Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

50. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 28, 1955, 11:25 a.m.¹

Washington, January 28, 1955, 11:25 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Situation of Off-shore Islands

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister
• Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
• The Secretary
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

Dr. Yeh said it seemed necessary to make some announcement about the Tachens very soon. The Communists had started emplacing long range artillery on Ichiang Island (Yikiangshan) which they had recently captured. They could shell the Tachens from there. He realized that the situation for the U.S. Government was delicate, with debate in the Senate on the Joint Resolution still in progress. The Chinese Government did not want to embarrass the Administration. Still he felt he should warn us that the Tachen situation was becoming more precarious.

The Secretary said that we had to consider the effect of any public announcement on the ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty, as well as on the Joint Resolution.

Dr. Yeh said he envisaged the following sequence of events: (1) the “regrouping” operation; (2) ratification of the Treaty; (3) mutual consultations under the Treaty.

The Secretary said that this Government does not now contemplate mentioning Quemoy and Matsu by name in a public statement. He thought it would be preferable to adhere in general to the language of the Resolution and refer perhaps to positions “related to the defense of Formosa”. The Secretary mentioned that the Chinese statement should not imply that the Treaty is already an accomplished fact. It should be remembered that it is not yet ratified.

The Secretary thought that the Chinese should be cautious about making any assumptions about the Treaty. The Treaty might not be passed for two or three weeks. Committee hearings on the Treaty would probably start February 7. There might be an extended debate on the floor of the Senate. The issues brought up in the debate on the Resolution might be picked up and repeated in the course of floor debate on the Treaty.

Dr. Yeh said that he assumed that the Resolution will have been passed by the time any Chinese statement is made. The Resolution could be used as a basis.

Dr. Yeh said he wanted to bring up a second matter: Could the Tachens not be denied to the Communists? He thought we should consider whether the UN should not be asked to keep a civil administration there, without complete demilitarization of the islands.

The Secretary said he thought this would be very tricky business. If such a principle were accepted it might be argued that it should be applied to Quemoy and Matsu also.

Amb. Koo said he was thinking of a Chinese civil administration under UN protection.

Mr. Robertson thought this too would establish a bad precedent.

The Secretary said we were trying hard to accomplish one thing and one thing only through the UN action—namely, to induce the Chinese Communists to stop fighting. The effort was to get the Chinese Communists to go back to the pre-September 1954 situation. The off-shore islands situation had been generally quiescent for about 5 years, since the Chinese Communists had been repulsed by the Nationalists when they assaulted Quemoy in October 1949. Any other question as to the general area would simply get you in trouble, possibly leading to arguments over UN jurisdiction, which might prompt someone to raise a proposal for UN trusteeship over Formosa.

Mr. Robertson said undoubtedly that line of approach was full of dynamite. The UN action should call only for cease fire as to the off-shore islands. If the Chinese Communists received such a call before withdrawal from the Tachens, the request presumably would cover the Tachens.

The Secretary said if a UN Resolution were passed before the evacuation was completed, there might be some degree of UN protection. It might then be possible to retain the Tachens with a civil garrison. But he did not think the Chinese Communists would accept any substantive UN jurisdiction over the question.

Mr. Robertson said it was standard Chinese Communist tactics to launch a big offensive before an anticipated negotiation. This had been done in Korea and in Indochina. The U.S. has never thought the Chinese Communists would comply with a cease-fire request as to the off-shore islands.

The Secretary said nevertheless we felt the New Zealand initiative would put the Communists on the spot and help the U.S. and Chinese positions. The move was partly invented by the U.S., for this reason.

Dr. Yeh asked if we knew anything about a rumored new Eden plan for relinquishing the off-shore islands to the Chinese Communists and setting up a “two China” situation?

The Secretary said we knew nothing about any such plan.

Mr. Robertson thought this newspaper report might have developed from a speech which Mr. Eden made before the House of Commons a few days earlier.²

The Secretary said that the British and others would be willing to turn over the off-shore islands to the Chinese Communists. The Kefauver substitute resolution³ was based on the thesis that the U.S. had an established interest only in Formosa and the Pescadores, and this stemmed from the victory over Japan and the fact that Japan had not transferred sovereignty over Formosa to any other country. Under this thesis Presidential action should absolutely be limited to Formosa and the Pescadores. The ADA thesis and the British official view ran along similar lines. This was not the view we accepted. It had been agreed with the British and the New Zealanders that the UN action would not be based on any agreement as to the status of the off-shore islands or the rights of the contesting parties. The UN action would simply put it to the Communists whether they are willing to stop the fighting in the off-shore islands and go back to the situation existing before the shelling of Quemoy.

