Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

63. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, March 16, 1955—11:16 a.m.

4009. Your 3697² omits mention basic reasons why usual flow rice from South to North interrupted. Has Free Viet-Nam imposed restrictions normal flow? Is question foreign exchange involved? Appears solution proposed reference telegram based assumption normal free trade impossible. Hanoi 910³ refers continuing and increasing nonstrategic trade. No US policy opposes free movement nonstrategics in reasonable quantities for consumption North Viet-Nam.

Our initial reaction is proposed program costly and of dubious value Free World especially in absence reasons why normal trade not being or could not be utilized.⁴ What would be reaction South Viet-Nam people offer free rice to North? What your estimation might be accomplished with program of substantially lesser scope?

We doubt value propaganda result as: a) Growing public knowledge inability any Communist regime feed its people produces favorable propaganda theme for West, particularly among people affected. Alleviation economic ills Communist area by use US funds seems inconsistent unless some balancing advantage anticipated. Do not anticipate such advantage would result from any scheme acceptable Communists, b) Alleviation economic ills Communist Viet Minh might lead to corresponding adverse effect on position Viet-Nam Government, i.e., Viet Minh enemy would be strengthened and that strength used against Free Viet-Nam.

Arguments in favor might be (a) free world unilaterally depriving people Viet Minh area subsistence food, (b) if Viet Minh deprived food could be forced attack Free Viet-Nam. However, we anticipate Communist breach of peace will be at time Communists choose and when Communists believe they can succeed.

FYI Burdensome surplus rice Burma in excess Viet Minh needs constitutes potential source of supply. Burma has contracted sell Chinese Communists 150,000 tons this year. If supply from Burma to Viet Minh is via Chinese Communists would be cause concern since would establish unnatural trade pattern. End FYI.

We recommend you discuss with Diem and his advisors to determine Free Viet-Nam position regarding resumption normal rice trade with Viet Minh area.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 851G.00/3–455. Secret. Drafted by Hoey and Jarvis and cleared with FOA, the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Treasury, and USIA and CIA. Also sent to Hanoi.
2. Document 54.
3. Dated March 10, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 851G.00/3–1055)
4. This reaction was based on a request by Hoover to FE for a policy recommendation to the OCB on this question. FE recommended to the OCB Working Group on Indochina that the plan not be supported for reasons made clear in telegram 4009 to Saigon. The OCB group agreed and telegram 4009 was sent Out. According to a note (author unidentified) attached to a memorandum from Hoey to Goodyear, March 17, Dulles said that unless he was given excellent reasons to the contrary, he did not favor the scheme. (Memorandum from Bishop to Robertson, March 9; ibid., OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Indochina, General, and memorandum from Hoey to Goodyear, March 17, with attachments; ibid., FE/SEA Files: Lot 58 D 266, OCB Material—1955)