Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

589. Telegram 1823 from Geneva¹

Geneva, April 27, 1956, 1 a.m.

1823. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 45th meeting today with prepared statement saying he has carefully studied draft I presented 26th meeting and was bound state this draft still contained points their side had long declared categorically unacceptable. Indeed, as he had pointed out at last meeting, this draft did not differ in substance from ones I had submitted on Nov 10, 1955 and Jan 10, 1956.

2. Wang said his side could not but consider that at a time when our discussions on this subject of announcement had entered eighth month, my submission of such draft was entirely at variance with my expression of expectation early agreement at last meeting.

3. Wang said as his side had consistently pointed out, US already used force and threat of force. Had seized Taiwan and was trying interfere in China’s liberation offshore islands. Under such circumstances, announcement which embodied our claim so-called right self-defense could only be interpreted as requiring PRC side to recognize status quo in Taiwan area as well as US treaty with Chiang Kai-shek clique. Obviously that was what his side could not accept. Yet my draft still contained clause on so-called right self-defense.

4. Wang said, moreover, I had also made references to what I termed “pursuit by each side of policies by peaceful means”. Insofar as US concerned, US policy towards China has so far been interference in China’s exercise sovereign rights over Taiwan, and in its liberation offshore islands. Statements I had made in course our discussions only bore this out. Such policy is inadmissible by whatever means it might be pursued.

5. Wang said if pursuit such policies by US to be countenanced, what purpose would then be left for any peaceful negotiations between China and US?

6. Wang said insofar as China concerned, its policy had been liberation open territory Taiwan and offshore islands. This matter of China’s internal affairs and admits no interference by any other country, whichever means China chooses use.

7. Wang said my draft also retained reference to what I termed “without resorting use force Taiwan area or elsewhere”. Here again as their side had long pointed out, announcement which mixes up international dispute with internal affairs is impermissible and therefore is something their side could not accept.

8. Wang said particularly serious aspect of matter is that while my draft makes specific reference Taiwan area, it entirely omits any reference holding Foreign Ministers conference. This only indicates that US still intending obtain declaration which would freeze situation Taiwan area and then to procrastinate and refuse take practical step for solution dispute there, in order to maintain status quo of US seizure Taiwan and interference liberation offshore islands.

9. Wang asked, such being case how could it be alleged that my draft meets points view both sides. As they had categorically stated, if it desired make specific reference Taiwan area, then same announcement must also provide for holding Sino-American conference Foreign Ministers. Moreover, no specific reference to Foreign Ministers conference made, there would be no justification for demanding reference to Taiwan area in such announcement.

10. Wang said any agreed announcement between us must give assurance both sides. Any agreed announcement putting a restraint on one side without other side offering any assurance could not be made basis for reaching agreement.

11. Wang said as he had pointed out, fundamental difference between respective drafts our two sides was that their drafts embodied points acceptable both sides and did not contain anything unacceptable either side, whereas my drafts require their side surrender rights and accept demands which their side cannot accept. Same comment applies fully my April 19 draft.

12. Wang said he must state in all seriousness that to reach agreement on matter issuance announcement, such announcement must be fair and reasonable, on basis equality for both sides. My draft, however, fell short of this mark.

13. I said in these discussions I thought it important we keep in sight fundamental involved this matter. As I often said, problem we face not the issuing announcement for sake of announcement, simply saying some words that may mean one thing to him another thing to me, so we can give superficial agreement to world. This was not point. Whole objective much deeper and more fundamental than that. My basic suggestion from very beginning our discussions very simply stated: is that recognizing these differences between us, never [very] serious difficulties and particularly with respect Taiwan area that we very simply and straightforwardly say we are not going to go to war about them. At same time, we would not say anything that would prejudice views either side with respect these disputes. I had suggested his government make such statement, and if it did so, my government would make similar statement reiterating its position. He had suggested form and content such statement, to which I had very closely adhered in incorporating views my government with regard those points which it considers essential to a meaningful statement.
However, question much more fundamental than those just of form and exact words of statement; question is, is there really agreement between us on renunciation use of force in settling disputes, including dispute in Taiwan area. That is, was his government, in accordance accepted standards international conduct, willing renounce force as instrument national policy?

