Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 338, “Korean Political Conference, June 1953”

The Commander in Chief United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, June 7, 1953—9:51 p.m.

CX 62890. AmEmb Pusan exclusive for Briggs. CGArmyEight exclusive for Taylor. CINCUNC (Adv) exclusive for Harrison. CGAFFE (Main) exclusive for Kendall. CGKCOMZ exclusive for Herren.

1. I am dictating this supplementary message flying back to Tokyo. As I have previously reported in the short message sent from Seoul,¹ I made absolutely no progress in my effort to persuade Rhee to take a reasonable approach to the armistice terms. I have never seen him more distracted, wrought up, and emotional. He told me he was not feeling well, was tired and that he had not slept all night.

2. I told Rhee I had requested to see him alone in an attempt to reach an understanding on the problems which confront us. I impressed upon him that my government is determined to go ahead and conclude an armistice on our May 25 terms, that agreement on the POW question is imminent and that there are only a few remaining questions to be settled. I told him that the President of the United States is dispatching to him a letter² which Briggs and I would deliver later in the afternoon. I reiterated the steps the US is willing to take to support the ROK, short of continuing the fighting to secure the unification of Korea.

3. I told Rhee that, inasmuch as an armistice probably would be consummated according to the terms which he has so often indicated would be unacceptable to him, I wanted to discuss with him the question of non-repatriate POWs particularly the Koreans, in an effort to secure his cooperation in their being taken over by the custodial commission. I explained that if he would cooperate in helping us explain to these POWs that my government would never be a party to their forceful repatriation, and with a little patience, those POWs who are determined not to return to Communism would be released to civilian status, the Koreans, if they so choose, in South Korea.

4. I explained that it would be better to concentrate these POWs on an island where the activities of the custodial personnel would be confined to a small area which would avoid any possible disturbances between them and the South Korean populace. Rhee interrupted and made crystal clear the following points:

a. That the US is making a great mistake in adopting these tactics of appeasement;

b. That the ROK government would never accept the present terms of the armistice.

c. That the ROKs would fight on, even if it meant suicide, and he would lead them.

d. That from any time hereafter he would feel free to take such steps as he deems appropriate.

I asked him to elaborate, but he was too emotional to do so. He did make one point with comparative composure in connection with possibility of consolidating Korean POWs. He said it would be much better to leave them where they are; not move them from present camps.

5. I asked Rhee if his statements meant withdrawing his troops from UN Command. He said not today or tomorrow, but he would feel free to take any action from now on. I told him how futile it would be for him to attempt to attack alone, for he would be unsuccessful and does not have the necessary logistical support, that it would result in destruction of himself and his country, and urged that he show the strong leadership he has displayed in the past and the kind his country expects of him now in such an emergency. He indicated that Korea would become another China; it is inevitable and he and his people may as well die now as later.

6. I indicated that Ambassador Briggs and I later would discuss a mutual defense treaty, as explained in the President’s letter. He showed no interest, said it is too late, that Korea could not survive as long as we leave the Chinese Communists on Korean soil.

7. As Briggs has reported to you, we delivered the letter. Briggs again raised the offer of the mutual defense treaty, and again Rhee indicated no interest.

8. I am not yet ready to believe that Rhee will continue the catastrophic course down which he is now heading, but it must be clear to you, as it is to me, that he has the capability of violating the armistice terms to the great embarrassment of the UN. As I have previously reported, he can do this by any one of a number of methods, with limited preventative action we can take. In this connection, Rhee told me today that he could not permit Indian troops in his country. He stated that he would be willing to give protection to the non-Communist members of the custodial commission and that if we had turned the custodial task over to a real neutral like Switzerland at least one of our difficulties would not have arisen. Rhee also said that the POWs will not submit to indoctrination by the Communists persuaders.

9. To summarize, Rhee was utterly unreasonable and gave no ground whatsoever. He himself is the only one who knows how far he will go but undoubtedly he will bluff right up to the last.

10. I see no solution at this time, other than to await developments.

1. The reference was to telegram GX 5715, Clark to JCS, June 7, 1953, in which Clark reported that he had met with Rhee, who was in lower spirits than ever before, and that he had made no progress. Clark discussed the offer of a mutual defense treaty, but Rhee expressed no interest and stated that he was prepared to take action as he saw fit if the United States signed an armistice. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)
2. Not printed, but see footnote 1, supra.