Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

252. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Reinhardt) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 31, 1955—8 p.m.

1027. Reference: Department’s telegram 681.²

1. Viet Minh circumspection in limiting post-Geneva activities in south to political action—leaving sabotage, terrorism, and [garble] opposition to disgruntled Nationalist elements—has permitted Viet Minh to operate so covertly and unobtrusively that probably only they themselves can accurately estimate their capabilities. French and non-Government Vietnamese observers usually ascribe omnipresence and great strength to Viet Minh political organization (cf Embassy despatch 55.³) Vietnamese Government spokesmen (even including Diem) frequently cite Viet Minh political strength as chief factor precluding National Assembly elections within free Vietnam. Government comments are confused, however, by tendency on one hand play down Viet Minh strength in order encourage Americans and themselves; and on other hand lump all anti-Government elements without distinction as “lackeys of Colonialists, Communists and Feudalists.”

2. Viet Minh paramilitary (and stay-behind regular military) organization impossible describe satisfactorily because careful concealment. Army Attaché has transmitted to G–2 all reports received on this subject, including indications most provinces CVN, south of 17th parallel have approximately equivalent one company each of armed personnel in small, dispersed groups, with framework for organizing ASH companies; Binh Dinh–Phu Yen region having equivalent one battalion. Similar armed groups indicated SVN provinces but organizational picture unclear. Attaché officers feel VNA, despite best efforts, has not to date been able break up VM network of cadres left in place which designed to be filled out into units when and if needed; presumably projected strength is whatever VM feel will be needed for job. Paucity of information concerning VM strength and activities according this view probably results largely from tightness of VM security and their political influence over population.

3. Political organization has emerged to surface in form “peace” and “mutual aid” front groups, most publicized in Saigon–Cholon but known to exist in other areas. Other reported front groups, particularly in rural areas, include religious-social groups centering around local Buddhist temples (utilized because of relative immunity from close Government supervision) and agricultural associations. Latter may have been used to promote suspicion of and opposition to such government measures as agrarian reform program and invalidation of torn currency; which is example of apparently minor item threatening become focus of anti-Government sentiment among farmers until Government backed down. All these groups are obviously appropriate channels for applying pressure along basic present line of Viet Minh “political struggle,” i.e., demand for consultative conference and 1956 elections.

4. Regions reported most subject to Viet Minh political influence are poor sections Saigon–Cholon, ex-VM regroupment zones particularly Ca Mau and Plaine Des Joncs, foothill region between Annam and Haut Plateau, P.M.S. (reported more important as communications route and possibly resistance base than political action area), Bentre, Mytho, and Tudaumot provinces. However, this may well show only greater frequency of reports rather than actually greater extent of influence. Typical degree of reported influence is that in certain areas Bentre and Mytho local inhabitants refuse participate in anti-VM local government for fear of reprisals.

5. Viet Minh political organization proper is described as clandestine small-cell unit size-up, apparently relatively immune to anti-subversion and penetration efforts of national government agencies. Viet Minh “Politbureau” controlling at least Saigon–Cholon operations is most commonly reported to be located in rural area with easy communications distance of Saigon near Thudaumot or Cailay (according prevailing versions). Location of over all regional control agency (if such exists separately from foregoing) is unknown. Couriers to and from North Vietnam are said to travel by variety of means, crossing 17th parallel in refugee guise, on foot or in small vessels between coastal points.

6. Viet Minh personnel traveling in French aircraft made available ICC in connection Geneva agreements business allegedly also act as couriers.

Reinhardt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/8–3155. Secret.
2. In this telegram, August 26, the Department asked for information on Viet Minh capabilities in the South, including strength by region, description of political apparatus, and paramilitary organizations. (Ibid., 751G.00/8–2655)
3. Dated August 24, not printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/8–2455)