Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, C. D. Jackson records, 1953–1956

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler)¹

top secret

Boston, September 21, 1953.

Memorandum in re Surrendered MIG, Sept. 20/53²

1. In April, 1953, General Clark made an offer to pay to any pilot who would bring a modern operational combat-type aircraft in flyable condition to South Korea a sum of money. This offer was part of a world-wide psychological campaign, instituted in Korea as a place most likely of success. The offer as published in Korea in leaflets (in Chinese, Korean, and Russian) contained the following substantial points:

(1) offer of help to brave pilots of the enemy;

(2) guarantee of refuge and protection;

(3) names will be kept secret, on request;

(4) Far Eastern Command will reward $50,000 to any pilot who delivers a modern operational combat-type aircraft in flyable condition to South Korean territory. The first pilot who does so will receive an additional $50,000 bonus;

(5) instructions as to how to come to Kimpo Airbase. (Note: the pilot who surrendered this plane came in that way.)

2. The President’s original reaction to paying the $100,000 reward to the pilot was: (1) what about the technicalities of the armistice and international law; (2) we should pay the $100,000 as a matter of national honor; (3) we should withdraw the offer as to the future; (4) we might consider sending back the plane. He thought that the psychological effect of saying that we are not interested in more MIGs and offering to return the plane would be significant.

3. Radford proposed to send this message to Clark: “You are authorized to release without delay statement to the effect that Far East Command offer of payment for delivery of operational jet aircraft made on April 27 last is valid.”

His reasoning was that to carry through out [on?] the offer will have a significant psychological effect on the Soviets, which will not be able to know hereafter which, if any, of their pilots can hereafter be relied upon.

4. Smith stated that he unqualifiedly approved of paying the money to the pilot; that it did not contravene the armistice terms; and that he did not think it ran contrary to international law.

5. Wilson, Anderson, Stevens, Smith, C. D. Jackson, Radford, Carroll all supported the position of paying the $100,000. Radford, Carroll, Anderson, Stevens, Wilson (I think) felt we should leave the offer open.

6. The President wanted to be sure that the matter had been fully thought out; doubted if more pilots would now come forward in response to leaving the offer open; wanted to be sure that the State Department was sure of its position as to the armistice and international law; said he would support the decision indicated above, if made and carried out.

7. I reported the above to Radford. He said he would check again with Undersecretary Smith, and thereafter dispatch the message.

8. Radford suggested we should review in the National Security Council the question of what our course should be in the future as to continuing the offer for more MIGs, which could be withdrawn in the future at any time deemed desirable. He will send over to me the text of the leaflet and the messages, for consideration; possibly by the Council.

9. In summary, the conflict in opinions was: (a) an opinion that while we should pay the reward, we did so only because of our honor; did not want, or for psychological reasons should say we did not want, the MIG; should be willing to return it; and should cancel the offer for the future; thus evidencing that we did not regard the matter as important, whether or not it had a bearing on the armistice; (b) an opinion that we should keep open the offer as a possible inducement to other pilots to defect and thus have a potentially psychologically adverse effect on the enemy who would worry about all their pilots.

R.C.

1. This memorandum was attached to a note by Cutler to Jackson, Sept. 22, in which Cutler noted that the President was “unconvinced” by the recommendations described in this memorandum. For more on Eisenhower’s doubts, see his letter to Smith, infra.
2. At 9:24 a.m., Sept. 21 (Sept. 20, Washington time), a MIG 15 landed at Kimpo airfield near Seoul and the North Korean pilot asked for asylum, as well as the reward offered by Clark.