Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

613. Telegram 2023 to Geneva¹

Washington, May 22, 1956, 4:37 p.m.

2023. For Johnson.

Guidance for May 24 meeting.

1. We consider best counter to Communist May 11 draft to be restatement our position. Go back to our original October 8 proposal and restate reasons why US seeks renunciation force. Again place on record our purpose to remove threat military force, not to require either party acquiesce in policies of other. Point out our April 19 revision Wang’s draft carefully drawn accomplish this purpose and no other.

2. While you should avoid being drawn into specific comment on Communist draft, particularly paragraph 1, you should probe further into meaning of two-month limitation paragraph three, along lines you took May 11. As we understand Communist position they are offering renunciation force only for period of negotiations. If negotiations fail within two months achieve solution satisfactory to Communists or agreement on Foreign Ministers Conference or if Foreign Ministers Conference fails reach settlement on Communist terms, renunciation force would lapse. This is not a renunciation force. Renunciation force is pledge such as that taken by UN members not to use force except in self-defense. Pledge has no time limit. Present Communist proposal appears to be agreement to refrain from using force for limited period only unless dispute in which they have threatened force is resolved in their favor.

3. If Wang continues base his argumentation on allegations US has used force against Taiwan and seized it you should take appropriate opportunity repudiate these falsehoods in addition to pointing out Wang is going beyond question renunciation force into substance dispute.

4. FYI Department commends your adroit drawing out of Wang on applicability Agreed Announcement to prisoners. Investigations of INS indicate high probability responsible Federal and State authorities agreeable release all Chinese alien prisoners for immediate deportation. If deportation decided upon, procedure desired which would bring maximum leverage on Chinese Communists to release imprisoned Americans and bring us tactical benefits Geneva. We intend avoid any compromise of principle, but are mindful convicted felons not entitled same civil rights as law abiding alien residents.
Following courses appear to be available:

A. Deport compulsorily to Mainland China all Chinese alien criminals who came from there.

B. Inform Chinese alien prisoners individually of Agreed Announcement and tell them they may apply for parole and immediate voluntary deportation Mainland China if they wish. If this course followed, we would have to decide whether Indian Embassy representatives would be allowed interview prisoners to verify prisoners’ decision and satisfy themselves it freely arrived at. In order obtain maximum bargaining and public relations benefit, we would clearly have to permit Indians interview all prisoners, although not desirable in some respects to allow representatives of Chinese Communist interests to interview Chinese prisoners who have not expressed any interest in returning to mainland. (It may be that most if not virtually all would reject voluntary deportation.)

C. Take no action on prisoners except possibly in cases where they appeal to Indian Embassy of their own volition for return to Communist China.

D. Refuse to take any action on prisoners in any event on thesis that Agreed Announcement does not apply to common criminals convicted of offenses involving moral turpitude.

If we should take action in regard to these criminals, question whether to demand reciprocity for our imprisoned nationals would arise. Should we endeavor to obtain balancing quid pro quo from Chinese Communists for every action taken by us? We could make offer to deport all Chinese prisoners contingent upon simultaneous deportation of all imprisoned Americans. Also could equate visits by Indian Embassy representatives to Chinese prisoners with visits by British Embassy representatives to American prisoners. Or we could refuse to descend to trading tactics, seeking place added moral pressure on Communists by keeping our action on higher plane independent of Chinese Communist transgressions.

Your detailed evaluation these courses and any variants which you may wish comment on, with your recommendations, are invited in time for formulation your instructions for next meeting. While effect each proposal on prospects of American prisoners and on future course of negotiations should be carefully assessed, also bear in mind effect on our public position in event of break off.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–2256. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and Clough; cleared by Phleger and Sebald.