Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
priority

Tokyo, June 8, 1953—6:06 p.m.

C 62910. Ref: A. CX 62890.¹ B. Ltr, AGJ 370.2 (4 May 53) CJ–P, Hq Far East Comd, 22 May 53, subj: Revised Outline Plan EverReady.² This msg in 2 parts.

Part I.

a. In order to be prepared for the remote possibility that the ROK govt may take unilateral action due to curr armistice developments, I have reviewed existing directives in light of the curr sit (ref A) and have issued the instructions contained in part II.

b. All component comdrs are fully alert to the sit and their aprop plans have been revised.

c. These instructions to my component comdrs are being forwarded to you by wire, in order that you will have them aval for ready ref in the remote case it becomes nec to implement any portion of these instructions.

Part II

To: Commanding Gen, United States Army Forces, Far East; Commander Naval Forces, Far East; Commanding Gen, Far East Air Forces.

1. Eff date: The provisions of this ltr are eff for planning purposes upon receipt and for execution only upon my personal order.

2. References:

a. Ltr, AG 312.1 (29 Dec 52) JSPOG, Hq Far East Comd, 29 Dec 1952, subj: Ltr of instructions.³

b. Eight Army outline plan “Ever Ready”, 4 May 1953.

3. Assumptions:

a. That the UNC is committed to acceptance of curr proposed armistice agreements.

b. That the UNC will assume responsibility to assure compliance with provisions of such armistice agreements.

c. That the present ROK govt will be reluctant to acpt the terms of the armistice and this reluctance may produce any one of the folg conditions:

(1) ROK trps, while not overtly hostile, are not responsive to UNC directives. (Condition A).

(2) ROK govt and mil units proceed along an independent course of action. (Condition B).

(3) ROK govt, mil units or people are overtly hostile to UNC trps. (Condition C).

d. That present favorable relationships between UNC forces and the ROK Army may decline gradually or suddenly and the conditions described in subparas (1), (2) and (3) above may develop in sequences, or any one of the conditions may be precipitated on short notice. (Note: There is currently no accepted evaluated intelligence which indicates that such conditions will dev.)

e. In the event that the present ROK govt cannot be forced to acpt the armistice terms, an amenable ROK govt, with a reasonable capability of controlling and maj elements of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces, the national police, and the pers engaged in log support operations of the UNC, can be established.

f. That if conditions indicated in assumption e above prove not to be factual, the obligations under assumption b will take second priority, and the UNC will devote its maj effort to actions designed to insure its ability to maintain intact the maj mil elements of the UNC.

g. That, despite an armistice agreement, the Communists may attack at any time.

4. Plans:

a. Be prepared to take such measures as are deemed nec to insure the scty of UNC forces in the event an emerg is created by any action on the part of the Republic of Korea govt.

b. Take nec action to insure the integrity of UNC forces.

5. Missions:

a. Army Forces Far East.

(1) Continue presently asgd mission.

(2) Be prepared to implement Eighth Army outline plan “Ever Ready” on my order.

(3) Action to establish a UNC Mil Govt in the Republic of Korea will not be undertaken.

(4) Upon implementation of outline plan “Ever Ready”, KCOMZ will be attached to Eighth Army for opnl control.

b. Naval Forces, Far East.

(1) Continue presently asgd missions.

(2) Support the CG AFFE as required in the implementation of outline plan “Ever Ready”.

c. Far East [Air] Forces.

(1) Continue presently asgd mission.

(2) Support the CG AFFE as required in the implementation of outline plan “Ever Ready”.

d. For all commanders. When the conditions of outline plan “Ever Ready” as listed below are in effect, comdrs will take the folg actions:

(1) Condition A (passive resistance to UNC leadership and direction).

(a) Intensify intel coverage of all ROK govt and mil activities.

(b) Maintain scty of all UNC installations and facilities.

(c) Alert all UNC units for emerg action, in accordance with curr plans.

(d) Initiate action to reduce levels of supply for ROK forces.

(2) Condition B (overt violation of armistice agreement, but no maj hostile activity directly toward UNC trps).

(a) Remove ROK mil units and indigenous pers from vital UNC log installations in Korea.

(b) Close out non-essential log installations in Korea.

(c) Discontinue air and naval support of ROK forces.

(d) Prep to discontinue log support of all ROK mil forces.

(3) Condition C (maj hostile action directly against UNC forces). Be prepared to execute plans to evac Korea on my order.

6. Copies of these instructions will be furn only to members of your staff on a strict “need to know” basis. In the dissemination of these instructions to subor comdrs you are authorized to make such pertinent extracts as are deemed essential in the execution of your mission. Auth is herewith granted to make extracts of outline plan “Ever Ready” as are required. Sgd Mark W. Clark, Gen United States Army.

1. Dated June 7, p. 1149.
2. Letter not printed (Department of Defense files); for Outline Plan Everready, May 4, see p. 965.
3. Not found.