Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/3–2452: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief Far East (Ridgway)¹

top secret
operational immediate

Washington, March 15, 1952—7:44 p.m.

JCS 903687. From JCS.

1. We have considered HNC 1033² and agree that time is near to convince Communists of our determination to stand inflexibly on stated minimum positions with respect to the three unresolved major issues and in doing so to utilize fully the public backing of United States and Allied Govts. We recognize that your recommended action represents one approach. However, we feel that it may be more effective to present our minimum positions on the three unresolved major issues in a single package rather than on a piecemeal basis. Such an overall approach would possess certain advantages in that it would have greater impact, it offers equal, if not better, chances of acceptance by Communists, and, if rejected, would place the UNC in a favorable position vis-à-vis public opinion and international support should negotiations subsequently be broken off by Communists.

2. Broad outline of this approach could be generally as follows:

A. Expedite resolution remaining minor issues at sub-del level. Those not resolvable at sub-del level should be added to package indicated in subpara D (1) below. (Your final and irrevocable positions on such issues should be cleared with JCS prior to presenting them as such to Communists.)

B. As soon as minor issues are resolved or no further progress thereon at sub-del level appears possible and you are prepared to implement plans for reclassification and segregation POWs as set forth in JCS 902159,³ negots should be moved from sub-del level to plenary session.

C. At this plenary session review outstanding issues, seek to determine whether Communists have any new suggestions for resolving these issues, and assuming they do not, have UNC del propose on your behalf a mtg between yourself and two opposing cdrs. This proposal should be substantiated by ltr from you to two opposing cdrs to be delivered by UNC del. Your proposal for mtg should be in such terms as would readily permit return of negotiations to plenary session of dels if rejected. Date specified for such mtg to be such as to allow prior implementation of plans for reclassification and segregation POWs accordance subpara B above and announcement by you at such mtg along lines set forth para 2, JCS 902159.

D. At mtg of senior cdrs:

(1) You would set forth final and irrevocable positions on major issues as follows and on such unresolved minor issues as have been approved previously by JCS.

(a) No restrictions in armistice agreement on reconstruction or rehabilitation of airfields. (In this connection if armistice is achieved, jt declaration will be issued in Washington as envisaged in JCS 91600 and JCS 91602.)⁴

(b) Any one of folg alternatives, which we feel should be presented concurrently, concerning organization and composition of supervisory commission on which you can get agreement appears acceptable to US:

(1) As set forth in para 2 of JCS 902160,⁵ the “neutral” designation of supervisory commission be entirely eliminated and supervisory organization and inspection teams be constituted to consist of nations selected by each side regardless their combatant status in Korean hostilities or acceptability to other side. Under this proposal UNC would be free to select any countries whether or not partcipating in hostilities and Commies would have similar right to select any countries. In event Commies select USSR (or Communist China) as mbr it would then be mandatory that mbrs from our side include United States. View here is that while Soviet Union (or Communist China) entirely unacceptable in position of “neutral” there is no objection to Soviet Union as mbr of supervisory commission that is not identified as “neutral” provided United States is also mbr. Commission would then be composed of United States along with, for example, Sweden and Switzerland on our side, while on Communist side Poland, Czechoslovakia and USSR would be acceptable; or

(2) Along lines already agreed in principle on this issue, that is, composed of “neutral” (noncombatant) countries acceptable to each side, in which event UNC refusal to accept Soviet Union as mbr of “neutral” supervisory commission is absolutely firm as stated in para 1, JCS 902160; and

(3) Inspection behind lines of each side to be carried out by inspection teams composed equally of reptvs of belligerents from opposing side responsible to mil armistice commission as set forth in original proposal this subj made by UNC. (This proposal would only involve composition and organization of inspection teams and would not imply any renunciation by UNC of any such agreements as have thus far been reached between two sides on places at which teams will be stationed and duties and rights of such teams.)

(c) All for all exchange of POWs based on lists revised by having removed therefrom those POWs reclassified and segregated accordance JCS 902159 and presentation thereof to be along lines set forth para 2 that msg.

(2) In presenting foregoing final positions you should present all of them in such a manner that your position on each of these questions is inseparably related to your position on each of the other questions and Communists or public opinion will not be able to interpret action as willingness to concede on one question without Communist acceptance your position on others. Positions should also be presented so that it will be clear that they do in fact represent our final and irrevocable positions. However, in so doing you should also present these positions as fair and reasonable reconciliation of opposing points of view in interest of prompt attainment of armistice.

(3) You would express willingness forthwith to sign armistice on foregoing basis, and expectation that two opposing cdrs as parties principal will be able and willing to do same.

(4) If, as is likely, enemy cdrs demur and request time for consideration, your position would be that of complete willingness to meet with them at such time as they are prepared to reply to your proposals. In any such subsequent mtg between you and opposing cdrs or mtgs in plenary session of dels you would, as appropriate, reiterate positions set forth in first mtg. While responding to any reasonable requests for amplification or explanation, you would avoid being drawn into any extended debate.

(5) If Communists then flatly reject your package proposal your position would continue to be that it remains your final and best offer and that while you or UNC del continue willing to meet whenever Communists desire, you would refuse to be drawn into debate on individual points. It is important that our proffered package not become a new point of departure for negots on individual issues.

3. If Communists reject your proposal for mtg of opposing cdrs:

A. Actions indicated in para 2 D above could be carried out in plenary session; or

B. Appropriate parts of para 2 D above could be transmitted in formal msg from you to opposing cdrs.

4. In undertaking actions outlined you would be accorded full polit and dipl support of United States Govt. The details of this remain to be developed.

5. Request your comments. Pending receipt thereof final action on HNC 1033 is withheld.

1. This telegram was the result of Johnson’s and Lt. Col Matthews’ combination of the drafts of the Departments of State and Defense and the recommendations arising from the discussion at the State-JCS meeting of Mar. 12; see the memorandum of discussion, p. 82. The telegram was then discussed with President Truman, who approved it; see the memorandum, supra.
2. Dated Mar. 11, p. 80.
3. Dated Feb. 27, p. 70.
4. Both dated Jan. 10, pp. 13 and 14.
5. Dated Feb. 27, p. 71.