217. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Developments Over Week End Relating to Chou En-lai’s Negotiation Proposal.
Word of Chou En-lai’s offer at the Bandung Conference to negotiate with the United States on relaxing tension in the Far East, including the Taiwan area, reached the Department early on the morning of Saturday, April 23. The Acting Secretary called a meeting of Departmental officers to consider the matter at 9:30 A.M. While a draft statement was being worked out, word was received from Presidential Assistant Hagerty that the President might wish to make a statement on the matter. Mr. Hagerty gave the Acting Secretary the text of a statement (Tab A)2 which he proposed to recommend that the President issue from Gettysburg, where he was spending the week end.
After some discussion of the matter in the Department, Mr. Hoover strongly urged Mr. Hagerty not to advise the President to issue a statement. Mr. Hoover pointed out that the Chou En-lai statement was merely issued as a press release by the Chinese Delegation at Bandung. The British had commented on it only through a Foreign Office press release. It would dignify the statement unduly for the President to comment on it directly. Mr. Hoover suggested that a statement, substantially as drafted by Mr. Hagerty but with certain changes recommended by the Department, be issued as a Departmental press release. After some further consideration of the matter Mr. Hagerty agreed to the drafting changes suggested by the Department and also agreed that it should be put out as a Departmental press release. The statement (Tab B)3 was issued to the press [Page 508] at 12:30 P.M. on April 23. It was telegraphed priority to Djakarta and Taipei, and also was sent by USIA to all our principal posts.
Subsequently messages were received from Cumming which quoted the reports of Romulo and Mohammad Ali on their meetings with Chou En-lai (Tabs C4 and D5). A reply to the latter telegram was sent to Cumming on April 24 stating that we do not intend to go beyond the press release of April 23 at this time, and indicating our interest in any additional information regarding Chou’s position which Ali might be able to obtain in further conversations (Tab E).6
Comment:
Chou’s proposal apparently was designed to leave the Bandung conferees with the impression that Communist China, without modifying in the slightest its basic demands for the “liberation” of Taiwan and the liquidation of the Government of the Republic of China, had gone more than half-way in a constructive effort to relax tensions over Taiwan. It was designed, as were the Chinese Communist tactics at Geneva, to establish a basis for throwing the onus for Far Eastern tensions on the United States, thus enabling the Communist propagandists to utilize the fear of war as a means of isolating the United States.
Initial reactions from abroad indicate at least partial success for Chou’s tactic. Bandung conferees were reportedly “stunned” by this “reversal” of Chinese Communist policy. The British reaction, while reflecting skepticism about Chou’s real intentions, makes it likely [Page 509] that allied reaction to a “negative” American attitude toward the proposal will be at best one of mild disappointment. Various foreign reactions are summarized in Tab F.7
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/4–2555. Top Secret.↩
Hagerty’s proposed draft statement reads as follows:
“The President has been informed of the press reports concerning the statement of Chou En-lai at the Bandung Conference. The United States always welcomes any sincere efforts by any nation desirous of bringing peace to the world. In the Formosa region we have an ally in the Free Republic of China and of course the United States would insist on Free China participating as an equal in any discussions concerning the area.
“If Communist China is sincere it could now take several steps which would clear the air considerably and give evidence before the world of its good intentions. It could immediately release the American airmen and others who are being held unjustly within the country and it could place an immediate cease-fire in effect in the area.”
↩The statement reads as follows:
“The Department of State has received press reports concerning the statement of Chou En-lai at the Bandung Conference. The United States always welcomes any efforts, if sincere, to bring peace to the world. In the Formosa region we have an ally in the free Republic of China and of course the United States would insist on free China participating as an equal in any discussions concerning the area.
“If Communist China is sincere there are a number of obvious steps it could take to clear the air considerably and give evidence before the world of its good intentions. One of these would be to place in effect in the area an immediate cease-fire. It could also immediately release the American airmen and others whom it unjustly holds. Another could be the acceptance of the outstanding invitation by the Security Council of the United Nations to participate in discussions to end hostilities in the Formosa region.”
↩- Telegram 2792 from Manila, April 24, not attached to the source text, transmitted the text of a message of April 23 from Romulo to Magsaysay, concerning the luncheon meeting that day with Chou En-lai, which Magsaysay had given to Ambassador Homer Ferguson. (Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/4–2455)↩
- Telegram 2006 from Jakarta, April 23, not attached to the source text, reported that Cumming met that evening with a member of the Pakistani Delegation who had passed on a message from Prime Minister Ali that he had met several times and planned to meet again with Chou En-lai on the subject of Taiwan and was convinced of Chou’s sincere desire for Sino-American negotiations leading to a peaceful settlement. Cumming made clear his understanding that the United States “could not undertake commitments re negotiations as to disposition off-shore islands without reference to Chiang whose control of islands we recognize”. He recommended that the Department send a message at once to “prevent confusion or misunderstanding during these crowded last hours of conference.” (Ibid., 793.00/4–2355)↩
- Telegram 1837 to Jakarta, April 24, not attached to the source text. (Ibid.)↩
- Not printed.↩