Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

486. Memorandum from McConaughy to Robertson¹

Washington, February 9, 1956

SUBJECT

• Recent Reactions to Continuance of the Johnson-Wang Talks in Geneva

Summary

Adverse reaction to continuation of the talks has been noted in

1. Thailand

2. Hong Kong

3. Taiwan

4. Japan

5. Viet Nam

6. Republic of Korea

No reaction was noted in

1. Australia

2. Austria

3. Belgium

4. Cambodia

5. France

6. Italy

7. Laos

8. New Zealand

9. Philippines

No survey of reactions was taken in countries that have recognized Communist China.

Thailand

Quoted from Bangkok’s telegram of January 12, 1956.

“In recent conversation acting Foreign Minister Ran (repeat Ran) told me Thai Government concerned over fact that Thailand Chinese becoming increasingly pro-Chinese communist. He attributed this shift primarily to impact U.S.-Chinese Communist Geneva talks, suggested U.S. use all (repeat all) means possible counteract.

“Comment: Chinese Communist star has been rising here as result of Geneva talks as well as other developments of which Department is aware . . . It is highly unlikely that our explanations can offset impact of fact that U.S. is talking with Chinese Communists. Even if talks should collapse, it would be most difficult erase effects of developments last six months on attitude local Chinese. So long as Chinese Communists continue play their propaganda cards as cleverly as they have been doing, they stand to hold if not increase gains already made.”

Hong Kong

Letter dated January 23, 1956 from Consul General Everett F. Drumright.

“. . . Already the tide is running against us, partly because of our own hobnobbing with the Chinese Communists at Geneva and partly because of the weak-kneed attitudes being shown by our allies out here. I am afraid the trend of drift to the other side is likely to continue and even to be accelerated unless we and our allies dig in and truly convince the uncommitted people out here that we are not seeking accommodations with the Communists and that we really mean business in pushing back Communist expansionism which has become much more dangerous, subtle and varied during the past year.”

Letter dated January 30, 1956 from Consul General Everett F. Drumright.

“. . . So long as we continue negotiations with the Chinese Communists, it is going to be impossible to convince people out here that we are not seeking some accommodation which will be at their expense. In such a climate, no matter how good our information program may be, it cannot be expected to achieve any measurable success among those we want to influence.”

Taiwan

Aide Memoire transmitted by Taipei’s telegram of January 26, 1956. The Chinese Foreign Minister said in part:

“The Chinese Government views with particular concern the offer made by the U.S. to enter into a bilateral declaration with the Chinese Communist regime concerning the renunciation of the use of force. Such a declaration would be tantamount to an admission by the U.S. to equal responsibility for the existing situation in the Taiwan Strait, for which the Chinese Communists should and must be held solely responsible. In the form now proposed by the U.S. it might be understood to imply a tacit de facto recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. It would be construed by the free peoples in Asia and elsewhere as a further retreat of the U.S. position and would consequently weaken their determination of resisting Communist inducement . . .

“It has been the consistent view of the Chinese Government that the Geneva talks, once permitted to go beyond the practical question of civilian repatriation, would inevitably degenerate into a favorable platform for Communist propaganda and provide opportunities for neutralist countries to further exert pressure on the U.S. toward appeasement. This view has unfortunately been borne out by recent events.

“It is the considered opinion of the Chinese Government that, in the interests of the U.S. and the Republic of China as well as the free world as a whole, the Geneva talks on the renunciation of the use of force should be brought to an end as soon as possible.”

The point of view stated in this aide memoire was also expressed by several Taipei newspaper editorials and articles as reported in January Weekas from Taiwan.

Japan

Quoted from Tokyo’s telegram of January 31, 1956.

“. . . In spite of all which has been said publicly by the Secretary and others, there is still a large body of opinion in Japan which believes that American policy towards Red China is changing and there is considerable concern lest an abrupt change be made without Japan knowing in advance so that she can adjust her own policy accordingly.

“I assured Mr. Kishi that I had seen no evidence of any coming change in our policy toward Red China and while obviously no one could say what would be the situation after passage of several years, nevertheless I could assure him that our policy in fact was the same that it has been stated to be time after time by our public leaders. I emphasized that the Ambassadorial level talks in Geneva were purely for the purpose of obtaining release of Americans imprisoned in Red China and for the purpose of obtaining if at all possible a commitment on the part of Red China not to use force in the Formosa area but that these talks in no way implied any recognition of Red China or any intention to recognize Red China in the future.”

Viet Nam

Newspaper editorial comment in Viet Nam has consistently criticized the Geneva talks and has recently stepped up demands for breaking off the negotiations. (Saigon’s telegram of February 4, 1956.)

Republic of Korea

Light newspaper editorial comment in the Republic of Korea has been skeptical of the value of the Geneva talks.

Austria, France, Belgium, Italy, Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Australia, and New Zealand

No comment indicating concern by these governments over continuance of the Geneva talks has been received recently by the respective desk officers.

In countries that have recognized Communist China no survey has been made of reactions to continuance of the Geneva talks.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–956. Secret. Drafted by Kahmann (FE/CA). A copy was sent to Lockhart (FE/P) and Phleger.