332. Letter 16 from Johnson to McConaughy1
Herman Phleger and I had dinner with the Secretary Friday evening during which we discussed the Chinese draft in a general and preliminary way but without coming to any conclusions. The Secretary has apparently not made up his mind on how he wants to handle it, and clearly wanted to have time to think about it, which was difficult with the extreme pressure on him of other events here. Therefore, in the telegram of suggestions for the next meeting, which I sent you on Saturday, I suggested that we not get into any detailed discussion.
The Secretary was also obviously very anxious that I get started on the trade embargo item, and, hence, my suggestion in that regard. I also want you to know that it was the Secretary’s thought that I should query Wang with regard to specific items on the CHINCOM list, set forth in the last sentence of my 999. I told him that I had serious doubts about the desirability of this, but put it up in my telegram as my own query so that the Department would not feel any inhibitions in commenting on it. I have talked to Goodkind about it but he was understandably very reluctant to commit himself on the policy considerations involved. He saw no objection from the purely technical CHINCOM standpoint.
It has been a big help to have Goodkind and Doherty here to get myself thoroughly briefed on all aspects of CHINCOM controls, as it is a subject with which I was not familiar in detail. I want to let both you and Walter know that, except for the foregoing background against which I sent my 999, it represented only my own thoughts and I deliberately avoided showing it to or discussing it with the Secretary, because I feel that he should have the advantage of thoughts and recommendations of you and Walter in each case before making up his mind. I do not feel it right that my [Facsimile Page 2] temporary proximity to him here should operate so as to cause him to give any undue weight to my opinions and without having FE opinions in front of him. This gets to be a little difficult, but I want you to know that I have it very much in mind, as I know he does. I am sorry that my 999 crossed with your 1053. I sent it priority quite early Saturday morning and do not understand why you did not have it prior to sending your 1053. However, I believe it worked [Typeset Page 459] out all right as the Secretary had both messages in front of him yesterday and he and Herman did up a Dulte on the subject to you.
The one specific question which I particularly desired to, and did, discuss with the Secretary and Herman Friday evening was this: As I told him, it seemed to me that in the context of our talks my continued reference to “other matters” which could be more hopefully discussed following a satisfactory renunciation of force statement included, in Wang’s mind, the presence of our forces in the Taiwan area. As I told the Secretary, I have very carefully avoided any specific statements and have carefully kept to simply the “other matters” formula. Wang has also not pressed me to be specific in this regard but he might well do so. In any event I want it to be clear in my own mind as to whether we would admit to discussion of the presence of our forces in the Taiwan area as an “other matter” if there were the satisfactory renunciation of force statement. Admitting to discussion, of course, would not carry with it any implication that we might be willing to agree with their demand for withdrawal or otherwise accept their point of view. However, I said it seemed to me that it would, as Herman phrases it, carry with it an implication of willingness to “bargain in good faith” and not simply sit and say “No”. I particularly raised the question as to whether any such discussion would be within the agreed scope of our talks or whether it would be something involving the rights and interests of the GRC and, therefore, outside the scope of our talks.
I believe the Secretary’s view can be summarized as follows: We cannot, of course, give any consideration, under present conditions, to withdrawal of all of our forces from the Taiwan area. Apart from any other considerations, the presence of at least symbolic forces is essential for the maintenance of morale on Taiwan. However, the United States has no desire to maintain forces in forward positions except as we consider essential in the light of our estimate of security situation in the particular area. This policy has been demonstrated by a reduction of strength in Korea and Japan. Similarly, the forces we maintain in the Taiwan area will be dependent upon our estimate of the security situation in that area. If the Chinese Communists unequivocally renounce force in the Taiwan area and otherwise demonstrate their peaceful intent, it could be expected we would give consideration to unilateral reduction in whatever strength is being maintained by us in the area. This would be a purely unilateral act on our part and not subject in any sense to agreement with the [Facsimile Page 3] Chinese Communists. Such decisions on our part do not involve the rights or interests of the GRC nor our agreements with the GRC. Therefore, “discussion” of the subject with PRC in the light of the foregoing could be admitted to.
[Typeset Page 460]The foregoing is merely my reconstruction of dinner conversation in which the Secretary was simply thinking out loud, and I am passing it on to you simply in that context.
The Secretary has taken with him on his trip to Madrid today the renunciation of force file, including the PRC draft and the Department’s draft. One aspect of the PRC draft that I am not clear on how I am going to handle in debate is that the 4th paragraph is very cleverly and carefully confined to disputes between PRC and the US. Thus, it is strictly within the agreed scope of our talks. What we want, of course, is for their renunciation to include the GRC, including Quemoy and Matsu. How do I justify this within the agreed scope of our talks? Is this not something which involves the rights and interests of the GRC and PRC-GRC relations? Another factor that occurs to me is if the PRC has renounced force as between itself and the US, how could it attack Taiwan as long as US forces are there without clearly breaching its renunciation of force with the US? Of course this leaves Quemoy and Matsu out. The Foreign Ministers’ Conference is, of course, easy to handle as they are in an insupportable position in attempting to make any renunciation of force conditional upon the Foreign Ministers’ Conference.
I am sure of only one thing: there is room for much and long discussion during which I will need all the ideas that you can give me.
Sincerely,
American Ambassador
P.S. I have just read & briefly discussed with Herman your Tedul 42. Herman very much feels I should not introduce any [illegible in original] draft at this meeting & that we can [illegible in original] factors mentioned in para 2 Tedul 42 by circulating our original statement on renunciation of force. However, as Secretary does not return until late tonight we will not be able to obtain his decision until tomorrow morning.
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. Johnson signed the original “Alex.” The postscript is handwritten. A handwritten note on the letter indicates it was received on November 2.↩