Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

61. Memorandum From the Chief of the National Security Division of the Training Relations and Instruction Mission (Lansdale) to the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins)¹

Saigon, March 14, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Panier de Crabes, II²

1. At his request, I saw President Ngo Dinh Diem yesterday from 1700 to 1850. He said he was very tired and needed to talk to someone as a friend. Here are the highlights of the conversation.

2. Binh Xuyen

The Binh Xuyen worry the President more then the other sects, because they are in position to endanger the government. He asked General Ely on 9 March for tanks for the National Army, but has received no reply to date. Also, on 9 March, General Ely agreed to write the President a letter requesting the return of French Navy armed corvettes now in possession of the Binh Xuyen, which would permit the President to take these away from the Binh Xuyen; the President said that the Navy turned these over to the French police who turned them over later to the Vietnamese police who gave them to the Binh Xuyen. Diem has not received this letter request from Ely to date.

President has been trying to talk to Bay Vien. Has written him invitations twice during recent days, telephoned him, even had a date with him for 1530 on 12 March. Vien did not show up. 10 minutes before my arrival yesterday, Vien telephoned the President to say he had twisted his ankle and thus couldn’t see the President. The President had told him that this would be a private conversation between the two of them, on a nearby plantation if Vien didn’t want to talk in the Palace. Diem said he planned to tell Vien he would help him in his economic ventures, if they were not illegal or harmful to the national economy (such as opium traffic). Would also discuss the integration of Vien’s men into the National Army.

Robert told the President that the Sûreté under the Binh Xuyen were spending 50,000$ a month to several informant “nests”, but that information about the Vietminh was worthless. He suggested that this task be taken away from the Binh Xuyen or that another Sûreté be created.

3. Other Sects

Pope Tac is furious that Generals Phuong and The support Diem. General The showed his true colors when he obediently moved into position to block the Binh Xuyen Saturday. Diem said that The had been in touch with General Ty on this move, being worried that his troop movement might be blocked by the Binh Xuyen unless the Army supplied trucks quickly.

The, Hue, and Ngo were agreeable to a plan the President outlined to them: work projects for their men who are not integrated, two or three months at 300$ per man per month.

President has maintained firmly that Ba Cut is a rebel, to give the Army a firm position. In a cabinet meeting, Soai said that the Army had attacked Ba Cut and Ba Cut was only defending himself. The President asked Minister Minh if this were the truth. Minh was very slow in answering that the Army was attacked by Ba Cut. The President said he was pretty much alone in his position in the cabinet meeting, felt lack of support by Minh.

Soai usually gets prepared for action by writing complaints to the government, has done so for years. Recently, he has complained about the unfriendly actions of National Army troops. President sent these letters to Minister Minh to answer for the Army; Minh has not complied. Such complaints give Soai an excuse for action.

4. Minh

The President was disturbed by the actions of Minister Minh, particularly in calling meetings of other cabinet ministers and telling them that the situation was very serious. Such a meeting, right after the sect manifesto was published, was curious. The President called in Minh, told him he was 20 years older than Minh, and that Minh should be more rational in viewing the situation, which was like a battle front: some sectors breaking out, but other sectors having good conditions. Minh should not generalize, but should get to work on those sectors needing attention. The President offered the large meeting room in the Palace for any future meetings of ministers Minh wanted to hold, saying that if Minh were going to discuss such serious matters, the President would be interested in hearing of what would endanger the security of the nation.

The President is now putting his requests to Minh in writing and following them up, since Minh has not taken action on many matters, including plans for the security of Saigon–Cholon, seeing Lam Than Nguyen³ re possible integration, and many others which the President requested verbally. Also, when Minh talks about how serious the situation is, the President asks him if he has any solution and Minh admits that he hasn’t.

5. Communications

The President asked if the United States could furnish radio sets with a 20 km radius. He wants a radio net: Presidency–Defense–General Staff–1st Military Region. The Presidential radio furnished by Minh is a small French set, which can only be used for a short time, with contact for only a few minutes at 0900 and 1700. He is worried that his radio will be nearly useless in an emergency. He would like small generators to keep the sets operable in case of city power failure. His radio communications with the Center are sketchy, since the Center’s transmitter is frequently out of order.

6. General Ty

General Ty was being fed a lot of rumors that the President was unsure of him, might replace him any day. The President called in Ty, reassured him that he had full confidence in him, and that he would like to talk to Ty two or three times a week, even if it were merely social visiting. Ty replied that from the bottom of his heart he knew that he was not a superman, was loyal, and if the President desired he would leave at any time. The President feels that he has reassured Ty.

7. G–6

I asked the President his desires re the re-establishment of G–6. He said that he wanted this re-established, that much of the intelligence now being reported to the General Staff was rumor and rather foolish. I informed him that officers now available to me at TRIM for advising G–6 were the same French officers who advised G–6 in the past, and that I intended to use them for this purpose. He did not comment on this.

8. U.S. Actions

The President asked me several times if I could tell him anything new about the sects. First, I reassured him that we were aware of the situation and were studying ways and means of what the government might do. After a time, I told him that Ambassador Collins and General O’Daniel had decided to invite sect military leaders in for routine briefings at TRIM,⁴ as a means of taking some of present pressures off the situation, and to help him. I did not go into details.

I told him that I intended to inform the Ambassador of our conversation. He said that it was embarrassing for a government head to have talked the way he did to me, if it were government to government, but that he would leave it up to my judgement.

9. Comment

The President certainly was not over-confident nor optimistic when talking about the sects. He was most serious and concerned, but seemed to be thinking out the problem clearly. I believe it would be useful to show a little extra friendliness or sympathy in manner, if not in words, during the next two or three visits with him. The weight of the situation is starting to tell on him.

E. G. Lansdale
Edward G. Lansdale
Colonel
USAF

1. Source: Collins Papers, Vietnam File, Series VII, L. Secret. Also sent to General O’Daniel.
2. “A Basket of Crabs.” In an earlier memorandum to Collins of this title, dated March 13, Lansdale had used the phrase to characterize the South Vietnamese political situation. (ibid.)
3. A Hoa Hao leader.
4. These briefings are described in a memorandum from O’Daniel to Ely, March 17. (Collins Papers, Vietnam File, Series VII, O)