Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

65. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, March 19, 1955—4 p.m.

3980. For the Secretary.

1. As you know, I have been studying for some time question of elections in Vietnam under Geneva Accords. Some time ago, I designated members of my mission to work up a study of this subject in conjunction with Embassy political section. This study is being forwarded by despatch² in order that our thoughts may be made promptly available to group in Department which, I understand, is likewise working on problem.³

2. I would like to outline in this message my personal judgments as to procedure we should recommend to Vietnam Government and broad outline of policies which we should advise them to follow.

3. Diem Government should seize initiative from Viet Minh and announce very shortly that they are in full support of genuinely free elections designed to unite all of Vietnam. They should express full confidence that if truly free elections are held Communist regime of Ho Chi Minh will be defeated. They should express willingness to participate in preliminary discussions commencing in July, which would lead to the conduct of elections in July of 1956. For the moment, however, Vietnamese Government should scrupulously avoid committing itself to any specific details arrangements.

4. Form and status of Government of South Vietnam as it is likely to develop between now and July 1956 must be considered in connection with question of elections under Geneva Accord. It would be advantageous if before July 1956 a fully elected assembly, and a government responsible to it, could be in operation in South Vietnam. Practical considerations, however, will probably rule out any such development, even though Diem Government has indicated its intention to proceed along that line.

5. Decree has been adopted by government providing for provisional assembly, partly indirectly elected and partly appointed. It is proposed that life of this assembly be limited and that it be succeeded by elected constituent assembly. Prime Minister Diem had said he does not believe he can resist pressures to form constituent assembly for longer than about six months after provisional assembly is formed, chiefly because sects want to take full advantage of their present strength and not allow government time to weaken them seriously before relative representation in assembly has been determined.

6. It appears that provisional assembly will not be set up and functioning before June 1955. If this assembly has only six months of life, plans for constituent assembly would have to be completed and an election held during last half of 1955, when Vietnamese will presumably be negotiating with Viet Minh on elections to be held under Geneva Accord in July 1956. Once constituent assembly has been formed, it would have to draft constitution dealing, among other matters, with thorny question of “permanent” form of government and “permanent” role of Bao Dai. Leaving aside question of whether constitution, once completed, should be submitted to people for ratification, constituent assembly, under normal procedures, would have to be succeeded by an elected legislative assembly, from which government would be formed. Since provisional assembly will apparently have been in process of formation for not less than six months, and that without holding a general election, it seems unrealistic to suppose that South Vietnam could create both a constituent and a legislative assembly, involving two general elections, draft a constitution and set up a government in its permanent form in time remaining before July 1956. Moreover, an attempt to crowd all these undertakings into next fifteen months, given inexperience and present lack of cohesiveness of south, would probably create more confusion and arouse more partisan differences and bitterness than South Vietnam can afford at a time when its best energies should be available to meet threat offered by negotiation with Viet Minh.

7. An additional point of substance in this connection is that if Vietnamese Government were engaged in formulation “permanent” political institutions while at same time it was negotiating with Viet Minh ostensibly to reunite the country, it might lay itself open to charges of duplicity which might carry weight with the powers represented at Geneva, particularly France and UK.

8. Accordingly, I believe we should advise Vietnamese not to attempt basic revision of their governmental institutions before July 1956. This might mean that formation of constituent assembly would have to be postponed until after date scheduled for elections under Geneva Accord. On the other hand, we should encourage Vietnamese in every way to strengthen government in its present form and to make provisional assembly as representative and effective as circumstances permit.

9. In discussions commencing this July, Vietnamese Government should propose and adhere to a formula approximately as follows: since North and South Vietnam will each have its own government in operation in July of 1956, elections at that time should have two objectives: to permit people express their will with respect to unification and to select delegates for convention which would determine form and conditions of union. North and South Vietnam must have equal representation in this convention. Conclusions of convention should be approved by two-thirds majority.

10. Consideration should also be given to introducing requirement that final act of convention would have to be approved separately by existing governments of North and South Vietnam. There are certain disadvantages to this latter proposal. It might be interpreted by the free world as a definite attempt on part of South Vietnam to block any union, or it might be accepted by Communists as a weapon in their hands to prevent union in the unlikely event convention should recommend a unified non-Communist government. An advantage of this proposal is that it would probably be completely unacceptable to Viet Minh and thus could serve as a definite “stopper” to any final action should [that?] prove necessary.

11. During convention, South Vietnamese could debate a whole series of issues pending development of situation which might lead to establishment of unified non-Communist government for all Vietnam. If latter should not be feasible discussions could continue until convention reached a state of inertia. Meanwhile, separate governments of North and South Vietnam would remain in operation.

12. In preparation for discussion to commence this July, US should firm up its position along lines of above formula, or some other specific proposal. We should strengthen present US Embassy staff in Saigon with one or two technical experts who have had experience in such matters, and who can be available to advise Vietnam Government.

13. In addition, I feel it would be well to secure services of some non-American technical expert, who might be hired by Vietnamese Government to work actively and openly with Vietnamese Delegation. This person preferably should be a national of one of the countries not signatory to Geneva Accord or Manila Pact.

14. Above ideas are sketched in broad outline only. Study forwarded by enclosure to Embassy despatch 297, March 17, discusses various aspects of this problem in more detail and may be useful supplement to excellent intelligence report number 6818 prepared by DRF.⁴

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Collins

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1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3–1955. Secret. Repeated for information to Paris.
2. Despatch 297 from Saigon, March 19, not printed. (ibid.)
3. Apparently the reference is to a draft of an NSC paper, “U.S. Policy on all-Vietnam Elections”, March 4, which was being prepared in S/P by Stelle. (Ibid., PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, S/P Record Copies, Jan.–May 1955) This draft was submitted in March to other members of the Department for their comments. (Memorandum from Fried to Stelle, March 10; ibid., S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5519)
4. Not printed. (Ibid., INR Files)