14. I said if his government had made decision in fact to renounce force as instrument national policy, there could be no real objection to text of draft which I gave him April 21. If that decision had not been made by his government, I could see no formulation of a meaningful declaration would be acceptable to him. Only if that principle were accepted without mental reservation or purpose of evasion would agreement on meaningful agreement for declaration be arrived at between us.

15. I said he had previously stated that his objections my other drafts based on connections he saw between self-defense clause and mention Taiwan area. Revisions which I suggested April 19 removed any plausible possibility such argument. I respected his right to hold whatever views he desired with regard to nature, origin, any other aspect our dispute in Taiwan area. This draft provided no basis for alleging it required his side recognize anything it did not want recognize or in any way prejudice his position. What this draft did do was require his side say unequivocally and clearly it will not use force to impose its views. Apparently it was that to which he objected, in fact, rather than to any other aspect of draft. We had done our utmost to produce draft which both sides could unqualifiedly accept and which should be accepted if [omission in the original] arriving at solution.

16. I was puzzled by and could hardly believe that he really meant his statement asking what purpose of peaceful negotiations would be if each side were free pursue its policies by peaceful means. If what he appeared be saying was that he saw no prospect of a solution to questions in Taiwan area unless they be able maintain their threat use force in that area. There was great difference between that and a renunciation of force that would genuinely make possible real negotiations. It seemed to me that this strikes to very root of question between us and represents not the slightest change from announced policy with respect use of force which his government had long maintained. Fundamental question was whether his government was willing without reservation or purpose of evasion renounce force so that there would be genuine peaceful negotiations. Central thought behind my original proposal had been and remained that genuine peaceful negotiations between us on these complicated and complex problems were not possible under overhanging threat that one side on one pretext or another would resort to use of force. Renunciation of force and peaceful negotiations were not separate and unrelated items. If one was really determined discuss problem peacefully, one could not at same time threaten use of force with regard that problem. Unless he accepted that principle, I could come no conclusion other than that there was not genuine sharing desire my government for peaceful solution.

17. I said I never had and did not now ask him abandon his views with respect our disputes in Taiwan area, but I did ask him accept applicability declaration as a whole to our disputes in Taiwan area. Not just that portion declaration relating peaceful negotiations but that indispensable concomitant thereto, of renunciation of force. The two went together and could not be separated. I could not escape conclusion that in his insistence on linking any mention Taiwan area to Foreign Ministers meeting he was, in fact, separating those two fundamental concepts.

18. I said I also could not escape conclusion that objection to self-defense clause in its present position was based upon an attempt to obtain a document which he would interpret as renunciation by US of its position. I was not asking him recognize in any way US position with regard to merits of our dispute. I was only asking him accord to me same respect for our views as I accorded to his. If there were agreement on his part with me on genuinely renouncing force as first essential preliminary to seeking means of peacefully settling our disputes, there could be no valid objection to this draft. If there were not such agreement, difficulties between us were indeed deep and disturbing.

19. Wang said he had given me his views with regard to my draft of April 19, both at last meeting and this morning. In his statements he had specifically pointed out reasons why they objected to and could not accept my draft. Their efforts at trying find agreement on issuance renunciation of force declaration must be carried out on basis of fair and reasonable proposal. Their drafts of October 27 and December 1 were just such drafts and fulfilled principle of reasonableness and fairness. If US had genuine desire settle and resolve grave disputes between our two countries, there could be no reason for not accepting these drafts of their side. He regretted find that so far we not able arrive agreement on basis their drafts.

20. Wang said he obliged note that new opinion submitted by me did not change my former position and did not advance our meeting a step further. This morning I had again made statements to effect that I respected their views and rights in Taiwan area and would not prejudice those views and rights. However my draft of April 19 in its text precisely prejudiced their lawful views in that respect. He noted in my statement this morning I had made repeated references to what I said had been use of force and threat of use of force by his side. Such references in fact were made in attempt cover up use of force by US in Taiwan area and attempt by US use threat of force against PRC. His side had constantly made clear that FonMins conference was the most effective means for settling grave disputes between PRC and US in Taiwan area, and so if it were desired make specific reference Taiwan area in agreement, same announcement must make provision for holding FonMins conference.

