Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

367. Telegram 1135 from Geneva¹

Geneva, November 10, 1955, 10 p.m.

1135. From Johnson.

1. I opened twenty-fifth meeting today with discussion of privacy of talks. I acknowledged Wang’s letter (Contel 1115) and told him I could not agee that his side bore no responsibility for London Daily Worker report. The Daily Worker article contained first report concerning substance of talks in their present stage and constituted full exposition of Chinese Communist position. It could have originated only from his side.

2. I said that as result of article, rash of speculation had broken out in press. I would have been justified in making public position our side but did not feel this in interests of talks. Have made every effort discourage further press speculation.

3. I said that in spite of my efforts speculation has continued. I had hoped he would have found it possible take action that would quiet this speculation.

4. I said that we must keep in mind distinction between discussion national policies by governments and either of us making available to reporters substance of talks. His press, radio, and public officials have been making statements on aspects of national policy some of which impinge on substance of talks. I did not raise question in that regard. I considered that quite different from publishing specifics of talks between us here.

5. I said my government’s officials also make statements concerning national policies but they carefully refrained from making available to press substance of discussion in this room. He should note that Secretary Dulles, in October 18 press conference Wang had referred to in his letter, carefully avoided discussion substance talks.

6. I then read excerpts from Secretary’s October 18 press conference dealing with talks.

7. I said Secretary had said absolutely nothing but what was known or made available by Wang’s side. Fact trade embargo and higher level meeting had been raised was made public by his side September 14. It was well-known fact even before talks started that US desired discussion renunciation of force. Secretary merely confirmed these were subjects of talks and refused enter into substance of meetings.

8. I said I cited this because I wanted him to understand how carefully we tried keep agreement concerning privacy of talks. We were disturbed by last sentence Wang’s letter, in which he apparently indicated intent make farther information available to press. I asked whether this was in fact intended.

9. Wang replied he had made his position clear in his letter. He could not accept charges I had made. In fact, it was his side that was dissatisfied regarding secrecy of talks.

10. Wang said at beginning of talks he had taken stand talks should be open. I had proposed secrecy, and as concession his side had accepted. Subsequently understanding reached that prior to public statement either side, other side should be informed. Thus it would be possible have full exchange of views to find solution to disputed matters.

11. Wang said his side has always followed this line. Chinese press has commented only matters on which agreement reached or which were made public. Has never gone into substance of talks.

12. Wang said members of his group engaged in talks have had no contacts with press. Nevertheless there had been disclosures to press. He wished to cite a few cases. Following meeting of October 27, at which his side put forward draft agreed announcement, press began to talk about important statement by Chinese side in which Foreign Ministers conference was envisaged.

13. Wang said that even this morning he had noted story in November 8 New York Times quoting official American sources and reporting principal ideas his draft and US position. There were many more examples he could cite.

14. Wang said his side turned down all requests for interviews with press and even refused pose for pictures. He was dissatisfied with what appeared in press. This applied even to story in London Daily Worker. He could not accept responsibility for story many points of which not satisfactory to him.

15. Wang said even Dulles in press conference I had quoted from had mentioned that in talks we were engaged in discussions renunciation of force. He considered this disclosure of what was going on in talks.

16. Wang said there had been distorted press reports concerning proceedings here and that his side could bear no responsibility for these. His side was therefore considering clarifying its position.

17. I said that I was glad he had mentioned press reports following October 27 meeting. I did not question his statements concerning his relations with press. He may be unaware of situation. I would mention it only in privacy of this room, but NCNA correspondent who stands outside this room has for long period of time had remarkably accurate information what goes on inside. He has not been discreet in discussing this information with other correspondents. I was not ten minutes back in my office after October 27 meeting when Western correspondents indicated NCNA correspondent had said Wang had presented important statement renewing proposal for higher level meeting.

18. I said I and members of my staff refused discuss report with press. Nevertheless, places me in difficult position. I was completely satisfied that this and other reports have often come from same source.

19. I said I had not seen November 8 New York Times report. If it contained details of his proposal, it was doubtlessly obtained from Daily Worker article. As for Daily Worker article, it clearly did not originate with us.

20. I said rather than continue discussion this subject, could we not agree do our best prevent press speculation. I did not intend make statement or reply to Daily Worker article. However, if Wang made statement as intimated in letter I of course reserved my right make reply.

21. I said I hoped we would not be reduced debating in public. Progress so far due in large part to fact we able discuss frankly without public debate.

22. I said I did not recall that Wang had proposed open talks. I did propose private talks but did not recall any counter-proposal from Wang. Did Wang reaffirm his agreement to private talks?

23. Wang replied that he could not accept my statement concerning NCNA correspondent. He often received telephone calls from Western correspondents who said American delegation had said something and reporters asked for comments. He had never made any reply to such inquiries.

24. After October 27 he requested assistance NCNA correspondent in tracing leak, but reporter responsible for information refused disclose source. It was thus groundless to charge origin of leak was on his side.

