370. Letter from Johnson to Sebald1
Thank you very much for your thoughtful and generous letter of November 4. I know that you fully appreciate my problems, but I must say I could not ask for better support. As I have told McConaughy previously, and have repeated here to the Secretary and Herman, I feel my instructions have consistently been excellent and have enabled me to go to meetings with a feeling of confidence in having sufficient elbow room to meet any likely situation. However, as I also told Herman, I would be very happy if someone else were dealing with this renunciation of force item. Prisoners was a subject upon which I could really get my hands and bulldog, but with renunciation of force I sometimes feel as if I am punching at clouds or grabbing at eels which slip out just when I think I have hold. However, I will try to do my best.
It is hard to tell what will happen in the next few weeks. As far as substance is concerned, there is quickly not going to be much more to talk about. It is going to simply come down to a refusal by them to renounce force against Taiwan and our insistence that they do so. I am convinced they are not going to do so unless they get something they want very badly. The Foreign Ministers’ meeting is obviously in this category but whether even this would be sufficient is somewhat doubtful in my mind.
It will then come down to whether they are willing to keep these talks going for their own sake. This might be the case, and the louder that Taiwan screams about their continuation, the more it serves to convince Chou that it would be useful to keep them going.
[Typeset Page 514]Another aspect is that even if they desire to break off the talks, I believe we have them in a position that makes it difficult for them to do so. They will realize that we would be able to present it as a refusal on their part to renounce force, which would carry with it implications that would be difficult for them to handle.
[Facsimile Page 2]As you can see from my telegrams I still feel it is a mistake to bring up implementation at every meeting. On the one hand it tends to become routine (I have run out of any new ways of saying it), and on the other hand I think it is counterproductive in that it makes it a little harder for them to release them. However, I think we should take advantage of every opportunity to put the heat on them through U Nu, Nehru and others. I know, however, that I am in a minority of one on the former point.
I am having serious personnel difficulties in Prague and, hence, I have been trying recently to get up there as often as possible to lend a hand, but it is becoming more difficult with the uncertainties of flying here in the winter and the curtailed schedules.
Tell Walter Robertson that he need not worry that I will ever do anything rash with ideas that are exchanged in personal letters with any of you. I would hope that I could continue to correspond on a purely informal basis, as I have in the past, and pass ideas back and forth without commitment by anyone.
Tell McConaughy I have, just as I was writing this, received his letter of November 8 and will not be writing him today.
My best to all.
Sincerely,
American Ambassador
P.S. I have just read Hong Kong’s despatch 579 of October 3 on the release of Buol. I would be interested in knowing from our friends whether there is any probable basis for the report Buol mentions that three Americans missing from the 1951 Li Mi operation are imprisoned.
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal.↩