606. Letter from Osborn to Clough1
Reading Walter’s latest letter, which came this morning, I feel bad about all the trouble you in CA and FE have had to go to on my account. Believe me I appreciate it from the bottom of my heart, and if there had been any alternative I would gladly have taken it. [text not declassified]
If I can take advantage of this extremely informal context, I’d like to broach an idea or two on the talks, mainly so that if the ideas reflect too much of a drift away from FE’s, you can write back and tell me they’re all wet. They are not official suggestions, not endorsed by the Ambassador (to whom I haven’t shown—but will show—this letter) and don’t even reflect any hard-and-fast opinions on my part.
1. Duration of Talks—We will presumably continue unwilling to force a break, so that duration is up to CHICOMS. Their position with respect to continuation of talks will reflect not only their appreciation of the value [Facsimile Page 2] of the talks per se, as an instrument for promoting the trend towards accommodation and hurting the GRC, but also their estimate of the prospects for a FMC.
2. CHICOM Estimate of FMC Prospects—CHICOMS will presumably not want to force the issue of a FMC before Nehru’s U.S. visit in July. Question is whether they will want to try to force the issue during Nehru’s visit, or whether they may not have another crucial date in mind, the presidential elections in November. They must be aware that we are not going to volunteer any movement towards a FMC, at least before November. They might be content to wait out November. On the other hand, they might try to put the Administration in a pre-election dilemma, by threatening hostilities against the offshores unless we agree to a FMC. Either choice would be very painful, particularly just before election time, but the CHICOMS might figure that with the GOP campaign slogan “Peace and Prosperity” the Administration would choose the FMC as the lesser of two evils.
3. The Worth of a FMC—The thing that bothers me about a FMC, apart from the general damage that a FMC would do to the anti-communist forces in the FE, is what would there be to talk about? Paradoxically, about the safest topic I can think of would be a meaningful renunciation of force. Still, in Europe especially, one senses how much the U.S. needs [Typeset Page 969] some [Facsimile Page 3] evidence to point to to show it is not being “unreasonable” in its opposition to Communist China.
4. Our Tactics Vis-a-vis New Draft—Wang’s new draft has a lot of bargaining room built in. We can exploit this for two or three months, at least. Here, however, is a point: in order to get the most mileage out of the new draft, it would be a tremendous help to have some idea of the Department’s thinking on strategy. One approach on the new draft, designed to get mileage, would be to go through the thing paragraph by paragraph. The first paragraph alone, for example, would be good for three or four meetings. However, in planning this kind of approach, it would be helpful to know more about our objectives. If we are going to be really adamant on the first paragraph as per our April 19 draft, for example, we should save discussion of the paragraph until the last, since once we start insisting on ICSD without “mutual respect” we have put a term to the mileage we can get out of the new draft. What would enable us to get the most mileage would be if we had a “minimum position” draft towards which we could work point by point and paragraph by paragraph—such a draft would, of course, not be tabled until all possible mileage had been squeezed out of Wang’s new draft.
[Facsimile Page 4]5. A “Minimum-Position” Draft—In the enclosure, I have tried my hand at such a draft. This does not represent my opinion of what would be desirable in the way of a declaration if we had carte blanche. It is merely a sample of the kind of thing that would be a very useful guide for us in getting mileage out of Wang’s draft.
In drafting the enclosure, I have tried to protect our position on three points: (a) no sacrifice of self-defense right; (b) renunciation of force applicable to Taiwan; and, (c) U.S. control over whether and when FMC to be held, with implication in any event not until Americans released. The last paragraph in particular is rather treacherous ground, but in any case, the whole enclosure is purely illustrative and not intended as a concrete suggestion.
As to whether Wang would “buy” the enclosed, I have my doubts, but I think it is at least conceivable. He would certainly look darn unreasonable if he turned it down. Whether or not he would buy it, such a draft would at least help us get mileage out of Wang’s draft.
Hope I haven’t presumed too much on your time. Regards to Doug, Steve, Joe, Allene, Irene, Elaine. Regards and sincere thanks to Walter and Mr. Sebald—and Cappy.
Sincerely yours,