Dr. Yeh said he had a third matter to raise:—the UN cease-fire proposal. Pres. Chiang felt it was bad from a psychological warfare standpoint to withdraw from the Tachens on the eve of the UN move. It was tantamount to agreeing to let the Communists have the Tachens. Would it not be better to hang on until a cease-fire move could take effect or at least be considered?

The Secretary said he did not think there would be any cease-fire. He thought the issue would be kicked around in the Security Council for quite a while, possibly with no decisive result. The Communists would claim there was no UN jurisdiction. They would keep up a fuss. He thought the Chinese should announce immediately upon passage of the Joint Resolution that they were making a military withdrawal from the Tachens. The Joint Resolution would constitute a make-weight to throw in the scales on the favorable side. He said he would not pay much attention to the likelihood of favorable UN action. He thought if the Chinese missed a chance to offset the bad effect of the evacuation with the added strength and determination which could be derived from the Joint Resolution, they would have nothing later with which to counteract the letdown of the evacuation.

Amb. Koo asked if the President or the Secretary plan to make a statement?

Dr. Yeh hoped a statement, if made, would characterize the prospective redeployment of the troops on the Tachens as a move to enhance the strength of the Formosa defense.

The Secretary said he thought something along this line could be done. He hoped that the Resolution would be passed tonight or tomorrow. It looked as if the opposition was beginning to crumble. The President might make a statement on Monday after signing the Resolution. The Secretary said “We will bear your interests in mind.” He wanted the Chinese representatives to remember that he thought it was a good idea “to get out the bad news when you have good news to cover up with”. He suggested that the Chinese Government not let the situation draft. He said we wanted to throw some strength into the balance “when otherwise a bad morale problem might exist”.

Dr. Yeh said that President Chiang thought the UN Resolution should contain some sort of condemnation on the Chinese Communists. He remarked that if the Chinese forces held the Tachens, the Chinese Communists would undoubtedly hit them again, thus committing a new aggression.

The Secretary said he anticipated that a regrouping operation would take about two weeks. He suggested that the regrouping be tied in with either the Joint Resolution or the statement of the President. Dr. Yeh hoped that the President could indicate that in view of the circumstances now prevailing, the U.S. has decided to help the Chinese Government defend Quemoy and Matsu. “Would the American Government do this, or would it remain mute?”

The Secretary said he could not say. He thought the President might want to let actions speak for themselves. There were some disturbing developments mentioned by our intelligence, including a new Chinese Communist artillery buildup on the Fukien coast near Matsu.

Amb. Koo asked if there would be any objection to a Chinese statement that a civil administration would remain on the Tachens, and that Chinese military forces would be withdrawn as a peaceful gesture?

The Secretary questioned whether the withdrawal should be put on this basis. He thought it was better to put it on a basis of a regrouping for tactical reasons. It was desirable not to let it seem that the Tachens were voluntarily relinquished to the Chinese Communists. He thought it might be well to leave a Chinese Nationalist civil administration there. Then the Communists could only move in by force. They could not simply take over by default.

Mr. Robertson said in that event the Chinese Nationalists would not be renouncing their rights to the Tachens. They would not abandon them, but would only regroup their military forces.

Dr. Yeh said the Secretary apparently wanted the Chinese to avoid naming Quemoy and Matsu. The Secretary said, “in your formal statements, yes”. He said there was no formal agreement or commitment between our Governments as to this area. There was no agreement the Chinese Government could hold the U.S. Government to. It is the present U.S. intention to assist in the defense of those islands. But the Chinese Government should not through its public statements get the U.S. in the position of apparently having made a formal commitment. The U.S. Government might have to deny such an implication. Unofficial Chinese quarters could speculate on this. The entire record of the debates in Congress shows that the President has very broad authority to use U.S. forces as he considers necessary in the “related area”. This is a matter of public knowledge. But he felt there should be no indication of mutual commitments to defend any specified places in the area outside Formosa and the Pescadores in any official statements, either U.S. or Chinese. The responsibilities which the U.S. was assuming were voluntary and unilateral. The Secretary said he had told Congress that he felt we could not draw an absolute geographic line, or publicly state what islands were considered important and what islands were not important. If you say a place is not important, a new Communist buildup often makes it important. The Secretary said that he had told Congress that we would regard any significant Communist buildup in the area as of concern to the United States.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1–2855. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy. The time of the meeting is from the Secretary’s appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. Reference is apparently to remarks by Eden in the House of Commons on January 26 in which he distinguished sharply between the status of Formosa and that of the offshore islands; for text, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, vol. 536, cols. 159–160.
3. The substitute resolution, introduced by Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee and defeated on the Senate floor on January 28, recognized the President’s authority to employ U.S. armed forces for the specific purpose of defending Formosa and the Pescadores from armed attack but did not authorize the defense of related positions and territories; for text, see Congressional Record (84th Cong., 1st Sess.), vol. 101, pt. 1, p. 981.