25. Wang said concerning November 8 New York Times story he did not regard it as objective attitude on my part to presuppose origin of story without having read it. Writer of story attributed it to “US officials”. It could not be concluded that these officials were staff of London Daily Worker.

26. I asked him whether he intended issue statement.

27. Wang replied that distorted reports make it necessary consider this step.

28. I asked whether this constituted notification statement would be issued.

29. Wang said the matter was under consideration.

30. I asked whether I would be notified prior to any statement.

31. Wang said he could not say at the present moment.

32. I said that I did not intend to issue a statement unless he did, in which case I reserved my right to make a reply.

33. Wang next presented a prepared statement on renunciation of force. He said two months had passed since agreement on agenda item one. Following agreement his side had introduced two subjects: embargo and higher level meeting. In view of our raising question of renunciation of force, he had submitted on October 27 a draft agreed announcement recommending settling disputes between China and US without threat or use of force in accordance with provisions of UN Charter. In order to materialize this principle draft proposed convening conference of Foreign Ministers to settle through negotiation question of relaxing and eliminating tension in Taiwan area.

34. Wang said after repeated efforts on his part my response so far had not been satisfactory. At last meeting I had raised question whether his draft incorporated renunciation of force to achieve national objectives, as I had proposed. Such general term as national objectives confuses internal with international disputes.

35. Wang said in practical terms renunciation of force to achieve national objectives constituted demand his side renounce sovereignty and recognize status quo of US interference internal affairs and occupation China’s territory of Taiwan.

36. Wang said in regard to Taiwan, China’s national objective is to liberate island. This lies within framework of China’s sovereignty and internal affairs. China has repeatedly stated that conditions permitting it will strive liberate Taiwan by peaceful means. Means by which Taiwan is liberated, however, is matter China’s internal affairs and US has no right interfere. This cannot be made subject Sino-American talks.

37. Wang said on other hand US national objective Taiwan area is to continue encroachment China’s territory of Taiwan and continue interference Chinese internal affairs. US has already used force and threat of force attain such aggressive national objective.

38. Wang said I had skipped over this fact and refused discuss such concrete issue as withdrawal US armed force Taiwan area. At same time US has demanded through use of general term national objectives China recognize status quo in Taiwan area, continued US encroachment Chinese territory Taiwan and US interference in Chinese internal affairs. This can in no way be complied with.

39. Wang said at last meeting I had asked whether intent of his draft was that force not be used except in self-defense. Taiwan is Chinese territory and US use of force in that area places China in defensive position. Just as China cannot go to Honolulu to put up defenses in respect to US, so US has no grounds put up defenses in Taiwan area in respect to China.

40. Wang said in spite this situation China proposes settle through higher level negotiation question relaxation and elimination of tension in Taiwan area. If it is intent that China and US settle disputes in Taiwan area by peaceful means, this intent finds expression in his draft agreed announcement. However, if it is intent that China renounce exercise sovereign right over Taiwan and recognize US encroachment, this simply will not do.

41. Wang said I had suggested that point was not whether a situation was internal or external but whether force prejudiced international peace and security. His side could not accept confusion of domestic and international issues.

42. Wang said everyone knew Chinese people had liberated mainland and many coastal islands including Hainan, in process of which they had not at any time threatened international peace and security. On contrary, victory had indisputably promoted stability of situation in Far East and made immense contribution to international peace and security. On other hand, US had encroached on Taiwan and interfered with liberation Taiwan and coastal islands, giving rise to situation which threatened international peace and security.

43. Wang said it was for sake of safeguarding international peace and security that he had proposed Sino-US meeting on higher level to settle through negotiation question of relaxing and eliminating tension in Taiwan area. Yet I had at last meeting objected to linking agreed announcement to conference of Foreign Ministers.

44. Wang said this is proof US intent is to require his side to renounce exercise sovereign rights in regard to China’s Taiwan and to accept status quo of US encroachment on Taiwan and interference in China’s internal affairs by armed force. He wished categorically to repeat that his side could not agree to this.

45. Wang said he had stated before that mere statement of principle force will not be used in relations between China and US without providing steps to realize that principle would make US inconsistent in words and deeds, would not contribute settlement tension in Taiwan area, and would be likely give rise to misunderstanding that China admitting to US encroachment in Taiwan and interference in China’s internal affairs.

46. Wang said he had on many occasions raised question of withdrawal of US armed force from Taiwan area. However, I had failed to make any answers this proved entirely necessity of holding conference of Foreign Ministers.

47. Wang said at last meeting I had said that response to question of embargo must depend on degree of agreement on renunciation of force. The policy of embargo was itself unreasonable and hence must be lifted. That was exactly his intent in the question of embargo and that is unanimous demand of people of whole world. If US after using force in encroaching on Taiwan should further demand China recognize status quo and renounce liberation of Taiwan before US side would consider lifting embargo, his side could not accept.

48. Wang said his draft agreed announcement represented great effort seek concretely apply UN Charter to the situation. If our side were genuinely desirous of peaceful settlement there is no reason why our side could not agree to his draft agreed announcement.

