Page 5] ascertained to be appropriate and necessary.]3

  1. Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official–Informal. Osborn signed the postscript “Dave.”
  2. Confidential.
  3. Bracketed paragraph would not be part of initial draft. [Footnote and brackets in the original.]