21. Wang said I had said my draft of April 19 had met their views and had removed reasons for their objections, but actually this draft, like all others, retained those features toward which they voiced their objections. As such, how could I say it had met and removed their objections? As he had said in his statement this morning, his side trying to find announcement capable of being accepted by both sides. My side had repeatedly proposed drafts which their side long ago made clear it objected to and could not accept. This would not help resolve problems between us.

22. I said there were two aspects to his objections. One aspect was whether anything that was said prejudiced his position with respect to our disputes. The other aspect was whether or not our declaration was to constitute an unqualified renunciation of force with respect to all our disputes including our dispute in Taiwan area. My draft of April 19 was second successive attempt I had made arrive formulation which took account his views. With regard to aspect prejudicing his position, I was satisfied it met every essential requirement both sides in this regard. However, if his purpose in this declaration was retain his ability use threat of initiating use of force in Taiwan area, I agreed it did not meet his position and I never could meet his position in that regard. To do so would be complete perversion of entire purpose this declaration.

23. Wang said I had said I had made so much effort in order meet their views; however, my draft actually did not make such provisions as I had said. On contrary, my draft of April 19 still retained those points to which they objected and which they could not accept. If one could be credited with making genuine effort achieve a declaration it was his side which had made such an effort, as manifested in his December 1 draft. To speak about the threat of armed force, he could say actual problem we now facing [garble] US threat of force against his side and not his armed forces occupying US territory. Nothing could obscure this fact.

24. I said if had nothing further I would like speak again about our September 10 announcement on civilians. I wished tell him very plainly, very bluntly, that sense of outrage in my country over what I could only term the premeditated and malicious failure of his government release remaining Americans as agreed in our announcement of September 10 was growing. His government should know this was particularly true of all members of both parties of both Houses of our Congress. This was an urgent and serious situation. I would be doing a disservice if I minimized or attempted gloss over the growing feeling in my country with respect to what everyone regarded as a very straightforward case of failing carry out the pledged word of his government. It was going on eight months since we made that announcement of September 10 and it was over four months since any Americans had been released. I asked he impress upon his authorities urgent importance of immediately doing something about this matter.

25. Wang said if we were to speak about dissatisfaction concerning the civilian question, it was his side which was dissatisfied about the situation. He had made so many representations concerning the return of Chinese from the US. But so far had not received any resonable reply from me. Just how many Chinese were there in prison in US—he had raised this question many months ago and I had not bothered reply this simple question as to how many Chinese were in prison in US. Could I say this attitude my side conformed with September 10 announcement? He had given me names 49 Chinese whose departure being obstructed in spite of fact these people innocent and had not committed any crime. However, I had not complied his request make investigation and give accounting of them. So far I had not given any constructive reply this question. Chinese people were very dissatisfied with obstructions received by Chinese nationals in US. Therefore, he hoped I would impress this feeling of Chinese people on US Government. And see that these obstructions against Chinese residents in US were corrected.

26. I said facts showed there had not been a single case of any obstruction and he well aware of that fact. Fact that Indian Embassy had not called our attention to single case in which obstruction had been alleged was incontrovertible evidence that cannot be denied.

27. Wang asked did I mean to say that not a single Chinese was locked up in US prisons?

28. I said there had not been a single case of Chinese desiring return Wang’s country who had alleged obstruction of any kind. I make no exceptions. If there were such case it certainly would have been called to our attention by Indian Embassy.

29. Wang said fact was that 49 Chinese desire return but have not been able do so. Such was a fact. He would appreciate my making formal statement hereto that there not now single Chinese in prison in US.

30. I said if any of those 49 Chinese really desired return and felt really being obstructed they certainly would have contacted Indian Embassy, and if Indian Embassy felt had there been any factual basis it certainly would have carried out its functions under agreed announcement.

31. Wang said he could only impress on me, here, great dissatisfaction of Chinese people with regard failure to return these 49 Chinese. They would not cease raising this matter here as long as these people had not returned.

32. Wang proposed Saturday May 5 for next meeting. I agreed.

Gowen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4–2756. Confidential; Limit Distribution.