49. I replied that he had properly pointed out that it is now two months since agreed announcement on return of civilians was issued. Only two of those who remained in prison at that time have returned. At this rate it presumably would be 17 months until all have returned.

50. I said that by no stretch of the imagination or any interpretation can this be considered “expeditious” or fulfillment of commitment made by his government in agreed announcement.

51. I said continuation of this situation would inevitably influence my government’s view of reliance which can be placed on commitments made by his government and thus profoundly influence other aspects of our talks.

52. I then presented prepared statement on our counter-draft agreed announcement as follows:

A. I have listened carefully to your statement this morning. My government has also given careful study to draft agreed announcement which you gave to me at our meeting of October 27. It has also taken into consideration our discussions of subject at our last two meetings. I am taking into consideration your statements this morning.

B. It seems to me that we are in agreement that differences between our two sides shall not lead to armed conflict. However, as I said at our last meeting, this is subject too vitally important to our two peoples and to peace of the world to leave to cloudy language that may mean one thing to one side and something else to other side. I consider it essential that we both not only fully understand each other but that any form of words that we use publicly to announce whatever understanding we reach be absolutely clear.

C. In studying your draft it does not seem to me this purpose is fully accomplished. For example, while you cite in your draft some of sound and fundamental principles of international conduct set forth in Charter of United Nations, it is quite clear from our discussion that we have differing views with respect to applicability of these particular principles to situation in Taiwan area. As I noted at our last meeting, there are also other United Nations principles which may be considered also to have applicability to that situation. There are many other equally appropriate citations in United Nations Charter and other international documents. However, it does not seem to me profitable to attempt to cite or include in any public statement upon which we may agree all of provisions of United Nations Charter or other documents which may be applicable to situation.

D. I do consider it important that we make perfectly clear in whatever we agree publicly to say, that without prejudice to our differing views or policies with respect to the situation in the Taiwan area, we are determined it shall not lead to armed conflict.

E. I think it also desirable that whatever we say we make it clear that neither one of us is renouncing right of individual and collective self-defense, which is recognized by United Nations Charter.

F. Also, as I said at our last meeting, I do not consider we can condition our enunciation of such fundamental principle upon any particular form of negotiation between our two countries. I repeat statement which I made at our meeting of October 8, that such declarations would make it appropriate to pass on to discussion of other matters with better hope of coming to constructive conclusions. I have already indicated my willingness to hear your views with respect to what you term trade embargo if following our issuance of such declaration there are other matters properly within the scope of our talks which you desire to bring up, I will also be prepared to discuss them with you.

G. You and I have agreed that our differences in Taiwan area should not lead to armed conflict. We are also in agreement that public statement should be made in this regard. I have therefore prepared draft which I believe fully takes into account views of both sides and clearly expresses this intent.

H. You will note from this draft that, although my original proposal had in mind separate declarations, I have adopted your suggestion of agreed announcement similar in form to that which we made on September 10.

I. You will also note from this draft that I have taken account of the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as our differing views on the situation in Taiwan area. With particular reference to your statements this morning, you will note that this draft is carefully drawn so as not to require your government in making this statement to renounce or to prejudice its views in this regard. You will also note that draft specifically refers to right of individual and collective self-defense and that it provides for statements by the two governments to be identical. That is, it is not being suggested your government say anything but what my government is willing to say.

J. I would hope we could agree on this draft, issuance of which would mean so much not only for progress of our talks but for world longing for assurance of peace.

53. After reading draft in English original and having it interpreted Wang replied that he had some preliminary comments. We all recognized existence contradictions in policies and disputes between our governments. These disputes must be settled conformity accepted and recognized standards international conduct. That why entirely necessary as in his draft have specific quotations provisions United Nations Charter, indicating intent settle disputes accordance quoted provisions.

54. Wang said we were in agreement that public announcement should be made. However, he could not agree that issuance such announcement should be a prerequisite for discussion of other matters.

55. Wang said he noted that my draft omitted two paragraphs United Nations Charter he had quoted. My draft also omitted provision concerning holding of Foreign Ministers’ meeting. My draft contained reference to “national objectives”. As he had said this morning, such a catchall term as “national objectives” could solve nothing.

56. Wang said question arises what objectives are meant by term. In 1941 after Pearl Harbor United States joined in war against aggression on basis national objective which was self-defense. Use of force to achieve such national objective justified.

57. Wang said other national objectives concern domestic affairs of country. National objective of self-defense is quite just.

58. Wang said he noted that draft refers to United States self-defense in connection with Taiwan area. He could not see how United States has right to put up self-defense in Taiwan area.

59. Wang said that draft mentions desire settle disputes between two sides by peaceful means. This in conformity with main idea of his draft announcement.

60. Wang reserved further comment for next meeting.

61. Meeting ended at 12:10. Next meeting Thursday, November 17. Same press release.

Gowen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–1055. Confidential; Limited Distribution.